press. When the Congress considers that the President is asserting the privilege in inappropriate circumstances, it has many means of persuasion available to it. I note Senator Symington's reported testimony to this committee on Tuesday that "we are as much at fault as the executive branch*** we won't bite the bullet" to cut off appropriations until information is supplied. I might add that at times the Congress may not have asked for all the pertinent information which might readily have been given. Sometimes they blame the Executive for not furnishing that which has not been asked for or that which the Executive did not realize that Congress was interested in receiving.

It may not be amiss to point out that as the process of supplying information should be essentially cooperative and based on mutual trust, the Executive will probably tend to supply more information in executive sessions, if Congress accepts the administration's view on the confidential nature of any information. A wise and capable staff can be of considerable assistance to a committee requiring executive information in its deliberations. Such a staff can contribute to mutual trust between the committee and the Executive. I needn't mention to you, sir, that there was a period during the so-called McCarthy time when there was a good deal of suspicion on both sides.

I believe as I have indicated that Congress is entitled to more information than it has sometimes received. That is true, in my opinion today. Take our policy in Vietnam. The President has stated that we continue that tragic conflict in order to give the South Vietnamese "a reasonable chance." The administration should be called on to explain what "a reasonable chance" means and what American vital interests are involved. Such information is necessary to permit intelligent legislation on our policy in Indochina about which our people are so deeply concerned. I hope that the Congress will be successful in persuading the administration to supply this vital information.

Senator ERVIN. As I interpret your statement, you think that it would be a mistake for Congress to attempt to regulate this matter by specific laws.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, sir; I don't think it would be inappropriate for Congress to legislate on the subject. However, I don't think they can be fully successful in doing it. I think there must be a give and take. It is an area in which there is no specific line, and which has to be dealt with case by case. I think cooperation of the Senate and the Executive is of vital importance.

I mentioned the case of Senator Vandenburg because there was the case of a Senator that was then a Republican majority leader, with the Executive a Democrat, as you well know. So, cooperation is possible if there is an attempt at good will on both sides.

I do think public discussion of this issue can also have an influence. I think that the airing that you and the subcommittee are giving this matter can perhaps contribute to a better understanding on both sides.

Senator ERVIN. You say in your statement that, assuming Congress should undertake to enact the measure proposed by Senator Fulbright, certain aspects of that measure, particularly section 301, are

not workable. In other words, you raise the point that the witness is never fully apprised in advance as to all the information to be sought by a committee in a hearing and for that reason it is impractical for the President to assert the executive privilege before the hearing starts.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes; in my experience, I have been called on one subject, and an entirely different subject has been raised. And sometimes it may be a subject which is so sensitive that the person should have the right to be consulted in advance. And that is also true, I think, in the case of an individual whom the President thinks should not be called upon to testify on the subject in question, I think it would be undignified to make him appear personally. The President should send a communication to the committee.

Senator ERVIN. In your statement, you indicated that you have a very strong conviction that persons who are called upon by the President to give him advice in the formulation of his policies should be assured that their advice will not become a matter of public knowledge, in other words, be kept confidential.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, sir; I can think of cases in my own experience where I have been asked to advise the President, and I know that he has received advice in another direction, and I have tried to counterbalance that advice, I haven't necessarily thought mine was the final answer, but there were matters to which I thought the President should give consideration in order to balance it. Now, to have that go in the public record and have it always available for people to use against him, I don't think would be fair. And I don't think men would be apt to communicate so frankly with the President if they knew that every time they send a communication it might become public. I think as a politician, sir, there are times when you would want to be able to tell a close colleague of yours, some of your innermost thoughts which you wouldn't want to have on the record for all time. You might change your mind a month or two later. And it would be almost impossible for the President to get full and frank opinions from his close advisers if they are to be aired rather fully thereafter.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Florida indicated that he has to leave the committee, and would like to proceed first.

Senator ERVIN. That would be fine. I am delighted to have the Senator from Florida with us today. I know that he has been unable to be here because of other personal duties, but we are delighted to have him here now.

Senator GURNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We also have the McClellan hearings going on.

Thank you for your excellent statement, Governor. You raised the subject of Vietnam here, the war in Southeast Asia. And I thought I would like to pursue, perhaps, a line of questioning about Congress seeking information about the war.

For example, take a case where Congress tried to get information, say, from the appropriate department, from the State Department, or the Defense Department, on some aspect of the war. For instance, some years ago, there was a keen interest in what military supplies were being furnished by Russia or the Communist bloc nations in

Eastern Europe, how much POL, in other words, was flowing into North Vietnam from the Communist bloc. Or the Congress might want to know how many British vessels, or allied vessels for that matter, British or what not, were coming through the Port of Haifa. What about questions of this sort. Do you think that the Executive should refuse to give this information?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Offhand. I should think information that is available to the enemy should be given to the Congress. I can't think of any reason why it shouldn't be unless there is some particular circumstances in connection with the manner in which the information was obtained. I remember an article in a Chicago newspaper that broke the fact that we had received information regarding the movement of the Japanese fleet because we had broken their code. Sometimes information is obtained by means which one doesn't want to become generally known. Also, there are times when the Executive might not wish to give out the information because they don't want the enemy to know how exact their information is. But, generally speaking, the information which the enemy knows should be made. available to Congress without any question.

Senator GURNEY. I certainly would agree. And the reason I asked the question is, when I started in the House some years ago when you were Ambassador-at-Large, these were questions I asked of you, and I didn't get the answer.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would like to know the subject. I am not sure

Senator GURNEY. They were precisely the questions I pose now. Mr. HARRIMAN. I would like to check the record. I don't doubt your memory, but don't recall what the questions were. I always tried to report to the Congress very frankly.

Senator GURNEY. This was when you were briefing the House Members on the war in Vietnam. Occasionally, you came up to the Hill about once a month, to tell us what was going on in Vietnam.

And I raise the question, really, Governor, not to embarrass you, but to make the point that this is one of the reasons I suppose we have this bill here. Congress at times seeks information which it thinks is in information it ought to have, and very frequently the Executive is very reluctant to give it. And this is the problem we have that we are trying to press forward on.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is quite correct. And on the other hand, there are times when Congress has not asked for the information, and then has blamed the Executive for not supplying it, I have been on both sides. I am now on the side of Congress, but I have been on the other side. And if I have offended the other side, I regret it. Senator GURNEY. Would you say this. Possibly in many of these matters, the Executive tends to be over secretive with Congress? Mr. HARRIMAN. I think that is correct. I am willing to admit that I have undoubtedly erred in that direction in the past.

Senator GURNEY. I wasn't singling out any individual. I just merely wanted to get on the record that we do have a problem and I think we need to work together, both the Executive and the legislative branch on it in order to resolve the forumla, so that we can develop information which would be useful to both branches, so that they perhaps could better work together as coequals.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I agree with you fully. I do think that although legislation may be desirable, that we should make it plain that the Congress expects the President to exercise this executive privilege himself rather than have subordinate Cabinet officers exercise it. I know in the cases I speak of, when I refused to give information to the Senate on the security files, the President supported me. I think I was wrong, and I should have gotten the President's approval first. But he sustained me in my position.

Senator GURNEY. I tend to agree with you on that.

Mr. HARRIMAN. But that was a special case.

But I do think that the Vandenburg-Truman period of the Marshall Plan and NATO are worth considering as an example of what can be given freely. The NATO experience was a treaty which the Congress played a role in developing.

Senator GURNEY. Thank you.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Mathias?

Senator MATIAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with you in welcoming the Governor here. I think he is a distinguished American, and he has rendered a very remarkable service to his country.

I also notice that he refers to Senator Vandenburg. And the name of Senator Vandenburg has come up often in these hearings. Secretary Acheson referred to his ability to work with Senator Vandenburg. Senator Symington referring to the period when he was Secretary of the Air Force, mentions Senator Vandenburg. And I am also reminded that Secretary Acheson said that part of the problem was because Members of the Senate weren't quite as-he didn't say quite as good as they used to be, but that was the inference. And I am wondering about the quality that Senator Vandenburg had that made this communication possible, and which prevented the very kind of confrontation which is tearing us apart

now.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know. I can't psychoanalyze that one. I can say that he had extraordinary influence in the Senate and both sides. of the House, because he had been an isolationist and then he recanted in a very famous speech in January 1945. And so for that reason he had an influence with the more conservatives, since he used to be an isolationist, so-called-I don't like that word, it doesn't have a good connotation about it--but he had been an isolationist himself. That is only a comment on the Senator.

But he did take a lot of initiative. As I mentioned here, he invaded the President's prerogative. And I thought he was right in doing it. He insisted that the Marshall Plan administration be independent of the State Department-which, incidentally, was supported more by the Bureau of the Budget than by the Secretary of State, although the Secretary of State wanted general supervision of the Marshall Plan. That was No. 1.

And the other was that the President should nominate an outstanding businessman. He didn't think the Congress would go along with the legislation unless they had confidence that it would be administered in an efficient and effective manner.

And Hoffman was the man selected. And Vandenburg urged his appointment. Hoffman happened to be a Republican, but I don't

know that Vandenburg wanted to make it a partisan affair, it is just that prominent businessmen are usually Republicans.

Senator MATHIAS. Going back just a moment to this series of briefings that Senator Gurney mentioned in the House, when the State Department did provide for all Members of the House without regard to their partisan affiliation or their committee assignment, an opportunity to be briefed by high officials of the State Department, including Secretary Rusk and yourself, how do you feel about the President, if not in person, or at least by his closest deputies, briefing the Congress, and in that briefing getting some reaction from the Congress, so that becomes a two-way street, so that the Presidentand I think this would apply particularly to the Senate-so that the President does get, in effect, some advice from the Congress? Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't know exactly what you refer to. If you are suggesting that it is a question of whether or not Kissinger should be called by the committee, I think Dr. Kissinger should respond if he is called.

I had a similar position during the period of the Korean war. I was Special Assistant to the President to coordinate military and political affairs, during the Korean war for a year and a half. And I was called to testify before the so-called MacArthur hearing. And I was due to testify. But before I could testify I went abroad. So I submitted a brief. I see no reason why a man like Dr. Kissinger, who is very much involved in policymaking-should not be called before a congressional committee, I think a confidential counsel or private secretary or someone of that kind should not be called, but Dr. Kissinger is very much involved in international affairs, and some people indicate that he is assuming some responsibilities for President Nixon of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State is normally considered the most intimate adviser of the President on foreign policy, and he is called to the Congress. Mr. Acheson yesterday indicated that he didn't think Dr. Kissinger should be called because his office happened to be in the White House. When I was in that position I was glad to respond to a call by the Senate. And I think it would be appropriate for the Congress to have the benefit of Dr. Kissinger's testimony.

Now, there could well be many subjects

Senator MATHIAS. Let me paraphrase my original question, would it be any benefit for Dr. Kissinger to have my testimony?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think it would be very beneficial for anyone who is working with the executive branch to have contact with the Members of Congress who are involved, I think you can get a better idea of what is going on in a meeting like we have today, once in a while. I have always learned when I appeared before a committee. Senator MATHIAS What is the record on this? Let's work at NATO as an example. Was there this kind of consultation both ways prior to the establishment of NATO?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. I should have added, NATO really perhaps in the sense that the Senate was even more interested in NATO than in the Marshall plan, because NATO was a treaty. There was full discussion-I speak again of Senator Vandenburg, and members of his committee on NATO-in fact, if my memory is correct, Senator Vandenburg made the first speech-I think it was in May 1949