Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on ConsciousnessJohn R. Smythies, Robert E French Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness brings together leading neuroscientists and philosophers to explain and defend their theories on consciousness. The book offers a one-of-a-kind look at the radically opposing theories concerning the nature of the objects of immediate perception—whether these are distal physical objects or phenomenal experiences in the conscious mind. Each side—neuroscientists and philosophers—offers accessible, comprehensive explanations of their points-of-view, with each side also providing a response to the other that offers a unique approach on opposing positions. It is the only book available that combines thorough discussion of the arguments behind both direct and indirect realism in a single resource, and is required reading for neuroscientists, neurophilosophers, cognitive scientists and anyone interested in conscious perception and the mind-brain connection. - Combines discussion of both direct realism and indirect realism in a single, accessible resource - Provides a thorough, well-rounded understanding of not only the opposing views of neuroscientists and philosophers on the nature of conscious perception, but also insight into why the opposition persists - Offers a unique "dialog" approach, with neuroscientists and philosophers providing responses and rebuttals to one another's contributions |
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Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness John Smythies,Robert E French No preview available - 2018 |
Common terms and phrases
actually argue box in front brain Cambridge causal chain claim clock cognitive color conscious awareness deny Descartes direct awareness direct perception Direct Realism directly distal object distal physical objects distinction Dretske ence epistemic epistemological disjunctivism epistemological disjunctivist example excellent reason exist explain external objects external world foot French hold Huemer illusions inferential instantiated intermediate representations involved knowledge Lehar mediated mental metaphysical disjunctivism mind Morvan Naïve Realism neuroscience neutral monism noninferential justification objects of perception observer one’s ontological ordinary language perception and hallucination perceptual beliefs perceptual experience perspective phenomenal character Phenomenal Conservatism phenomenal space phenomenology Philosophy philosophy of perception present problem properties qualia qualitative red box reflectively accessible regress argument relation represent representational realism retinal image sense data sensory experience Smythies spatial theory of perception things tion true veridical perception visual experience visual perception Waterford Township