What the Home Builders and other real-estate groups have overlooked in giving their rosy presentation of the Baltimore plan is the better-than-average possibility that the plan will prove to be a Trojan horse as far as their own interests in housing are concerned. What a housing-law enforcement campaign does in the long run is expose the facts of slum life, and these facts, if they get into the hands of an active civic group like Baltimore's Citizens Planning and Housing Association, do little to bolster claims that the slums should be left in private hands. In Baltimore, at least, the campaign has given the public almost daily examples of the ways in which private investors exploit human misery in slum areas at the public's expense. Such examples are hardly likely to turn the . public against public housing. The Baltimore plan has awakened in Baltimoreans the realization that taxpayers as a whole underwrite the gilt-edged investments of slum-property owners. They have learned that 40 percent of their staggering city budget goes for the support of downtown slum areas that comprise less than 10 percent of the city's total area. They have become aware that property assessments in those slum areas have dropped $10,000,000 since 1938, with the result that Baltimoreans spend an estimated $14,000,000 more per year on their slums than they get back through real-estate taxes. Baltimoreans now know, in short, that they are dumping precious tax money down ratholes, and the knowledge has stirred them into action. In the spring of 1947 the voters of Baltimore turned down a $2,500,000-loan proposal to give the city funds to buy up large parcels of slum property for redevelopment purposes. But in November 1948, after a year of the public education that went with an intensified housing-law enforcement campaign, the same voters passed a $5,000,000 redevelopment loan by a large majority. More significant yet, the voters supported the slum-clearance plan while turning down a smaller loan for a new municipal stadium. That is one good reason for the assumption that attempts to make the Baltimore plan an end in itself will fail. The more the public learns of slum conditions, the less content it is to settle for a makeshift clean-up program. This is not to imply that the plan is not a good one. The Baltimore plan is the least that a city can do for its slum areas. There is no reason, save complacency, for a city's allowing a few private investors to milk dry an ever-widening portion of its residential area. Some of the money extracted from low-income families should be forced back into slum housing to maintain property values and safeguard public health and safety. And, as long as investors advertise their willingness to pay cash for dwellings condemned by city officials, there can be no doubt that there are profits in slum housing that should be tapped to help pay the bills for the disease, poverty, crime, and fires that make the slums a public burden. Utilized most effectively, the Baltimore plan offers any city a simple method of preventing the further spread of slum blight by compelling landlords to fix up marginal housing before it becomes hopelessly dilapidated. As for the housing too far gone for permanent restoration, the plan presents an inexpensive way to make the worst dwellings more nearly fit for human habitation by seeing .to it that both landlords and tenants live up to basic health and safety requirements. Baltimore fosters no illusions that it has the whole answer to slum problems. But it is prepared to show other cities what can be done temporarily to ease a situation that will certainly trouble Americans for generations to come. Mayor D'ALESANDRO. It has been said that housing and slum clearance are local problems and should be handled directly by the cities. and States without Federal assistance. I am not going to debate the theoretical merits of this question, but I will say that without Federal assistance nothing effective will be done, except in a few of the wealthier States. The areas which have the worst housing needs are those which are least able to help themselves. The problem is one of the most urgent domestic issues confronting the country. For the Federal Government to turn the whole matter back to the States and cities would represent an indefensible neglect of its proper responsibility for the national welfare. I have so far spoken mainly about public housing, because it has caused more controversy than any other aspect of the proposed legislation being considered by this committee. I do not, however, want overlook two other items included in this bill or in other pending gislation: redevelopment and middle-income housing. My support for public housing is not inconsistent with my belief hat private enterprise should be encouraged and assisted to handle as much of the housing and slum-clearance problem as it can. Private enterprise has not heretofore been able to operate in slum areas because of the high cost of existing properties and the difficulties involved in assembling an areas sufficiently large to be usable. Redevelopment, as proposed in title I of H. R. 4009, provides a formula to overcome these difficulties. Use of this formula should enable private enterprise to assume a portion of the job of slum clearance. The necessity for Federal assistance to redevelopment is illustrated by our experience in Baltimore. The Baltimore Redevelopment Commission was one of the first to be created in the country. Eight official redevelopment areas have been established, covering a total of about 400 acres. These areas represent only a portion of our total slum areas. Last November the city overwhelmingly approved a $5,000,000 bond issue for redevelopment purposes. This is the most that the city can afford, and yet it will serve to treat only one-or, at most, twoof the eight areas. H. R. 4009, if adopted, will, in effect, triple our resources and enable us to use private enterprise in tackling a real job of slum clearance. H. R. 4009 is primarily designed to assist low-income families. These are, of course, the families most urgently in need of assistance, but in centering our attention on this group we should not overlook the fact that there is a middle-income group above the public-housing level, but below the point at which private enterprise is currently providing decent housing. Certain additional legislation has been introduced into Congress designed to deal with this problem through either a liberalization of Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance or a system of direct loans to cooperatives and nonprofit corporations. I do not wish to comment in detail on this legislation other than to state that the United States Conference of Mayors heartily endorse its purpose. In speaking before the Senate committee on S. 138, I concluded with a number of recommendations for changes in the bill which were also advocated by other witnesses. I am very happy to note that practically all of these changes have been incorporated in the Senate bill and in H. R. 4009. The two bills are virtually identical except that H. R. 4009 authorizes 1,050,000 low-rent public dwellings in 7 years as against the Senate bill's 810,000 dwellings in 6 years. We believe that the higher figure in the bill before your committee represents a more realistic appraisal of the size of the problem, and we strongly urge you to hold to this figure. As you know, when the housing bill was debated in the Senate, a determined effort was made by a small group to cripple the bill through amendments. Many of these amendments appeared plausible on the surface, but, if adopted, they would have effectively blocked proper administration of the bill. Fortunately, all such amendments were decisively rejected in the Senate, but it appears probable that the effort to have them adopted will be renewed in the House. The bill as it now stands is in excellent shape. It is based upon several years of careful study of the problem and of past experience in administer 89451-49 -35 What the Home Builders and other real-estate groups have overlooked in giving their rosy presentation of the Baltimore plan is the better-than-average possibility that the plan will prove to be a Trojan horse as far as their own interests in housing are concerned. What a housing-law enforcement campaign does in the long run is expose the facts of slum life, and these facts, if they get into the hands of an active civic group like Baltimore's Citizens Planning and Housing Association, do little to bolster claims that the slums should be left in private hands. In Baltimore, at least, the campaign has given the public almost daily examples of the ways in which private investors exploit human misery in slum areas at the public's expense. Such examples are hardly likely to turn the public against public housing. The Baltimore plan has awakened in Baltimoreans the realization that taxpayers as a whole underwrite the gilt-edged investments of slum-property owners. They have learned that 40 percent of their staggering city budget goes for the support of downtown slum areas that comprise less than 10 percent of the city's total area. They have become aware that property assessments in those slum areas have dropped $10,000,000 since 1938, with the result that Baltimoreans spend an estimated $14,000,000 more per year on their slums than they get back through real-estate taxes. Baltimoreans now know, in short, that they are dumping precious tax money down ratholes, and the knowledge has stirred them into action. In the spring of 1947 the voters of Baltimore turned down a $2,500,000-loan proposal to give the city funds to buy up large parcels of slum property for redevelopment purposes. But in November 1948, after a year of the public education that went with an intensified housing-law enforcement campaign, the same voters passed a $5,000,000 redevelopment loan by a large majority. More significant yet, the voters supported the slum-clearance plan while turning down a smaller loan for a new municipal stadium. That is one good reason for the assumption that attempts to make the Baltimore plan an end in itself will fail. The more the public learns of slum conditions, the less content it is to settle for a makeshift clean-up program. This is not to imply that the plan is not a good one. The Baltimore plan is the least that a city can do for its slum areas. There is no reason, save complacency, for a city's allowing a few private investors to milk dry an ever-widening portion of its residential area. Some of the money extracted from low-income families should be forced back into slum housing to maintain property values and safeguard public health and safety. And, as long as investors advertise their willingness to pay cash for dwellings condemned by city officials, there can be no doubt that there are profits in slum housing that should be tapped to help pay the bills for the disease, poverty, crime, and fires that make the slums a public burden. Utilized most effectively, the Baltimore plan offers any city a simple method of preventing the further spread of slum blight by compelling landlords to fix up marginal housing before it becomes hopelessly dilapidated. As for the housing too far gone for permanent restoration, the plan presents an inexpensive way to make the worst dwellings more nearly fit for human habitation by seeing .to it that both landlords and tenants live up to basic health and safety requirements. Baltimore fosters no illusions that it has the whole answer to slum problems. But it is prepared to show other cities what can be done temporarily to ease a situation that will certainly trouble Americans for generations to come. Mayor D'ALESANDRO. It has been said that housing and slum clearance are local problems and should be handled directly by the cities. and States without Federal assistance. I am not going to debate the theoretical merits of this question, but I will say that without Federal assistance nothing effective will be done, except in a few of the wealthier States. The areas which have the worst housing needs are those which are least able to help themselves. The problem is one of the most urgent domestic issues confronting the country. For the Federal Government to turn the whole matter back to the States and cities would represent an indefensible neglect of its proper responsibility for the national welfare. I have so far spoken mainly about public housing, because it has caused more controversy than any other aspect of the proposed legislation being considered by this committee. I do not, however, want to overlook two other items included in this bill or in other pending legislation: redevelopment and middle-income housing. My support for public housing is not inconsistent with my belief that private enterprise should be encouraged and assisted to handle as much of the housing and slum-clearance problem as it can. Private enterprise has not heretofore been able to operate in slum areas because of the high cost of existing properties and the difficulties involved in assembling an areas sufficiently large to be usable. Redevelopment, as proposed in title I of H. R. 4009, provides a formula to overcome these difficulties. Use of this formula should enable private enterprise to assume a portion of the job of slum clearance. The necessity for Federal assistance to redevelopment is illustrated by our experience in Baltimore. The Baltimore Redevelopment Commission was one of the first to be created in the country. Eight official redevelopment areas have been established, covering a total of about 400 acres. These areas represent only a portion of our total slum areas. Last November the city overwhelmingly approved a $5,000,000 bond issue for redevelopment purposes. This is the most that the city can afford, and yet it will serve to treat only one-or, at most, twoof the eight areas. H. R. 4009, if adopted, will, in effect, triple our resources and enable us to use private enterprise in tackling a real job of slum clearance. H. R. 4009 is primarily designed to assist low-income families. These are, of course, the families most urgently in need of assistance, but in centering our attention on this group we should not overlook the fact that there is a middle-income group above the public-housing level, but below the point at which private enterprise is currently providing decent housing. Certain additional legislation has been introduced into Congress designed to deal with this problem through either a liberalization of Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance or a system of direct loans to cooperatives and nonprofit corporations. I do not wish to comment in detail on this legislation other than to state that the United States Conference of Mayors heartily endorse its purpose. In speaking before the Senate committee on S. 138, I concluded with a number of recommendations for changes in the bill which were also advocated by other witnesses. I am very happy to note that practically all of these changes have been incorporated in the Senate bill and in H. R. 4009. The two bills are virtually identical except that H. R. 4009 authorizes 1,050,000 low-rent public dwellings in 7 years as against the Senate bill's 810,000 dwellings in 6 years. We believe that the higher figure in the bill before your committee represents a more realistic appraisal of the size of the problem, and we strongly urge you to hold to this figure. As you know, when the housing bill was debated in the Senate, a determined effort was made by a small group to cripple the bill through amendments. Many of these amendments appeared plausible on the surface, but, if adopted, they would have effectively blocked proper administration of the bill. Fortunately, all such amendments were decisively rejected in the Senate, but it appears probable that the effort to have them adopted will be renewed in the House. The bill as it now stands is in excellent shape. It is based upon several years of careful study of the problem and of past experience in administer 89451-49-- -35 PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 12, 1949. Hon. PAUL V. BETTERS, United States Conference of Mayors. The city of Philadelphia is doing everything humanly possible to re-create here the best possible environment for living and working. Because of financial limitations, it will be necessary to have the assistance of the Federal Government if we are to achieve our high goal of civic improvement. In the program of redevelopment of old areas, Federal assistance will be necessary in helping to meet the cost. This same assistance must be forthcoming to solve the problem of production of an adequate quantity and quality of housing for all elements of our population, especially for families of low income. Better housing conditions and slum clearance, of course, would be reflected in the cost of the operation of our police and fire units. Bright, cheerful homes, and adequate space for recreational activities would go a long way toward reducing delinquency among the youth of the city. The method for giving us the required Federal assistance will be for Congress to determine. PAUL V. BETTERS, United States Conference of Mayors, BERNARD SAMUEL, Mayor of Philadelphia. DETROIT, MICH., April 12, 1949. Washington, D. C.: Housing shortage Detroit City, estimated at 50,000 families lacking own home, living in rooms, trailers, or with another family. Additional 48,000 dwelling units needing major repairs or lacking water or minimum sanitary facilities. Present waiting list eligible families for public housing 8,700 families is highest ever, despite efforts of local authority to discourage applicants. Expressways, slum clearance, playgrounds, and other public improvements already programed expected dislodge 10,000 families next 5 years, of whom estimated 6,000 eligible public housing. In addition, 6,500 families in temporary war and veterans' housing to be rehoused. Estimated 40,000 families in Detroit have annual income below $2,000 and additional 70,000 between $2,000 and $3,000. Thus, approximately 100,000 families eligible public housing. Immediate need for low-rent housing conservatively estimated 50,000 families. Now have 5,000 permanent public housing units. Seven thousand three hundred and seventy-six private housing started year ending March 1 were only 45 percent previous 12 months. Total new multiples for rent started were 635. Virtually no rental housing built since war rents below $80 per month, 85 percent of it rents $90 or more, median rent available homes over $100. Slum-clearance program essential to preserve city's tax base. City plan commission has designed 2,520 acres in need redevelopment. Present annual average tax revenue $864 per acre. If privately redeveloped would yield $2,304. Increase would pay city's third net project cost in 10 years. Public housing 10 percent shelter rent in lieu would amount to $700 per acre. Redevelopment 80 percent private, 20 percent public housing, would pay city's share costs in 12 years. Data juvenile delinquency, health, fire costs, and so forth, and more detailed data of above summary air-mailed to you today. PAUL V. BETTERS, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., April 13, 1949. United States Conference of Mayors, San Francisco housing shortage still acute. No exact data available but vacancies hard to find anywhere in bay area. San Francisco Housing Authority waiting list 3,521; 7,700 temporary dwellings and 1,750 low-rent dwellings fully occupied. Housing authority has removed over half of families ineligible because of incomes over income limits; is removing more each month. San Francisco realproperty survey 1939 revealed approximately one dwelling of every six was substandard. Ratio today probably about the same. Low-rent housing-market |