772 STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment cannot alter the clear statutory language of § 3309 (b)(1). I agree with the Court that these church employees are exempt under the plain language of that provision. See also Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F. 2d 366 (CA5 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-922. When the Court is confronted with the task of construing legislation of this character, there is special force to the rule that the plain statutory language should control and that resort to legislative history is appropriate only when the statute itself is ambiguous. Congress has a special duty to choose its words carefully when it is drafting technical and complex laws; we facilitate our work as well as that of Congress when we adhere closely to the statutory text in cases like this. Failure to follow that approach led this Court into what I regard as manifest error in its recent summary, per curiam affirmance in HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U. S. 1, a case in which the taxpayer's claim for exemption had equally strong support in the statutory text and, in my opinion, greater support in the legislative history than is true here. See id., at 19-23 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Today, although I agree that the Court reaches the result required by the text of the FUTA, I write this separate statement to emphasize that this result is not supported by the legislative history of the 1976 Amendments, nor is it consistent with the Court's contrary resolution of the parallel tax exemption issue in HCSC-Laundry. Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals in Alabama v. Marshall accurately characterized the judicial function in cases such as this: "If Congress desires to change the established exemption of unemployment compensation coverage for elementary and secondary parochial school employees, it is well within its ability to amend the law to reflect that desire by drafting a clear statement to that effect. But, it is not the responsibility or function of this court to perform linguistic gymnastics in order to upset the plain language of Congress as it exists today." 626 F.2d, at 369. REPORTER'S NOTE The next page is purposely numbered 901. The numbers between 791 and 901 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official citations available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. ORDERS FROM APRIL 20 THROUGH MAY 26, 1981 Appeals Dismissed APRIL 20, 1981 No. 80-851. PRINGLE V. TEXAS. Appeal from County Court of Hale County, Tex., dismissed for want of substantial federal question. No. 80-927. THOMAS V. CROUCH, JUDGE. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mo. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 603 S. W. 2d 532. No. 80-1303. POTOMAC EDISON Co. v. PENNSYLVANIA. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 491 Pa. 432, 421 A. 2d 214. No. 80-1441. KODGER V. SINGH. Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question. No. 80-1360. GENERAL ATOMIC Co. v. UNITED NUCLEAR CORP. ET AL. Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. M. Motion of appellant to defer consideration of the appeal denied. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this case. Reported below: 96 N. M. 155, 629 P. 2d 231. No. 80-5972. RUHL v. ALABAMA STATE BAR. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ala. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 391 So. 2d 1036. 901 |