No. 72-1047.

C. A. 5th Cir.

WEATHER WISE Co. v. AEROQUIP CORP.

Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari. Reported below: 468 F. 2d 716.

No. 72-5045. NAVARRO v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari. Reported below: 462 F. 2d 1091.

No. 72-5066. Ross v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari. Reported below: 464 F. 2d 376.

No. 72-5227. ORTIZ v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari.

No. 72-5625. EPPS v. NORTH CAROLINA. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS Would grant certiorari. Reported below: 15 N. C. App. 610, 190 S. E. 2d 722.

No. 72-5815. CROVEDI v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari. Reported below: 467 F. 2d 1032.

No. 72-5978. ANDERSON v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari. Reported below: 467 F. 2d 210.

No. 72-801.

Sup. Ct. Ariz.

ANDERSON v. CITY OF PHOENIX ET AL. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari. Reported below: 108 Ariz. 388, 499 P. 2d 103.

No. 72-967. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD Co. v. GRECO. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari. MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 464 F. 2d 496.

No. 72-923. BRIDGE V. NEW JERSEY. Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would deny certiorari on ground of mootness. Reported below: 120 N. J. Super. 460, 295 A. 2d 3.

No. 72-1022. POPOFF v. JOHNSTON. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 72-1027. IN RE GROSS. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 503 P. 2d 995.

Mont.

No. 72-1067. COLUMBIA STANDARD CORP. V. RANCHERS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT CORP. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 468 F. 2d 547.

No. 72-5707. BASSETT v. SMITH, WARDEN. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant certiorari. Reported below: 464 F. 2d 347.

No. 72-6002. CHEANEY, AKA OWENS v. INDIANA. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied for want of standing of petitioner. Doremus v. Board of Education of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would deny certiorari on grounds that petitioner, who was convicted of performing an abortion, is not a doctor and that the decisions of this Court in Roe v. Wade, ante, p. 113, and Doe v. Bolton, ante, p. 179, were confined to the condition, inter alia, that the abortion, if performed, be based on an appropriately safeguarded medical judgment. Reported below: Ind. N. E. 2d 265.

285

No. 72-5988. EISENBERG v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would grant certiorari for the reason stated in his dissent in No. 71-1656, United States v. Achtenberg, 409 U. S. 932. Reported below: 469 F. 2d 156.

Rehearing Denied

No. 72-5133. BUCHANAN v. TEXAS, 409 U. S. 814 and 1029. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.

INDEX

ABORTIONS. See also Appeals; Constitutional Law, I, 1, 5, 7;
VIII; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Stand-
ing to Sue, 1-2.

1. First trimester of pregnancy-Decision to abort.-For the stage
prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman's attending physician; the State may define
the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed
by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is
not a physician as so defined. Roe v. Wade,
p. 113.

2. Right to abortions.-A woman's constitutional right to an abor-
tion is not absolute. Doe v. Bolton, p. 179.

3. Second trimester-Maternal health-Viability-Potentiality of
human life. For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of
the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health
of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. For the
stage subsequent to viability, the State, in promoting its interest
in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother. Roe v. Wade, p. 113.

ABSENT DEFENDANTS. See Jurisdiction, 1.

ABSTENTION. See Abortions, 1, 3; Appeals; Constitutional Law,
I, 1; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Stand-
ing to Sue, 1.

ACCREDITED HOSPITALS. See Abortions, 2; Constitutional
Law, I, 5, 7; VIII; Standing to Sue, 2.

ACCURATE VOTER LISTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 10.
ACQUIESCENCE. See Boundaries, 1; Procedure, 4.

ADJUDICATION. See Administrative Procedure, 1-2; Interstate
Commerce Commission, 1-2.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. See also Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 1-2; Jurisdiction, 2.

1. Freight-car shortages-Commission procedure-Exclusion of
oral argument.-The language of §1 (14) (a) of the Interstate.
993

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE—Continued.

Commerce Act that "[t]he Commission may, after hearing .
establish reasonable rules . . . ." did not trigger §§ 556 and 557
of the Administrative Procedure Act requiring a trial-type hearing
and the presentation of oral argument by the affected parties; and
the ICC's proceeding was governed only by § 553 of the APA re-
quiring notice prior to rulemaking. United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U. S. 742. United States v. Florida East
Coast R. Co., p. 224.

2. Rulemaking procedure-Consultation with affected parties-No
adversary trial.-The "after hearing" language of §1 (14) (a) of
the Interstate Commerce Act does not by itself confer upon inter-
ested parties either the right to present evidence orally and to cross-
examine opposing witnesses, or the right to present oral argument
to the agency's decisionmaker. United States v. Florida East Coast
R. Co., p. 224.

AD VALOREM TAXES. See Constitutional Law, III, 2; Taxes,
1.

ADVERSE TESTIMONY. See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3.

AGENCY HEARINGS. See Administrative Procedure, 1-2; Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 1-2.

AIRCRAFT. See Procedure, 3; Taxes, 2-3.

ALABAMA. Courts, 1-2.

ALIBI TESTIMONY. See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3.

AMENDED BILL OF COMPLAINT. See Boundaries, 1;. Pro-
cedure, 4.

ANNUAL GROSS SALES. See Fair Labor Standards Act.
ANTIBIOTICS. See Antitrust Acts, 5-6; Patents, 1-2.

ANTI-RACKETEERING ACT OF 1934. See Unions.

ANTITRUST ACTS. See also Patents.

1. Electric utility company-Contracts with other suppliers-
Restrictive provisions.-The record supports the District Court's
findings that Otter Tail-solely to prevent the municipal systems
from eroding its monopolistic position-refused to sell power at
wholesale or to wheel (transmit) it, and that Otter Tail to the
same end invoked restrictive provisions in its contracts with the
Bureau of Reclamation and other suppliers, the court correctly
concluding that such provisions, per se, violated the Sherman Act.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, p. 366.