operate and I would be grateful if you would enlighten me in this regard. First of all, with respect to the difference between the Industrial Defense Program and the "less selective" Industrial Security Program, what is the nature of the services performed or products manufactured by facilities in the Industrial Defense Program?

Mr. YEAGLEY. I am not quite sure what you mean by the Industrial Defense Program. Do you mean the Industrial Security Program, the screening program ?

Mr. CULVER. You make a distinction, I recall, and the other witnesses between two programs, the Industrial Defense Program and the so-called less selective Industrial Security Program. Is that not correct?

Mr. YEAGLEY. No, I don't recognize the terminology "Industrial Defense."

The CHAIRMAN. State it in your own way if you drew a distinction between any two things.

Mr. YEAGLEY. I am sorry. I don't understand the question, Mr. Chairman. That is my trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. CULVER. What is the nature of the services performed or products manufactured, Mr. Yeagley, by facilities in the Industrial Defense Program?

Mr. YEAGLEY. Well, the words "Industrial Defense Program"

Mr. CULVER. Excuse me. Is this a distinction that is more appropriate and applicable to the program that Mr. Liebling of the Defense Department testified to?

Mr. YEAGLEY. Yes, this seems to be a problem that the Defense Department could answer better than I could.

Mr. CULVER. I understand. How many individuals would you estimate are presently employed in the facilities now currently being screened in the country?

Mr. YEAGLEY. I don't know.

Mr. CULVER. Are all such employees subject to the same screening criteria and procedures?

Mr. YEAGLEY. Yes, sir; if they fall within the Industrial Security Program under Executive Order 10865.

Mr. CULVER. Under a future program assuming that the proposed legislation is enacted in substantially its present form, would that assist you?

Mr. YEAGLEY. Yes, I believe it would. Of course, there are changes proposed in this bill such as extending the screening program to defense facilities as distinguished

The CHAIRMAN. Would this be the distinction? In this particular bill, the term "defense facility" is defined as distinguished from the one undefined that the Supreme Court found fault with. In other words, the bill is to cure and to satisfy and to comport with the Supreme Court decision.

Mr. CULVER. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if I might request that maybe Mr. Liebling could also take a place at the table and that might expedite the questioning, because I think some of the questions I have would perhaps be more appropriate for him and he would be the appropriate witness to give the response.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be all right.
Mr. Liebling, you may come forward.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF JOSEPH J. LIEBLING, DIRECTOR FOR SECURITY POLICY; WILLIAM SCANLON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY CLEARANCE REVIEW; AND CHARLES HAAS, INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Chairman, I have a series of questions here and I wonder if the appropriate witness could reply as they determine to be appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. CULVER. I wonder, Mr. Liebling, going back a moment, could you enlighten the committee concerning the difference between the Industrial Defense Program and the "less selective" Industrial Security Program and what is the nature of the services performed or products manufactured by facilities in the Industrial Defense Program?

Mr. LIEBLING. One of the major differences, of course, in the Industrial Security Program is the fact that the facilities under that program primarily are concerned with production of munitions and related services by contract in support of the Armed Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. They are related to war, in other words.
Mr. LIEBLING. Yes, these are war materials as such.
The CHAIRMAN. And they are innumerable.

Mr. LIEBLING. Oh, yes, quite. It is also specifically confined to an area where access to classified information is involved. Only 20 percent of the total Industrial Defense Program are in the field I just mentioned involving war materials, but the other 80 percent of the program deals with support facilities such as water, power, electrical, support facilities, and installations, and there are several others which Mr. Haas can elaborate on.

Mr. CULVER. That is sufficient for our purposes here today, I think. Could you estimate how many individuals are employed in the facilities, just a rough estimate?

Mr. LIEBLING. In which program?

Mr. CULVER. In both categories, the total number of employees. Mr. LIEBLING. The total number whether it is classified or not, just overall defense industries complex versus outside defense?

Mr. CULVER. Could you give the committee a rough estimate of the number of employees in the United States industry today that would be subject to the clearance procedure administered by your program under either category?

Mr. LIEBLING. The number of industrial personnel under the Industrial Security Program today with security clearances of all types is approximately 2.2 or 2.3 million persons. As far as the Industrial Defense Program is concerned, of course, none of these people are cleared except the 20 percent that I mentioned before who are also included in the Industrial Security Program.

Mr. CULVER. And the 2.3 million represents a rough total figure of the individuals employed in facilities in both categories?

Mr. LIEBLING. No, these are the cleared employees.

Mr. CULVER. I want to know the total number of employees in United States industry today under both categories of security designation

who are being subjected to the screening procedures administered by your Department. I hope I made myself clear.

Mr. LIEBLING. We have no overall figures of the total amount of people employed. However, as I indicated, 2.2 or 2.3 million have clearances under the Industrial Defense Program. These are subject to screening. I believe, based upon a sampling from Industrial Defense figures, there might be roughly 8 to 11 million employees of industrial security facilities.

Mr. CULVER. What in the other category, the number of employees? Mr. LIEBLING. I have no idea how many would be in, let's say, those involved in the particular type of dam or electrical facility.

Mr. CULVER. Can you give an estimate?

Mr. LIEBLING. No, sir. This would be the Department of Labor, I presume. They might have that.

Mr. CULVER. How about under a future program? Assuming that the proposed legislation is enacted in substantially its present form, how would this alter your total figure personnel wise?

Mr. LIEBLING. Again I must answer by saying we have not made any estimate of that, as I indicated in my last testimony. Of course, it would depend on the criteria and ground rules that you lay out and the administrative machinery that this bill would provide us with. It may increase slightly from 2.2 million to-as I say I can't give you an X figure as such, but it would not be that great because the administrative machinery would have to be provided where we would designate certain positions under the Industrial Defense Program as critical or sensitive and then we would put that under the category of the clearance requirement.

Mr. CULVER. Under the proposed legislation would the total number of people being screened be increased or decreased?

Mr. LIEBLING. Increased.

Mr. CULVER. How significantly?

Mr. LIEBLING. We have no idea.

Mr. CULVER. I was interested in your estimates of what additional cost might be represented when you have no idea of how many additional people are involved.

Mr. LIEBLING. You remember that last time I indicated that we have no indication of this because we don't know the extent of the administrative machinery or the scope of clearances that you would require by the bill. We know that there are 3,500 facilities involved in the Industrial Defense Program, but we have no idea of what percentage of that we would bring in.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask this question. What are you willing to undertake if this bill is passed by Congress?

Mr. LIEBLING. What are we willing to do?

The CHAIRMAN. I assume you would perform your duties and carry out the provisions of this act if it is made law?

Mr. LIEBLING. Oh, yes, undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't quite follow the purpose of these questions myself.

Mr. CULVER. I think, Mr. Chairman, if I am permitted

The CHAIRMAN. Let me put it this way. I understand that the gentleman is not satisfied with this proposed bill and I understand he is disappointed because these witnesses think it is a good bill.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully submit that that is an unfair inference. What I am trying to ascertain is something that I hope will be very useful to this committee as a whole and the Congress of the United States, if I might finish.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a great observation. I appreciate it and I apologize.

Mr. CULVER. I believe it important to try and understand a little bit more about how the administration of this program operates so that we can make an intelligent judgment on the wisdom of this bill and how it might possibly be improved.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman for the bill?

Mr. CULVER. I have not yet made a determination.
The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will be for it.

Mr. CULVER. I hope we can have a bill consistent with the national security interest and the Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. Not that we can satisfy you. That is all right.

Mr. CULVER. I think that is a judgment that is rather premature. The CHAIRMAN. I will apologize if necessary.

Mr. CULVER. Who owns and operates the facilities in the Industrial Defense Program?

Mr. LIEBLING. Who owns and operates them? Private and governmental.

Mr. CULVER. Exclusively.

Mr. LIEBLING. I would prefer Mr. Haas who is a specialist to answer this.

Mr. HAAS. A majority are privately owned and privately operated. There are Government-owned and contractor-operated plants as well. Mr. CULVER. Could you give me a rough percentage breakdown? I won't hold you to it necessarily.

Mr. HAAS. I would say less than 5 percent are Government owned, contractor operated.

Mr. CULVER. Thank you. Similarly with respect to the approximately 13,000 facilities within the Industrial Security Program, are all individuals in such facilities subjected to the same screening criteria and procedures?

Mr. LIEBLING. No, sir. Only those who would require access to classified information.

Mr. CULVER. AS I recall, the recommendation you made to the committee was that we should make an effort to narrow the sensitive categorization.

Mr. LIEBLING. We have it now defined that way.

Mr. CULVER. I know in some of the references to the legislation before us this recommendation has been made.

Mr. LIEBLING. Yes. As I indicated earlier, we would have to designate certain positions as sensitive.

Mr. TUCK. Would the janitor also be subject to examination? I would think that he would be in a better position to find out about defense secrets than anybody else would. The janitor carries out the wastepaper. Mr. LIEBLING. Yes, under the Industrial Defense Program, Mr. Con

gressman

Mr. TUCK. I am in favor of not allowing anybody to get these secrets. Mr. LIEBLING. In those positions that you just indicated under the Industrial Security Program

Mr. Tuck. I want to make it just as tight as we can make it under the law.

Mr. LIEBLING. We do, in fact, do it now.

Mr. TUCK. I have no sympathy for anybody that would destroy the Government of the United States or give out the defense secrets against our interests.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Liebling, how many facilities and how many screened individuals would be involved if the proposed legislation were enacted in substantially its present form and if executive authorities administered personnel screening procedures to the maximum extent authorized by the pending legislation? Do you still find it impossible to make a judgment?

Mr. LIEBLING. Yes, I would have to reiterate my previous answer. Mr. CULVER. What categories of facilities that produce goods anyplace in the Nation could not be subjected to the personnel screening requirements to be authorized by the pending legislation?

Mr. LIEBLING. Most U.S. plants would not be so covered. I would say those that would be involved are initially in direct support of industrial facilities that are producing military arms such as, let's presume, the water, power, and dam close by to the facility that would require generation, power units, and so forth, a rather critical item which would require the outside assistance of the particular facility that we are discussing under the program. This would be a critical area. In other words, you could not perform without this water power or generation for your electrical facilities in the area although they might be completely separate. So as I am saying, it is direct support for production of a military arm as such.

Mr. CULVER. As I recall, you made a recommendation in your initial statement to broaden the general categorization of the facilities affected. And I was wondering whether or not it is not true that if we employ the term "national interest purpose" that virtually every product today could be thought to have some "national interest purpose."

Mr. LIEBLING. In regard to broadening the "standard" for making security decisions my answer is "no." If you remember I also indicated that we would obviously use some pretty good sensible judgment in this proposed broadening in the criteria now in play where we define what particular type of facilities we would cover so that we would not use that. Legally, possibly, the Secretary of Defense would have the authority to broaden in these areas that you are alluding to, but it would be completely unlikely.

Mr. CULVER. It might be unlikely, but that is rather broad authority that he is being provided; is it not? Isn't that true?

Mr. LIEBLING. It is broad, but we have got to exercise some judgment. Mr. CULVER. That is right. I agree. We have to exercise judgment, both in the enactment of legislation as well as its administration. Under the proposed legislation would the personnel screening requirements apply to all, some, only a few, employees of the facilities that had been designated, not because of current operations at such facilities, but because at some time in the future such facilities could become engaged in activities that would have the requisite relationship to the national security?

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.)