Because it is my belief that Congress with this bill is merely reaffirming the position set out in the Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. 781 et seq., it may be helpful at this point to take a minute to review the declared purposes of that act. Without laboring over each provision, it seems fair to say that with the act Congress, aware of the situation of the world, aware of the capabilities of our enemies, aware of the length to which enemies might go in an attempt to destroy our institutions, and aware of the value to our enemies of certain of our information, outlined in this act a program for combating internal subversion. Of concern to our discussion today was part of the program with which Congress intended to exclude from employment in defense facilities those persons found to be members of a Communist-action organization. Such persons, the act provided, were subject to criminal penalties if they remained in designated employment.

Also of interest to us today was the idea expressed, though the act did not speak in specific terms with regard to this matter, that those awarding contracts of a sensitive nature be able to screen those employees likely to have dealings with classified material.

And thirdly, of concern to us today was that measure adopted in the same year as the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. 191 et seq., which had as its purpose the prevention of sabotage of our port facilities. Though that act did not specifically adopt procedures for the screening of employees, it is my understanding that the Congress clearly had this in mind when it adopted this piece of legislation.

In other words, this bill asks the Congress to do nothing new. It does request the Congress to sharpen the technical language found objectionable by the Supreme Court to retain the overall objectives envisioned in the 1950 acts.

This being our objective, let us review the Court's objections to the earlier provisions and our proposals to overcome these objections.

Apparently not excluding the possibility that some narrowly drawn legislation aimed at keeping "from sensitive positions in defense facilities those who would use their positions to disrupt the Nation's production facilities," the Supreme Court in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), held that the present statute swept too widely, catching in its net not only those persons for which the bill was designed, but also persons in nonsensitive positions who were only passive members of such organizations. Our bill would limit the definition of defense facility in order to limit the inclusion to only those actually in sensitive employment. In addition, our bill would require in criminal proceedings that the prosecution show that the defendant was a member of such an organization knowing that it was designated as subversive and knowing that the employment was designated a defense facility.

The Supreme Court, in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) did not challenge the Congress' right to adopt or delegate some form of screening for persons in national defense industry; it merely found that the Department of Defense lacked the necessary authority to operate as they were doing. Our measure would merely give the President the authority with the safeguard that the person involved be allowed the broadest privilege of confrontation and cross-examination consistent with the national interest.

Similarly, with regard to the screening provisions in the Magnuson Act, to protect our vital ports, the Supreme Court in Schneider v. Smith on January 16, 1968, found that while Congress had granted broad authority to the President to assure the safety of our port facilities, it had not authorized the screening methods here applied. Our bill, then, adds the necessary authorization.

While the world has changed greatly since 1950, the need to protect our institutions, in particular our defense operations, from internal subversion and sabotage has not changed. For this reason, I urge your serious consideration of this measure.

The CHAIRMAN. This closes our witness list for today, and the committee stands adjourned until tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., Wednesday, May 1, 1968, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, May 2, 1968.)

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 15626, H.R. 15649, H.R. 16613, H.R. 16757, H.R. 15018, H.R. 15092, H.R. 15229, H.R. 15272, H.R. 15336, AND H.R. 15828, AMENDING THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL ACT OF 1950 Part 1

THURSDAY, MAY 2, 1968

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,

PUBLIC HEARINGS

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities. met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana, chairman; William M. Tuck, of Virginia; John C. Culver, of Iowa; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Tuck, Culver, Ashbrook, and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel.

Mr. TUCK. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair is happy to announce that the very distinguished Representative from the Commonwealth of Virginia is here, Congressman Abbitt.

Mr. Abbitt, we will be very pleased to hear from you.

Mr. Abbitt has been a Member of the Congress of the United States since 1948. He is most widely known and highly regarded throughout the State of Virginia.

Mr. Abbitt has a statement he would like to make on one of the bills that is now pending.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. M. ABBITT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA

Mr. ABBITT. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before this illustrious committee. It is a great pleasure indeed.

I will take just a minute of your time.

I just want to say that I am so proud of the efforts of this committee in trying to salvage the Subversive Activities Control Board and to save it for the American people.

94-756-68-pt. 1-10

1453

This committee is doing an excellent job. I was pleased to be one of the sponsors with Mr. Willis, along with the members of this committee, of H.R. 15626. I think it is widely important that this committee go into this bill fully and report it out and that the Congress enact it and that it be adopted into law.

It is one means of saving America, trying to salvage something for our people. I think it will go a long way toward trying to correct some of the decisions that have been so detrimental in recent years.

I ask unanimous consent to file a statement.

Mr. Tuck. Your statement will be filed and I take this opportunity to thank the gentleman from Virginia for his cooperation, not only as a copatron of the bill, but for his cooperation in bringing to us the information which he has collected.

(Congressman Abbitt's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. W. M. ABBITT OF VIRGINIA

Mr. Chairman: I wish to express my appreciation to you and other members of the committee for inviting me to present my views with reference to H.R. 15626, which I cosponsored and which is the subject of hearings currently being conducted by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Recent court decisions have rendered ineffective certain parts of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and it is essential that Congress take some action in order to plug the loopholes created by these decisions and to deal with the problems which have resulted.

I personally do not believe that the Communist infiltration menace to our country has lessened to any degree whatever. On the contrary, it is my view that we need to guard with more vigor than ever before the constitutional freedoms which the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 intended to protect. That act made it unlawful for members of Communist-action organizations to engage in employment in a defense facility, but the Supreme Court in United States v. Robel has largely voided this action. Other court decisions have made ineffective various sections of the act and an enumeration of these decisions and their effect is unnecessary at this point inasmuch as considerable testimony has already been given.

The real issue here seems to be whether the Congress should take action to overcome the problems raised by the courts in their decisions on provisions of the law. I do not believe there is any question but that Congress should move and move expeditiously in order that there not be any great concern on the part of the general public as to our intentions in this regard, although the situation has changed considerably since the basic law was passed nearly 2 decades ago. The threat to our security has increased if anything and certainly has not been lessened either by actions of the Communists overseas or by subversives here at home. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies of the Government have clearly indicated that subversives are constantly at work in the United States, and the evidence of their successes is still considerable.

I call upon the committee to take immediate action with reference to the problems which have been considered and which would be dealt with in the bill before you at this time.

May 1, 1968.

Mr. TUCK. Our next witness is Mr. Albert E. Green, assistant chief counsel, United States Coast Guard.

Mr. Green, we are delighted to have you before our committee this morning and we look forward to hearing your statement.

You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ALBERT E. GREEN, ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. GREEN. I am Albert E. Green, assistant chief counsel of the Coast Guard and I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on H.R. 15626 particularly as it affects the Coast Guard.

I have with me this morning Captain Garth H. Read, who is chief of the Merchant Vessel Personnel Division, Office of Merchant Marine Safety.

Before discussing the proposed amendments to section 1 of the Espionage Act as amended, it may be helpful to discuss briefly the merchant vessel personnel screening program established in basically its present form during 1950.

Ünder the amendment to the Espionage Act enacted in 1950, the President was authorized to initiate measures to protect vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities against destruction, loss, or injury due to sabotage, subversive acts, accidents, or causes of a similar nature whenever he found the security of the United States endangered by actual or threatened war, invasion, or insurrection, subversive activity, or disturbances, either threatened or real, of the international relations of the United States.

Executive Order 10173 was issued under this authority indicating that the security of the United States was threatened by subversive activity and it established the basis for the Coast Guard's Port Security Program. That program had two parts, the first directed generally to the physical security of facilities, the second directed to personnel. It is the latter portion to which I will direct my remarks.

The personnel screening program relates directly to persons employed aboard merchant vessels of the United States. Under this program, the Coast Guard exercised authority to bar employment of a merchant mariner aboard a merchant vessel of the United States of over 100 gross tons unless his normally required document contained an endorsement evidencing that the Commandant was satisfied that his presence aboard the vessel would not be inimical to the security of the United States.

In addition, authority has been exercised to bar persons from waterfront, port, and harbor areas and from vessels located therein whenever these areas are "restricted" and also from certain types of small boats which in their normal course of employment contact larger vessels on which mariners must have endorsements unless these persons have "Port Security Cards" issued by the Coast Guard under the same conditions as for endorsement of merchant mariners' documents.

Until 1955 a person applying for an endorsement to his merchant mariners' document or for a Port Security Card was denied clearance before a hearing was held if, upon investigation derogatory information reasonably sufficient to raise a doubt was uncovered. The applicant was informed, however, of the general grounds for denial and was afforded an opportunity to appear before a board to rebut the derogatory information. Much of this information was obtained from confidential informants, and names, dates, and places were not furnished to the applicant and in most cases heard by a board, Government witnesses did not appear. In effect, the burden was upon the

applicant to prove that he was not a risk. Under this procedure, it was possible to appeal an adverse decision of the board to a headquarters board where basically the same format was followed. Under this system, only about 3/4 of 1 percent of all applicants, and there were several hundred thousand, were finally denied the endorsement or the card.

The procedure I have just described was successfully attacked in court and as a result of the decision in Parker v. Lester, 227 F. 2d 708, in late 1955, the Coast Guard completely overhauled its procedures to correct the deficiencies noted by the court. These included the absence of adequate notice of the basis for denial, the failure to produce witnesses for confrontation and cross-examination, and reliance upon confidential information in reaching a denial. The result of the revision in procedure was a marked decrease in the number of denials.

Under this procedure, the Coast Guard had taken the position that failure of an applicant to answer questions submitted to him in the course of the application procedure prevented the Commandant from making a final determination in the matter, and, accordingly, the application was not processed any further.

This procedure was also attacked in court, and on January 15, 1968, the Supreme Court in Schneider v. Smith held that although the present act, 50 U.S.C. 191 (b), authorized keeping the merchant marine free of saboteurs, it did not authorize the establishment of the screening program for personnel on merchant vessels. The Court stated it was loathe to assume that Congress in its grant of authority to the President to safeguard vessels and waterfront facilities from sabotage and other subversive acts undertook to reach into the first amendment area. The Court ruled that the act speaks only in terms of action and not in terms of ideas, beliefs, reading habits, or social, educational, or political associations and therefore does not authorize a screening program to inquire into these areas.

This decision has the effect of eliminating the personnel screening portion of the Port Security Program and leaves the Coast Guard without any authority to prevent the presence of merchant mariners or other persons on board vessels and in waterfront port or harbor facilities when their presence represents a risk to the security of the United States.

The amendments proposed in section 2 of H.R. 15626 would cure the deficiency found to exist by the Supreme Court in the Schneider case and would therefore permit the Coast Guard to continue a screening program.

To the extent that the standards, provisions, and regulations authorized under the proposed section 5A to be added to the Subversive Activities Control Act would be made applicable to the screening program, no difficulties are anticipated in accommodating the existing procedures to any new requirements. As a matter of fact, as a result of the changes made in 1956, the existing procedures parallel many of the guidelines found in section 5A.

That concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

Mr. Tuck. We thank you very much, Mr. Green, for your splendid statement, and I take it that you share the view which I have, and that