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Dr. FLETCHER. No. We looked at all the factors considered. We talked with airline companies. We talked to the builders of engines and we talked to builders of commercial aircraft and, on the basis of all that, in consideration with the expenditure limitations that we were faced with, we made the decision to emphasize the JT8D.

Senator CANNON. So that is one that you made on your own without any nudge or any marked help from OMB or the White House. Dr. FLETCHER. I think we had the support of the White House and the OMB.

Senator CANNON. I would think you would have their support if you cut it all out, probably.

Let me ask this.

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Jackson would like to comment.

Mr. JACKSON. Senator Cannon, this was a decision that involved DOT as well as NASA.

Senator CANNON. You mean DOT did not express concern for this problem of noise that we are being bothered with so much now?

Mr. JACKSON. No. They expressed concern. They are as concerned as the rest of us. We are talking about the decision of the 8D with respect to the 3D.

Senator CANNON. I do not like to put them one as against the other. I recognize the greatest opportunity exists in quieting the JT8D to reduce noise levels but putting the 3D on its own, that is what I would like to have you comment on.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, we spoke to that. We were faced with the situation of reducing the funding and then we were faced with the decision of what was the best program within that funding and we came to the decision of which engine and that is the point I was going to make. This was a unanimous conclusion on the part of DOT and NASA that the 8D should proceed ahead of 3D. The 3D work has been buttoned up in a sound manner. The engineering that has been done is in the bank like you said before and there is useful information available for the money that was invested in that program. And it establishes quite clearly on paper, granted on paper, but it establishes very clearly and in a lot of detail what the benefits would be and what the costs would be.

Senator CANNON. How much money was put into the JT3D program?

Mr. JACKSON. I believe about $3 million.

Senator CANNON. About $3 million.

Mr. JACKSON. That brought us to a clean-cut point where we wrapped up the engineering work and could do it in a businesslike way. Senator CANNON. But as far as you are concerned, that program is terminated now.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

NERVA PROGRAM

Senator CANNON. Now, Doctor, getting back to our discussion a moment ago, the nudges that you get, where did you get the nudge from on the NERVA program? Was that an OMB decision to terminate NERVA?

Dr. FLETCHER. We made that decision ourselves, Senator Cannon. We think the NERVA program-you are talking about the reduced nuclear propulsion program or the

Senator CANNON. The whole NERVA program.

Dr. FLETCHER. The whole NERVA program, of course, was terminated last year and was put into a smaller scale.

Senator CANNON. You reduced the program, which is terminated this year.

Dr. FLETCHER. The reduced scale program was terminated this year. That was the small engine primarily directed at the outer planets missions. We decided to take the technology, the research and technology that was aimed quite a way into the future, and focus on that as the primary targets for cuts. This is throughout the agency. All of our research and technology that was looking beyond 10 years we took a very hard look at and it is not just in the nuclear propulsion and power area but throughout. Nuclear propulsion and power looked as though we could not have a use for it in the next 10 years and, therefore, it was terminated.

Senator CANNON. Does that mean, then-does that imply that this $28 million in R. & D. in supersonic technology is within that 10-year time frame that you are talking about using that?

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes, sir. A good bit of it could very well be useful in this 10-year time period.

Senator CANNON. In other words, we might expect that you will recommend an SST program within the 10-year time.

Dr. FLETCHER. No; because that is not NASA's function at the present time.

I think the point should be made again that advanced supersonic technology is useful now in a lot of different ways. I mentioned the CIAP program earlier, because there are other people flying supersonic transports in the stratosphere and we ought to know about it. The other point is that the military is using supersonic technology and they need to know or have the benefit of NASA's expertise in this area.

So, yes; this program does have immediate application and very great application for the next 10 years.

BREAKDOWN ON $91 MILLION CARRYOVER

Senator CANNON. While we are on that, where did that $91 million carryover come from anyway? Precisely which programs?

Mr. LILLY. The reduction of $91 million came about as follows: We reduced the Apollo by $10 million. We reduced the Space Flight Operations by $15 million. By deferral or suspension of HEAO and the related launch vehicle we reduced the space science area by $31 million. In the applications area we reduced by $6 million, coming about by the phaseout of the communications satellite effort. In aeronautics we reduced $24.8 million from the termination of the QUESTOL development; $4 million from the nuclear power and propulsion area. I believe that totals the $91 million. We can submit a table showing these changes in detail.

[Material requested follows:]

NASA SUMMARY OF FISCAL YEAR 1973 BUDGET PLAN ADJUSTMENTS RESULTING FROM FISCAL YEAR 1973 OUTLAY LIMITATIONS AND FISCAL YEAR 1974 BUDGET DECISIONS-FISCAL YEAR 1973 BUDGET PLAN

[blocks in formation]

1 Funds to be applied to fiscal year 1974 program. Fiscal year 1974 request for new obligation authority adjusted accordingly.

2 Unobligated balance which will lapse at the end of fiscal year 1973.

3 Does not include provision for January 1973 pay raise.

Senator CANNON. I see. So that those figures you gave us earlier that you were cut by-that you cut as a result of OMB's nudging in respect to these various programs did not represent all of the cuts on those programs because you had already reduced some from last year's input into them. Is that correct?

Mr. LILLY. The reductions that I was giving you before were the 1974 reductions. The ones I just gave you were related reductions that were made in 1973 with this amount of money being available to apply against 1974 requirements.

Senator CANNON. So that, for example, on space flight, you gave me a figure of $62 million that you scrubbed out of it but you also had $15 million that you did not spend from last year's request.

Mr. LILLY. In Space Flight Operations, that is correct. Senator CANNON. Yes. Space Flight Operations. And in the HEAO program you saved-how much of a saving this year?

Mr. LILLY. In the HEAO this year, it was $31 million.

Senator CANNON. Yes; but also in the 1974 request you made a deferral and you gave me a figure there that was how much?

Mr. LILLY. I gave you a figure in the physics and astronomy area of $61 million, which was largely made up of HEAO. The actual reduction in HEAO in 1974 budget was about $53 million.

Senator CANNON. So that you would add the $53 million to the $30 million, then, to get the combined 2-year reduction.

Mr. LILLY. The reduction for the 2 years; that is correct, sir. Senator CANNON. Well, you have given me $232 million now of your cuts in response to NASA and White House nudging and I think if you have covered the largest items, perhaps you could insert the balance of those for the record.

Are there any others larger than those you have given me?

ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS IN NASA'S BUDGET

Mr. LILLY. There are a couple of others that are larger. For instance, NASA's personnel reductions. The Research and Program Management account was reduced by $27 million consistent with the new size of the program. We had another large reduction in Construction of Facilities, about $36 million, and in the procurement of launch vehicles, about $27 million which we were able to cut because of the related

Senator CANNON. What that is going to do is just buy lesser launch vehicles; is that right?

Dr. FLETCHER. They are related to other cuts and deferrals. Senator CANNON. I understand, but you will buy less launch vehicles and, therefore, save that figure.

Mr. LILLY. We rephase the funding of these launch vehicles when we slip the project. In those cases, Senator Cannon, other than when we have actually terminated and gotten out of it, any of these reductions that we have given you are reductions at a period in time and are not reductions in total cost.

Senator CANNON. I understand that, but that is this year's reduction. Mr. LILLY. That is correct.

NO FURTHER DELAYS ON SHUTTLE EXPECTED

Senator CANNON. Now, while we are on that point, is the delay in the Shuttle program likely to increase or is this as much delay as you foresee at the present time?

Dr. FLETCHER. I think we just cannot let the Shuttle be delayed much more. We have absolutely no idea of any further delays in the Shuttle.

Senator CANNON. Well, you did not have any idea last year of any delays in it this year until OMB got together with you. You think there is a likelihood of some further delays?

Dr. FLETCHER. No; I do not.

Senator CANNON. We heard reference to the studies that have been made with respect to the economic break-even point on the number of launches required. Has there been any updating of the studies that we have available to indicate that we need a greater or a lesser number of launches to break even?

Dr. FLETCHER. There have been many studies. We update our mission model every year and every time we do it, the cost benefits seem

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to be greater primarily because new ideas on the use of the Shuttle come into being. We do not have an annual publication of the mission model, but we can give you the updated version.

Senator CANNON. Well, is your estimate still that about 30 launches a year makes it an efficient operation?

Dr. FLETCHER. That is still correct.

Senator CANNON. And while we are speaking of models, tell me a little something about how many of these test types of models such as are here in the hearing room do we have and what are they used for and how expensive are they?

Dr. Low. I can comment on this one, Senator Cannon. This is a one-of-a-kind engineering model of the docking mechanism. It is the one that was used as a working tool in our negotiations and work with the Soviet Union in developing the system. General Stafford will discuss it in a moment. I do not know the cost of it but it is an essential part of the project cost.

Senator CANNON. But the contractor built that as a part of the project cost.

Dr. Low. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Will you try to find out the cost and insert that for the record?

Dr. Low. I would like to emphasize this is an engineering tool which is an essential part of the project.

Senator CANNON. I understand. How about others over here?

Dr. FLETCHER. We can get the cost of that for the record if you like. Senator CANNON. All right. Are there others like this? I think we ought to have for the record how many of these sorts of things do we have and what do they cost and what are they used for, except to come up and show us what you are doing.

Dr. FLETCHER. All right. We will dig into that.

Senator CANNON. Will you insert that in the record? Mr. Chairman, I think that is a good point for me to stop for a while. [Material requested for the record follows:]

The models presented for display and illustration at Senate hearings included an operational engineering model and three educational display models. The 2-scale engineering model of the Apollo-Soyuz Docking Module was prepared to test the compatibilty of elements in the ASTP system during tests conducted in Moscow last December. The original cost of this testing device was approximately $125,000. Modifications and improvements resulting from test findings cost an additional $75,000 for a total of $200,000.

The 40-scale ASTP model shown to the Senate Committee cost approximately $300. This is one of forty Apollo Soyuz models used for education, public display, and orientation and reference for scientists and employees. The total cost for all ASTP models was $10,000.

The 48-scale Skylab model, costing $684, and the more detailed 20-scale model, costing $4.750, are among ten Skylab models at NASA Headquarters and Centers. The total cost for the ten models was approximately $10,000. They are used for educational, reference, and display purposes.

The Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs reports that NASA has, over the past fifteen years, accumulated a total of 819 models for public display and educational purposes.

While many of these models were built specifically for public information use, a substantial number of the more expensive replicas were acquired at little or no actual expense from contractors and NASA engineering divisions after the completion of their use as design and engineering test models.

The total original cost for building all 819 models (including those provided without charge for public affairs use) was approximately $1.3 million.

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