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Senator CannON. Dr. Fletcher, why did NASA decide to phase out its work on the development of experimental communications satellites?

Answer. Today, intercontinental communications by satellite are sustained through the existence of a privately-financed, effective and profitable international communications service which can support its own research and development efforts. Today, private industry is prepared to finance and manage domestic communications satellites to serve the United States. With these conditions established, and in light of the extremely tight fiscal constraints under which all Federal agencies must operate, NASA plans in this calendar and fiscal year to commence to phase out its R. & D. activities in support of commercial communications satellites.

SENATOR CANNON. Does this include work on such application satellites as the aeronautical satellite and the marine satellite?

Answer. Yes it does.

SENATOR CANNON. How do you view NASA's role in bringing about the use of such (aeronautical and maritime) application satellites?

Answer, NASA has developed and demonstrated much of the technology required for such applications satellites through its experimental ATS-1, 3 and 5 satellites program. We plan to continue such advanced technology developments with the L-band Position Location and Communications Experiment (PLACE) on ATS-F, in cooperation with the FAA and MarAd. With the technology now in hand, it is felt that private industry can finance and manage first generation operational satellite systems to meet the needs of the commercial aeronautical and maritime communities. NASA will continue to provide consultation services and technical support to the FAA and Maritime Administration in establishing these capabilities.

SENATOR CANNON. Dr. Fletcher, Captain Conrad stated that the backup Skylab could be launched in 10 months after failure of Skylab A.

Under what conditions would Skylab B be flown

1. Failure on launch of Skylab A;

2. Failure in 30 days; 3. Failure in 90 days;

4. Failure in 120 days.

Is there funding in the fiscal year 1974 budget for launching Skylab B? If not, where will funding come from?

Answer. Our Skylab Program Plan earlier provided for capability to launch the backup within 10 months of decision. Cost limitations imposed during the past fiscal year have caused us to increase this time to 15 months. The increase is caused by reduction in the degree of completion and testing of the backup hardware.

If there were a failure of Skylab A, a decision to fly the backup flight hardware would depend upon the amount and quality of data obtained and the nature of the failure encountered in Skylab A.

We plan to maintain the capability to fly the backup hardware through the end of the second manned mission, now scheduled for early October 1973. There are insufficient funds in the Program Plan to support flying the backup and none are available elsewhere in the Agency for that purpose.

The committee will stand in recess until 9:30 a.m. on March 6. [Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the committee adjourned to stand in recess until 9:30 a.m., Mar. 6, 1973.]

[The following two tables were subsequently supplied for the record.]

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TOTAL PAYLOAD TRAFFIC

53 52 57 51 64 54 69 61 72 67 73 63 736

1/ This chart summarizes the space payload traffic for calendar years 1979 through 1990 based on the 1971 NASA and

DOD mission models. These payloads are listed in Table 3 of the NASA Technical Memorandum, NASA TM X-64731
(see p. 101 these hearings) except that in the early years, 1979, 1980, and 1981 some payloads would be launched on
expendable launch vehicles; these are not included in Table 3.

* During these years the number of space payloads launched by expendable launch vehicles follow:

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NASA AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1973

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 235, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank E. Moss (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Moss, Symington, Cannon, Goldwater, Weicker, Helms, and Domenici.

Also present: Robert F. Allnutt, staff director; Mary Jane Due, counsel/chief clerk; James J. Gehrig, Glen P. Wilson, Craig Voorhees, Charles Lombard, and Lester Fettig, professional staff members; Ralph E. Vandervort, assistant chief clerk; and Mary Rita Robbins, clerical assistant.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

THE CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

In the hearing we are having today, we are departing somewhat from the traditional format of authorization hearings. Rather than devote our hearings this year exclusively to NASA's plans and funding requirements for the coming fiscal year, Senator Goldwater and I felt it would be useful to the committee to devote 1 day to taking a longer range look to where we are headed in aeronautical and space technology. It is easy to become so concerned with details of ongoing research and development projects that we run the risk of losing sight of the real reasons why many of these programs are undertakenpractical, operational systems of the future which depend for their success on work done today.

With this in mind, I asked Dr. Fletcher to share with us today his views as to where the programs NASA is carrying forward now might lead us in the 1980's.

Dr. Fletcher is uniquely qualified to look into the future in this area. His background is that of a scientist, educator, and a businessman. He knows what can be done and I suspect his business experience would permit him to project what will be done.

Dr. Fletcher has prepared a somewhat lengthy presentation for us today and I am going to suggest that we feel free to interrupt him with questions as he proceeds. We will, of course, question him at the conclusion of his presentation.

We are very pleased to have Dr. Fletcher, Dr. Low, Mr. Shapley, and Mr. Lilly, with us this morning.

(245)

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES C. FLETCHER, ADMINISTRATOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DR. GEORGE M. LOW, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR; WILLIS H. SHAPLEY, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR; AND WILLIAM E. LILLY, NASA COMPTROLLER

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Goldwater, this morning, as indicated, we are going to try an experiment with something we have never really attempted before. We are going to try to give a presentation on NASA's long-range objectives, to give a kind of snapshot approach as to what we feel NASA hopes to accomplish in the next 10 to 15 years in light of our 1974 authorization request.

This morning instead of focusing on specific NASA programs or mission models we will instead focus on the impact of these programs to attempt to predict some of the benefits from the space and aeronautics programs which will be realized in the next 10 to 15 years. We will try to give you some idea of how space and aeronautics will af fect you and me and all Americans and, to a degree, people throughout the world, in the year 1985.

I think a word ought to be said about forecasting the future, though. and particularly a word ought to be said about scientists. I have been a scientist all my life in a sense, because that is how I was trained. Scientists have some defects, and you are familiar with most of them. But one of the defects is that scientists tend constantly to overestimate what they can do today and underestimate what they can do tomorrow; they just do not look ahead very well into the future. And I think that is proper, because scientists have to be objective. They have to be able to prove their points, and that is part of their training. Projecting the future does involve some risks, particularly in the economic and political arena. So scientists generally underestimate.

On the other hand, it has been my experience, and there are some case histories which show, that hard-nosed, practical businessmen are best able to predict the future, because their livelihood depends on it. If a business cannot project accurately several years ahead, it just is not going to survive. It has to know what the environment is going to be that far ahead. And some of the businessmen, the ones that make the big investments, are the ones that can project the farthest ahead.

So this morning, I am going to try to make use of my business background, which you mentioned. I did spend 15 years in private industry and six of those was as chief executive of a private corporation in California.

So hopefully, I will be more accurate than the usual scientist. We will see.

Most of what is going to be said this morning cannot be proven, and much of it will not even take place. On the other hand, many other things will take place which we will not discuss, and I hope that the broad-brush snapshot treatment that we are going to present will be reasonably accurate. We can look at today's technology, and even though we cannot predict political and economic things, we can make reasonable overall assessments of the future.

Now, one other point I think should be made before we start. That is, what is going to be presented is not dependent solely on NASA programs or even on NASA spinoffs, but will depend on develop

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