Current Negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second Session, March 15 and 16, 1978 |
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... Davies , Assistant Director , Bureau of Multilateral Affairs , Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency . Admiral Davies , do you have any information that can help us in making some determination on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ? Admiral ...
... Davies , Assistant Director , Bureau of Multilateral Affairs , Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency . Admiral Davies , do you have any information that can help us in making some determination on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ? Admiral ...
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... Admiral DAVIES . You mean for [ deleted ] that I mentioned earlier , our position is that we must have [ deleted ] . They have also said in a qualitative way they would [ deleted ] . They have not agreed to a firm definition of the ...
... Admiral DAVIES . You mean for [ deleted ] that I mentioned earlier , our position is that we must have [ deleted ] . They have also said in a qualitative way they would [ deleted ] . They have not agreed to a firm definition of the ...
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... Admiral DAVIES . The British military ? Tho CHAIRMAN . Yes . Admiral DAVIES . I really cannot answer that . [ Deleted . ] CTBT AND NONPROLIFERATION The CHAIRMAN . Is it the administration's position that a compre- hensive test ban ...
... Admiral DAVIES . The British military ? Tho CHAIRMAN . Yes . Admiral DAVIES . I really cannot answer that . [ Deleted . ] CTBT AND NONPROLIFERATION The CHAIRMAN . Is it the administration's position that a compre- hensive test ban ...
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... Admiral DAVIES . Well , the main thing , I think , is the more that we continue actions that imply a growing ... Admiral . in your opening sentence you said that you wanted to talk about benefits of the comprehensive test ban . Would you ...
... Admiral DAVIES . Well , the main thing , I think , is the more that we continue actions that imply a growing ... Admiral . in your opening sentence you said that you wanted to talk about benefits of the comprehensive test ban . Would you ...
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... Admiral DAVIES . I think he could sign it . However , it doesn't exist . You mean what the United States has asked for ? Mr. DAN DANIEL . I mean , could he sign it in its present form , and still live by that statement ? Admiral DAVIES ...
... Admiral DAVIES . I think he could sign it . However , it doesn't exist . You mean what the United States has asked for ? Mr. DAN DANIEL . I mean , could he sign it in its present form , and still live by that statement ? Admiral DAVIES ...
Common terms and phrases
ACDA adequate Admiral DAVIES Admiral MONROE Admiral WELCH agree answer areas arms control arrays BEARD BOB WILSON capability cavity Chairman Chiefs of Staff committee comprehensive test ban CONGRESS THE LIBRARY CTBT DAN DANIEL DARPA decoupling Defense Nuclear Agency delegation deleted designs detonations discrimination discussion earthquakes effects tests FORD FOSSUM Geneva GILLER going HOLT identified improve interagency Joint Chiefs KERR kiloton LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Limited Test Ban long-period magnitude Marcum military monitor negotiations Nonproliferation nuclear effects nuclear explosion nuclear testing position problem question Rayleigh waves record response ROBERT DANIEL ROMNEY safeguards SALT Secretary of Defense seismic events seismic signals seismic waves seismograph seismometers Soviet Union statement stockpile strategic STRATTON subcommittee surface waves talking technical techniques Test Ban Treaty test program testimony tion underground nuclear underground test United verification violation warheads Warnke weapons systems yield
Popular passages
Page 115 - October 10, 1963, the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water went into effect.
Page 58 - Group and assure its responsiveness to the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for operations analysis.
Page 76 - ... facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national security or should the treaty or any of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union.
Page 118 - Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.
Page 89 - By essential equivalence, we mean the maintenance of conditions such that: Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage; nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, is maintained...
Page 132 - Item 6 would be able to identify with good probability underwater nuclear explosions with a yield of 1 kiloton and above. 9 The conference notes that in certain special cases the capability of detecting nuclear explosions would be reduced; for instance, when explosions are set off in those areas of the ocean where the number of control posts is small and the meteorological conditions are unfavorable; in the case of shallow underground explosions; when explosions are set off on the islands in seismic...
Page 142 - ... only seismic phases detectable by stations at teleseismic distances from low magnitude earthquakes and explosions. Rayleigh wave: One of the two types of surface waves, distinguished from the Love wave by a different orientation of earth movement and by a slightly lower velocity.
Page 118 - The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and to improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future.
Page 40 - Current political initiatives toward a complete ban on nuclear testing have focused attention on a number of deficiencies in test detection, identification and yield verification capability which do not appear capable of solutions in the near term. Two of the more critical problems are the wide uncertainty in current seismic yield estimates and the limited ability to discriminate between earthquakes and underground explosions in the low kiloton energy range.
Page 54 - It requires us to operate at the leading edge of technology. We are dealing with phenomena and events that are totally removed from ordinary experience. We must expend extraordinary effort to be sure that we have thought through all the problems. We are continually dealing with new systems and new weapons, and we frequently uncover new phenomena of military importance — effects of nuclear weapons that were not understood before.