13 Department of the Navy, "Declassification Plan for Navy and Marine Corps Records Under Executive Order 12958,” (16 April 1996), on file with the Commission. 14 National Archives and Records Administration, Declassification Projects: Time & Cost To Process 1,000,000 Pages (on file with the Commission). 15 National Security Agency, "Estimated Cost Saving for Declassification Effort" (9 February 1996, briefing sheet, on file with the Commission). 16 Department of Defense staff, telephone conversation with Commission staff, 24 September 1996. 18 Department of State officials, interview by Commission staff, 19 September 1995. 19 Defense Intelligence Agency officials, interview by Commission staff, 30 August 1995. 20 National Classification Management Society, "Virtual Interview With The Director, Information Security Oversight Office," Viewpoints 1 (1995): 31. 21 Inspector General, Department of Defense, White Paper: Classification and Declassification Within the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1995), ii. 22 National Archives and Records Administration, Ready Access To Essential Evidence: The Strategic Plan Of The National Archives And Records Administration, 1997-2000, 13. 23 General Accounting Office, Environmental Data: Major Effort Is Needed to Improve NOAA's Data Management and Archiving, GAO/IMTEC-91-11 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1990), 26-27. 24 Inspector General, DoD, White Paper, i. IV Personnel Security: Protection Through Detection The personnel security system was put in place following World War II as a means of supporting the classification system and of implementing the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations' programs to investigate the loyalty of Federal Government officials. Over the past half century, a variety of directives and additional regulations have been issued to tailor the system to specific needs and respond to particular concerns (at times on an agency-specific basis), creating a layering of rules and, in turn, certain redundancies and other inefficiencies. Even so, the fundamental standards and criteria around which personnel security policies and procedures are organized remain those set out in an executive order that is now nearly 44 years old. Although President Clinton's Executive Order 12968, issued on August 2, 1995, provides for common investigative and adjudicative standards to improve clearance reciprocity, strengthens appeal procedures, and improves the means of ensuring non-discrimination, it does not supersede Executive Order 10450, issued by President Eisenhower in 1953. Thus, in effect, it simply adds another regulatory layer to the personnel security system. Personnel security in the future must be better integrated throughout the workplace, with managers and line officers accepting greater responsibility for security. Highprofile examples of espionage arrests and poorly-administered procedures reduce confidence in the overall system and reinforce the Commission's view that the existing approach to personnel security is in need of substantial reform. An updated personnel security system also must allocate more attention and resources to monitor, assess, and assist current employees, in particular those in positions of greatest sensitivity and those who have become at risk as a result of changes or difficulties in their lives. The Commission also believes that the personnel security process must be better understood. Many employees and applicants who have passed through the process have little understanding of what it actually involves. Greater security awareness and understanding should lead to a more secure working environment, as personnel become more knowledgeable about the key security concerns and significant threats, and what mechanisms exist to respond to these challenges. Overview of the Personnel Security Process The Background Investigation The chief objective of the personnel security process is to attempt to determine whether past behavior is a matter of concern for future reliability. Before prospective Federal employees (both military and civilian) and contractors' employees who work in the national security arena can have access to national security information, they must undergo an investigation and adjudication to determine whether they should receive a security clearance. As Figure 3 shows, according to a 1995 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, more than 3.2 million government employees and contractors held security clearances in 1993 (the last year for which full data are available).' Figure 3: Number of Federal and Contractor 2,299,000 768,000 154,000 A security clearance indicates that a person Top Secret Source: General Accounting Office, Background Investigations: The clearance process begins with the submission of a personal history statement The length and complexity of the background investigation varies depending on the level of clearance (or the access) needed. In most agencies individuals are vetted for Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret clearances, and possibly for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) as well. The Department of Energy (DOE) has a separate system pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act; most of its employees receive either an "L" clearance, which equates to a Confidential or Secret clearance, or a "Q" clearance, which equates to a Top Secret clearance. Types of Investigations There are three types of personnel security investigations: a National Agency Check When the NAC is supplemented by a credit check and written inquiries, the investigation is termed a NAC with Written Inquiries (NACI). Written inquiries are sent to schools, employers, and local law enforcement agencies to verify information submitted by the person under investigation. This has been the standard procedure required for Confidential and Secret clearances for Federal civilian employees in most agencies, as well as "suitability determinations" for applicants seeking Federal employment in positions not needing a security clearance. (It is notable that applicants for non-national security positions traditionally were subject to investigative steps for a "suitability" determination that exceeded those for military applicants who needed a Secret-level security clearance.) Those requiring access to Secret special access programs, however, usually require a review process similar to that for a Top Secret clearance. A Single-Scope Background Investigation (SSBI), incorporating the NAC but using investigative interviews in lieu of written inquiries, is required for Top Secret clearances, for many SAPS designated Secret or Top Secret, for "Q" clearances, and for access to SCI data. As part of the background investigation process, investigators interview the applicant, current and former neighbors, character references, former educators, former spouses, and current and former employers; undertake local and national law enforcement record checks; and obtain credit reports and military and medical records. In addition, some agencies such as the CIA and the NSA require the applicant to undergo a polygraph examination, a medical examination, and a psychological evaluation. Government employees and contractor personnel with security clearances are also subject to reinvestigations (covering the period beginning with the date of the last investigation) throughout their careers. The timing of reinvestigations can be random, but for Top Secret clearances they must be completed not less than once every five years. While the primary difference between initial investigations and reinvestigations is the period of time covered, some reinvestigation components may vary from the initial investigation. For example, during an initial polygraph examination, the NSA and the CIA cover counterintelligence issues (sabotage, espionage, and foreign intelligence) as well as additional issues such as possible use of drugs and any criminal 37-472 97-5 been permitted to charge its customers for investigations or reinvestigations, although this restriction is now being reexamined. The Adjudication The information collected during the investigative process is then forwarded to an adjudicative office, where an adjudicator evaluates all of the data collected in order to make a clearance determination. This decision is based on established guidelines. An adjudicator who believes that the investigation is incomplete usually has the opportunity to request additional information from the investigator. When an already cleared employee is transferred or detailed to another agency or special access program, that individual's file is reviewed again by an adjudicator at the receiving agency or by a program security officer prior to the acceptance of the employee's clearance. As a result, even though the individual's clearance may be up to date, additional security vetting is usually required before the clearance will be accepted by the receiving agency or special access program. Improving the Current System Modernizing the System's Cold War Foundations Prior to the Cold War, the Federal Government's efforts to maintain a trustworthy and reliable civil service were based primarily on the Civil Service Act of 1883. The Act included a core principle of "suitability” for Federal employment, defining this as “a requirement or requirements for government employment having reference to a person's character, reputation, trustworthiness, and fitness as related to the efficiency of the service." Seventy years later, Executive Order 10450 imposed an additional requirement for Federal employment: "that all persons privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government, shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States" such that ". . . employment and retention . . . is clearly consistent with the interests of national security." (Emphasis supplied.) The criteria applied to "suitability” and “security eligibility" determinations today are largely redundant. All civilian Federal Government employees, regardless of whether they need access to national security information, must be found suitable for government service through use of at least a NACI. Those requiring access to national security information must also be found security-eligible as defined by Executive Order 10450. However, the two-step process of determining suitability and security eligibility is not applied uniformly across agencies, frequently involves duplicative steps and long delays, and is poorly understood by applicants and many agency officials alike. In addition, both the responsibilities and the criteria for suitability and personnel security determinations may differ from agency to agency. Some agencies place responsibility for both evaluations in the same office, while others maintain separate offices for making suitability and security determinations, at times with minimal coordination between the offices. |