5

uld also like to note that the study of stockpile planning factors nsitive to congressional reluctance to authorize disposals of exaterials under the 1973 guidance.

difference between the term objectives and our new term, goals, e than a semantic one. When we talked about stockpile objec n the past, there was an implication that we would move to ac ome fixed quantities as quickly as possible. Stockpile goals will re dynamic, changing as there are new developments in data, logy, and other domestic and international events that tend to the static objectives rapidly obsolete. The stockpile goal for a al is a long-term quantity, but we look at short-term steps it when we review priorities and make recommendations for nual Materials Plan.

are continuing to study the Nation's industrial preparedness mergencies. One of the most important tools that we have in thening it is title III of the Defense Production Act. The stra stockpile authority is another important way in which we can o make our industrial base strong. The new planning process is ed to make stockpiling more sensitive to technological changes ther developments important to our industrial base.

Chairman, this is the end of my prepared statement. However, be happy to answer any questions you may have.

repared statement of General Bray follows:]

HENT BY LESLIE W. BRAY, JR., DIRECTOR, Federal Preparedness Agency,
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

am Chairman and Members of the Committee: At the request of the Vire
man, Senator Proxmire, I am here to discuss the national stockpilem of
zic and critical materials, established pursuant to the strategic and Critical
Hals Stock Ping Act of 1516, as amended. I expecially welcome this opp
to discuss national stockpile planning in the context of your interest in
rial preparedness planning terave thee two areas are intimateg to wied
ey are both sperial responsibilities of the Federal Prepare y

same time for a broad range of basic civilian economic needs to ensure the health, welfare. morale, and productivity of the civilian population needed to maintain vitality of the wartime economy. This policy goes well beyond the stockpile guidance issued in 1973. The new guidance calls for a different configuration of the stockpile than we presently have and it will entail major programs of both acquisitions and disposals. Because the statute requires us to avoid, to the extent possible, any undue disruption of the market, the rate at which materials can be bought and sold will be necessarily constrained. Further, data on materials requirements and domestic and international situations constantly change. For both of these reasons, any achievement of the new stockpile goals (as we now call them), will probably be a long-term proposition stretching out over a number of years.

An important procedural change, known as the "variable confidence level" approach, was adopted during the stockpile policy study. In this approach, materials required during a period of national emergency are specifically identified as being required for either Defense, Essential Civilian, or General Civilian use. Planning factors used to estimate supply sources and availability can be varied for these three groups. More conservative factors can be used for the defense portion of the requirements, and more moderate factors for the other requirements. Separate estimates for each year of an assumed war and a relative priority based on the three groups can also be used.

The study also recommended a new stockpile planning process to permit updating of stockpile goals and to better coordinate disposal and acquisition decisions. The new planning process will involve maintaining current data and planning factors, developing an "Annual Materials Plan," and provide for recurrent review of stockpile policy guidance. The “Annual Materials Plan," which will fully take into account the results of industry and market studies performed on a commodity-by-commodity basis, will allow for changes in national security planning, market and other economic conditions, international events, and budgetary considerations. The plan will be integrated into the budget cycle.

I would also like to note that the study of stockpile planning factors was sensitive to Congressional reluctance to authorize disposals of excess materials under the 1973 guidance.

The difference between the term "objectives" and our new term "goals" is more than a semantic one. When we talked about stockpile "objectives" in the past, there was an implication that we would move to acquire some fixed quantities quickly as possible. Stockpile goals will be more dynamic, changing as there are new developments in data, technology, and other domestic and international events that tend to make the static "objectives" rapidly obsolete. The stockpile "goal" for a material is a long-term quantity, but we look at short-term steps toward it when we review priorities and make recommendations for the Annual Materials Plan.

We are continuing to study the Nation's industrial preparedness for emergencies. One of the important tools that we have in strengthening it is Title III of the Defense Production Act. The strategic stockpile authority is another important way in which we can help to make our industrial base strong. The new planning process is designed to make stockpiling more sensitive to technological changes and other developments important to our industrial base.

This is the end of my prepared statement. However, I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, General Bray.

General Bray, I notice on the first page of your statement you point out that the stockpiling responsibilities all flow from legislation enacted right after World War II, and with the experience of World War II firmly in mind, and I notice on page 2 (see page 5) you refer to the fact that the assumption is a major war over a 3-year period, assuming large-scale industrial mobilization and providing for a broad range of basic civilian economic needs to ensure the health, welfare, morale, productivity, and so forth. A 3-year major war.

How do von envision that? Who would be our adversary in a 3-year major war? It seems to me this almost is like the cartoon I saw the other day of a general saying that he had seen the latest movie version

M

Kong and we had to be prepared for any kind of an emere don't know, we might be confronted with King Kong on ire State Building, and therefore we have to be prepared for 1 of a threat, and prepared to confront it.

der if a 3-year major war isn't almost in the same kind of a

al BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I think certainly the length of a war
important consideration in establishing any stockpile policy.
e try to respond directly to your question. I think the first
make is that we don't necessarily assume in the study that
will be 3 years. We think that our stockpile planning ought
sed on the 3-year period. Now, there is wide difference of
as to what the nature of a war with a potential adversary is,
orm it might take. Differences exist in the defense establish-
CS and among other strategic and defense planners. There is
of people who think that any continued, long term conven-
-ar in the future would be totally out of the question, that any
var will simply be a short-term nuclear spasm exchange.
may be right, and I certainly am not in any position to say that

e wrong.

e are other people, however, who think that as long as we have uate strategic nuclear deterrent force, and as long as we can in viable mutual assured destruction capabilities between ourand the Soviet Union, that the chances of an outbreak of ic nuclear war on that scale would be extremely remote. It is f our interests to further policies and programs that will do

e is a group of people who feel that if a strategic nuclear war kely, and if we can maintain a very viable deterrent stability n ourselves and the Soviet Union, the likelihood that future es will be resolved on a conventional basis increases.

. even within the conventional area, Mr. Chairman, there are nces of opinion.

ator PROXMIRE. Well, let's stop there, though.

eral BRAY. Yes, sir.

ator PROXMIRE. You talk about a stalemate on a nuclear basis se this might be mutual suicide or might not. We have had testirecently before this committee that there is some reason to exThe Soviet Union might engage in a pre-emptive nuclear strike. ver, it is just hard for me to envision a maior war which would ter all, a war between this country and the Soviet Union. lasting years. conventional armaments, that wouldn't, one way or er, lead to a nuclear war.

v, maybe that is possible, but I just can't imagine the scenario. w, we may have another Vietnam war-God help we don't-and is every reason to expect that we have learned a big lesson from t that is a possibility. But that wouldn't be a major war, at least e sense of needing this kind of strategic stockpile that we are ng about here.

neral BRAY. Yes, sir, I agree, that is not the type of war we are ng about. I do think. as I said, that the type of conventional war might break out in Europe, for example, is a type of war that is tal concern to all of us.

Now, there are different views that say that if conventional war does break out, what are the likelihoods of it remaining conventional, or even if it does, won't you reach some decisive point within a reasonably early period of time?

Well, I don't know of anyone, Mr. Chairman, who can assure you or anybody, first, that the war will not remain conventional, and second, I would hope that we could reach early determinations in any outbreak of conventional war and bring about an early termination of it.

Senator PROXMIRE. It just seems absolutely insane that we would go on in a conventional war with the Soviet Union, killing as many Russians as possible, or they killing as many Americans as possible, both trying hard to win, and then somehow at the same time having the sanity and good sense not to engage in a nuclear war.

Now, anything is possible. As I say, we might have King Kong on top of the Empire State Building, too, but I think if we are going to spend billions of dollars, we ought to consider what the prospects are that make some sense.

General BRAY. I think that we ought to have the option. If a conventional war were to break out on a large scale between major adversaries, we in the United States need to have the option of continuing that war as opposed to suffering a negotiated defeat, or as opposed to forcing us to go to a strategic nuclear exchange.

Now, I am not ruling out the fact that, of course, you may be exactly right. It may be impossible to prevent going to a strategic nuclear exchange. I would hope that that is preventable, and in case that it is, our options ought to be such that we have a capability of continuing in that role if the Soviets have the capability and an option of continuing in that role. I see nothing to indicate, Mr. Chairman, that they, at least, have ruled out the likelihood or even the probability of an extended conventional conflict with the United States.

We are not suggesting that this is the most likely situation to occur. What we are suggesting is it would be extremely risky for us to go into a situation where we in the United States no longer have the option of continuing a largescale nonnuclear conflict, and have the only two remaining sort of extremes of the spectrum: escalating to strategic nuclear war, or suffering a negotiated defeat. We ought to have better options than that, and the strategic stockpile is an area, I think, that could be managed in a way that could permit us some options of continuing for a longer period of time.

Senator PROXMIRE. Then what we are buying with the stockpile is the additional options.

General BRAY. Yes, sir, we are buying additional options that do not force us into the two extremes.

Senator PROXMIRE. In the event that as some may think and I think is extraordinarily unlikely that we would get into a prolonged conventional war, a major war.

General BRAY. Yes, sir.

Senator PROXMIRE. Well, let me go on.

General Bray, there has been a lot of concern about the potential cost of this greatly enlarged stockpile. Of the 91 materials in the stockpile, as I said, the goals for 74 of them have been increased over

3 objectives, and I understand the goals for 52 of them have creased over the pre-1973 objectives.

re some way that you can give us a reasonable estimate of l this material buying will cost us before we begin this us acquisition program?

al BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I want to be just as responsive to estion as I can, and let me start by saying to you that I think co explain very clearly, if I can, how we look at the term "the als."

ing our stockpile study, there was first one very broad conthat came out to all of us, and that was that the stockpile in ent form had some materials in it that we did not need under nceivable situation. The stockpile in its present form is a neration of material left over from World War II, and to xtent from the Korean war, and in fact, 95 percent of it was d prior to 1959. But that is not the most important part of clusion.

second important part of that conclusion is that there are we need in the stockpile that we do not now have.

, the magnitudes of things in it that we don't need, and the udes of the things we do need are so great that we are parly sensitive to the requirements of the statute that says that if ke any disposal of excess materials, we must do so in order to avoid disruption of the market, and to try to protect producers, sors and consumers. Similarly, in the acquisition of materials. v tells us that when we have to acquire materials, to try to do the extent practicable from excess materials that are on the

t is clearly the intent of Congress and of the law that undue tion in either the acquisition or disposal process be avoided. , when we look at the magnitude of materials that we think be gotten rid of, and the magnitude of materials that we think o be acquired and those provisions of the law, it is clear to us not do that in a short period of time, and it is going to stretch ver a good number of years.

period of years was asked of me a couple of times. Is it 10. I think it will be more than that, frankly, before we can fully ment the direction in which this policy proceeds.

v, if it is going to have that long a period of time, Mr. Chairthere are two other factors I need to mention. One of the things vas wrong with our old

ator PROXMIRE. Well, let me just interrupt. If we go on indefi, you say it will be more than 10 years, we wonder what value s. After all, you have some kind of a goal or some kind of ive, but if you are never going to achieve it, forget it. neral BRAY. I do think we will be moving toward fulfillment e goal and certainly after 5 years we should be closer to the Iment than we are now, after 10, much closer, and so forth. So nk we will close in on that and reach the point where we can tell ody precisely what is the remaining imbalance and how much it then cost in the short term.

nator PROXMIRE. Well, can you tell us what will be more or less mits of the cost of it, say, for the first 3 years or the first 5 years?