You will notice that the first tabulation, sheet i in the Congressional Presentation Data Book, shows the individual and cumulative total appropriations for fiscal years 1950 to 1954, both inclusive, which aggregated $19,730,370,686, and traces that total through various transfers, rescissions, allocations, and losses because of nonreappropriation, to a net cumulative figure for Department of Defense obligations for MDAP as of the end of the fiscal year 1954 of $15,402,608,634, after deduction of an unobligated balance as of June 30, 1954, of $2,422,512,729. The second tabulation, sheet ii in the Congressional Presentation Data Book, starts with the total net Department of Defense obligations for MDAP as of June 30, 1954, developed on the preceding tabulation, and brings forward the unobligated and unallocated balances as of the end of fiscal year 1954. In case you are not able to trace forward the unobligated balance as of June 30, 1954, which was reappropriated for fiscal year 1955, I suggest that you look at items 4, 5, and 7 of the second tabulation and you will notice that the $2.4 billion appearing as the next to the last item on the first sheet is brought forward as the net of such three items. Item 22 on the second tabulation shows the total net availability of funds to the Department of Defense, obligated and unobligated, for fiscal years 1950-55 MDA programs as of March 20, 1955. Item 24 sets forth the total amount of military assistance programs as of March 20, 1955, and item 23 reveals the fact that as of March 20, 1955, the total military assistance programs, as priced in the Department of Defense, exceeded the funds available on the same date by the amount of $230,174,105. In other words, as of March 20, 1955, MDAP was overprogramed by approximately $230 million. REDUCTION BY AMOUNT OVERPROGRAMED You may well ask at this point why the total MDA programs were not reduced by that amount of $230 million to bring the total programs in line with the funds available on the same date, and I would like to try to answer that question. There is no doubt that MDA programs cannot and will not be carried out unless funds are available to do so. Nevertheless, it seemed to us an unnecessary—and I might add it is an extremely complicated and arduous exercise to go through every detailed country program at this time to make the necessary reductions. The entire MDA program is now under analysis and review. Such study when completed will, in our opinion, reveal program excesses and, what is more, the existence of materials already delivered to foreign countries which cannot now be utilized and are, therefore, available for redistribution in satisfaction of existing but unfulfilled programs. For instance, we are already advised that approximately $180 million of equipment, much needing rehabilitation, is available in South Vietnam as a result of the cutback in the South Vietnamese forces being supported through MDAP. Some, if not all of this excess, will, after rehabilitation, be available for distribution to other country programs. We further believe that the country requirements being calculated on a time-phased basis, with appropriate notations of the items of equipment on hand not being utilized, the compilation of which I have previously described, will reveal other redistributable excesses which will more than counterbalance the $230 million of programs in excess of available funds as of March 20, 1955. Chairman RICHARDS. Mr. Secretary, may I say there that we have a rollcall down on the floor. I did want to go along a little bit further. At a good point, we have to stop until the next hearing. Mr. HENSEL. I can wait, if you want to come back. Mr. HENSEL. I can finish this in two or three paragraphs. Furthermore, as I previously stated, all existing plans and programs are being subjected to a review in the light of current political, economic, and military conditions, and even more radical changes in our programs may be recommended as a result of that review. We, therefore, prefer not to make any program revision at this time solely in order to bring our existing programs in line with the aggregate of available funds, when there are so many unknown factors which we believe will become clearer as our other studies are completed. Mr. VORYS. You use the word "programs." You are referring to the type of item-by-item programs that have been presented here as illustrative Mr. HENSEL. As modified and finalized. You know, those programs were taken back and further reviewed and were then finalized. If you turn to the country sheets, you will see that we show what has been completed and what is programed for the future. Mr. VORYS. The program of JCS, that sort of thing, the JCS force goals, you found on March 20, as modified and finalized, were $216 million more than you had funds on hand; is that correct? Mr. HENSEL. That is correct. Let us say our plans for meeting those were $216 million. Mr. VoRYS. One other question, Mr. Chairman. Would it be possible next week for two or three "eager beavers" from the committee to come over to your shop and look around and see the way in which you keep track of all this that you have described here? Mr. HENSEL. I would be delighted. Any date up to June 2; I have to be out of town then. Mr. VORYS. June 2? Mr. HENSEL. Not up to any date except June 2. Chairman RICHARDS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will stand adjourned until further notice. We are very interested in your testimony, and we will want to go into it further. The committee stands adjourned until further notice. MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1955 (H.R. 6922 and S. 2090, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.) THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1955 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C. The committee met in room G-3, the Capitol, at 10:20 a.m., Hon. James P. Richards (chairman) presiding. Chairman RICHARDS. The committee will come to order, please. Ladies and gentlemen, we will continue hearings this morning in executive session on the Mutual Security Act extension. We have the honor and pleasure of having with us this morning an old friend and great general, I am sure we all agree, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe. General Gruenther. STATEMENT OF GEN. ALFRED M. GRUENTHER, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS IN EUROPE General GRUENTHER. If it is agreeable to you, Mr. Chairman, I will give you a presentation on the military situation in Europe, not particularly with respect to the military security program now before you. You have had the benefit of the details of the program, and the general concept by other witnesses directly responsible for its administration, who are better qualified to give those details. Chairman RICHARDS. I think that will be a very good way to approach it. General GRUENTHER. I will limit myself to the military situation in Europe because that is a useful background in approaching this problem. [A chart was shown entitled "North Atlantic Treaty Organization."] General GRUENTHER. This chart shows the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the political side, in the Council, there is a representative from each country. The U.S. representative is Ambassador Perkins.1 There is also an international staff under the Secretary General, Lord Ismay. I would like to say here that this whole organization is working better and better all the time. The members always meet once a week and frequently twice a week, and the staff works together on a daily basis. 1 George W. Perkins (1895-1960) was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1949-53. In 1955, he was appointed permanent U.S. representative to NATO with the rank of ambassador; he served in that position until 1958. 2 Gen. Hastings L. Ismay (1887-1965), a career British Army officer, served in World Wars I and II. In 1952, he was appointed Secretary General of NATO, a post he filled until 1957. During this time he was also Vice Chairman (1952–56) and Chairman (195657) of the North Atlantic Council. You are familiar with the three major NATO commands, and you know that ours is this one, SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe]. This one is Admiral Wright's and this is the Channel Command. I will devote my attention to SHAPE. This chart shows the principal headquarters under SHAPE. [A chart was shown entitled "Principal Headquarters, Allied Command, Europe."] General GRUENTHER. This chart shows in green the area we are defending. We have a 4,000-mile perimeter from here to here. This chart shows all the NATO countries with, of course, the exception of the United States and Canada. In order to exercise command, we have broken the area into a northern sector with headquarters at Oslo, a central sector with headquarters at Fontainebleau, a southern sector with headquarters at Naples, and a Mediterranean Command, for the protection of the Mediterranean lines of communication, with a headquarters at Malta. These headquarters are all going concerns. They are fully staffed. Each has an operational plan which could be put into effect today. Whether or not all of the plans would be successful depends upon the amount of effort that would be brought against us, and the circumstances of the time. We base our plans on what a possible enemy do. could I will first tell you what the enemy could do by showing you very briefly his forces and then show you how we plan to meet the threat these forces pose and what difficulties we have and foresee in implementing our plans. STRENGTH AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES AIR FORCES The Soviet Forces are numerically about the same size they were when General Eisenhower came to Europe in the early part of 1951. There are still about 4 million Soviets under arms. The principal difference is that these forces now are much more effective than they were in 1951. The Soviets still have 175 land divisions. Those divisions are much better than they were in January 1951. Although they still have 20,000 operational airplanes, the effectiveness of the Soviet Air Force has increased materially. [A chart was shown, entitled "Soviet Air Force Conversion Program."] General GRUENTHER. This chart shows some of the improvements that were made. When General Eisenhower arrived in Europe in 1951, most of the fighters-about half of the 20,000 Soviet aircraft are fighters were piston driven. Now all of the fighters are jets. So, while the number of aircraft is still the same, the effectiveness of the Soviet Force has increased very considerably. The other side of the chart shows a similar increase in the effectiveness of light bombers. One element of particular interest to the United States, is the longrange element of their Air Force. The Soviets, today, are still dependent on the TU-4. That is the Tupolev-4, which corresponds to our B-29. While the B-29 has practically disappeared from the American inventory, it is still the operational mainstay of the Soviet long-range air element. However, the Soviets know that the TU-4 is obsolete, and they are working on new jet bombers. On May Day, year before last, the Soviets showed their version of our B-47. Last year they showed quite a few in flight. I think that in the long-range category our B-47 is the best airplane in the world today. Our first B-47 flew quite some years ago. Since that time General LeMay has been finding and solving problems in operating a longrange air force. After a number of years with a very rigid training program he has developed a really first-class long-range air force. You know that in addition to the B-47, we have the B-52 coming along. The B-52 is a great improvement over the B-47. Even in the numbers we are getting now, each B-52 costs a great deal of money. It is a very good plane, and a very expensive plane. We have known that the Soviets were working on a version of the B-52. Press reports indicate that several of these planes were seen rehearsing in formation for this year's May Day fly-by. Obviously, they were going to show them on May Day. May Day was a very rainy day, so they did not show them. They still have several parades after May Day, and I think at some time they are going to show these new planes. SOVIET PROGRESS IN AND APPROACH TO AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT They are making progress in both the B-47 and B-52 classes. I know that this can create a considerable amount of uneasiness, and I do not want to appear at all complacent about it. The progress the Soviets have made with respect to engines and other aircraft components may exceed what we expected, but it still does not mean that there is reason for a panic. It takes more than an airplane to make an air force. To be able to fly it from place A, to place B, when place B is several thousand miles away, calls for a great deal of skill. To be able to maintain and support it calls for a great deal of skill. We have had a great deal of experience in starting and developing air forces in SHAPE, and I can tell you it is full of headaches. The Soviets had done practically nothing on long-range air strength until one of our planes happened to fall into their hands. Almost everything they know about this subject has been learned in the last 10 years. That does not mean that we should be complacent about their advances. However, I say there are certain things that you can learn in 10 years and there are other things that it takes more than 10 years to learn. Now, the Soviets are concentrating in that field. And when you concentrate all of your resources in a field, you can make very good progress. But at the same time that they are doing this, they are running into other difficulties. All over Moscow they have elevators that do not run and they cannot get them to run. And they build buildings in which one wing has water pipes and another wing has bathtubs but no water pipes. |