INTERCHANGE OF JET DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY Mr. MAHON. Do you fully utilize the knowledge developed by the Navy in jet engines, for example, and does the Navy fully utilize the information and techniques developed by the Air Force on engines? General CRAIGIE. Yes, sir. Mr. MAHON. As you know, there has been some statement made that the Navy was not able to measure up to certain requirements because it had failed to adopt the engine used in the F-86. What is the story behind that story? General CRAIGIE. I do not know about that particular story, to which you refer, but I would like to say that there is excellent coordination at the top level and at the working level, between the propulsion development folks in the Navy and the Air Force. The Navy has a principal engine contractor. I say the Navy has, because the Navy has sponsored most of the work in this vicinity. I am referring to the Westinghouse Co. On the other hand, the Air Force has sponsored for the most part the engine developments which -the General Eelectric Co. has carried on. Those were the two big, heavy industries which got into the jet engine picture during the war. Mr. MAHON. You may elaborate on that answer. Is there a disposition to interchange gadgets and motors and engines and what not as among the services? General CRAIGIE. Yes, sir. Excellent. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Cannon, is there anything you would like to ask here? This is just about our final day. Mr. CANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to meet with the committee when you conclude. Mr. MAHON. All right. Mr. Taber? Mr. TABER. I do not think I have any more questions just now. I would like to say something. Perhaps it would make me feel a little easier if I said something about this personnel picture. There are some things which, after a little bit, before we put our figures down, I would like to talk to the Secretary about. Mr. MAHON. Matters we were talking about yesterday? Mr. TABER. Yes, but after we go over those things we were talking about yesterday I would like to talk to him. I do not think I have anything more just at this moment. Mr. MAHON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and gentlemen, for your appearance. We will have some further hearings, but this, generally speaking, concludes the major hearing on the 1953 Air Force budget. APPENDIX LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY FOR INCREASE BEYOND 70-GROUP AIR FORCE The information following was submitted in response to interrogation on page 15 of this printed hearing: MEMORANDUM OF OPINION CONCERNING THE NONAPPLICABILITY OF THE 70GROUP AND AIRCRAFT NUMBER AND TONNAGE PROVISIONS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1949 (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE AUTHORIZATION ACT) This memorandum considers and answers in the nagative the question as to whether the 70-group and related peacetime strength provisions of the authorization act restrict the freedom and authority of the Congress to appropriate funds for the expanded Air Force program. It should be noted that this question arose in connection with earlier appropriation laws, notably the Department of Defense appropriation act, 1952,2 and was definitively answered by the Congress itself in the negative. The Air Force, through funds appropriated by the Congress, has already expanded considerably beyond 70 groups and this memorandum is, therefore, concerned with the reasons and arguments which clearly supported and led the Congress to reach this decision. The purpose and legislative history of the authorization act, as well as subsequent enactments of the Congress, make clear that the 70-group provision (and the related serviceable aircraft and aircraft tonnage provisions) of the authorization act is no bar, and has not been considered by the Congress to be any bar, to the appropriation by the Congress of funds for the expansion of the Air Force beyond 70 groups. The 70-group authorization enacted in the authorization act was not required as a basis for appropriations and was entirely permissive in its nature, designed to indicate basic Congressional approval of, and to provide a target or objective for, an orderly, planned expansion of the Air Force. Hence, although it would be permissible, it is not essential here to maintain that the enactment by the Congress of an authorization, where none is required as the foundation for an appropriation, does not operate to restrict the freedom of Congress to appropriate beyond the authorization. Such an argument is founded on the sound notion that such an authorization implies no restriction or limitation beyond the authoriza tion. This argument becomes unnecessary in view of the clear purpose and legislative history of the authorization act and subsequent acts of Congress. I. PURPOSE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AUTHORIZATION ACT The legislative history clearly shows that Congress approached the bill which became the Authorization Act in a spirit of lending its legislative approval to a peacetime objective and not in the spirit of limiting emergency size. The entire emphasis was on the affirmative side of providing a peacetime legislative basis to ensure planned and orderly growth and to permit sensible long range planning. Title I of the Authorization Act, which relates to the Army, is expressed in providing for the organized peace establishment. Section 201 (a), in defining the Air Force of the United States, refers to organizations "necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the national defense in the event of a national emergency." The House Committee on Armed Services, in reporting the bill which became the Authorization Act, said; "Section 201 authorizes a 70 group program based on the December 20 [sic] 1947, report of the President's Air Policy Commission * * *"" This reenforces the conclusion that the 70-groups figure in the Authorization Act was intended to establish only a peacetime target, since the Commission, in its report, recommended 70 groups as about right during phase I, the period prior to the development of an atomic capability by the Soviets. The Commission clearly contemplated a much larger Air Force than 70 groups when we entered phase II. Events since the publication of the report, including proof of a Soviet atomic capability, the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, and the invasion of the Korean Republic, make clear that phase II has now long since been entered. 1 Public Law 604, 81st Cong., approved July 10, 1950. 2 Public Law 179, 82d Cong., approved October 18, 1951. The House committee report also significantly included the following: 'Accordingly, the provisions of Title II of the proposed bill contain authorization for a peacetime Air Force constituting a platform upon which the Nation may expect to build a decisive wartime Air Force should the necessity arise." No more succinct and forceful statement that the purpose was to establish a "peacetime platform" could have been made. Any interpretation that the 70-group and related provisions of the Authorization Act are still in force would be in disregard of the Congressional intention as examined above and would do violence to the declaration of policy which appears in the authorization act in the following form: "In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide an Army of the United States and an Air Force of the United States capable, in conjunction with the other Armed services, of preserving the peace, security, and providing for the defense of the United States, its Territories, possessions, and occupied areas wherever located of supporting the national policies, of implementing the national objectives, and of overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts imperiling the peace and security of the United States." Any such interpretation would also proceed in disregard of section 301 of the authorization act, which provides as follows: "The provisions of this act shall be subject to the duties and authority of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense as provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended." Section 208 (f) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides as follows: "It [the United States Air Force] shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war." A restrictive interpretation of the Authorization Act would thus leave the Air Force charged with a most serious responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947, while lacking the necessary authority to discharge this responsibility. Any such interpretation would likewise be in disregard of the provisions of section 101 (a) of the Air Force Organization Act of 1951,2 which provides that "The Secretary of the Air Force shall be responsible for and shall have the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Air Force establishment, including, but not limited to * * * preparedness and effectiveness *." In this period of national emergency and hostilities, as in previous such periods, Congress exercises its control and makes known its wishes as to the size, character and composition of our armed forces through appropriation laws. This provides the requisite flexibility to adjust to fast-moving conditions. * * II. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION SINCE THE AUTHORIZATION ACT REQUIRES THE CONCLUSION THAT THE 70-GROUP AND RELATED PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN REPEALED OR SUSPENDED BY IMPLICATION OR HAVE BEEN DEEMED BY THE CONGRESS TO BE OTHERWISE NOT OPERATIVE By Public Law 655, Eighty-first Congress, approved August 31, 1950, the Congress suspended the Air Force personnel authorization of 502,000 in the Authorization Act. The accompanying Senate committee report stated under the caption "Purpose of the bill": "The purpose of the bill is to permit such increases in the size of our military forces as is required by the present emergency." The following appears under the caption "Purpose of the bill" in the related House report: "In conformance with the message of the President to Congress on July 19, 1950, wherein substantial increases in the strength of the Armed Forces were recommended, the proposed bill provides for the indefinite suspension of present statutory restrictions on the authorized personnel strength of any component of the Armed Forces. Removal of the statutory ceilings will permit the expansion of the Armed Forces to any strength for which appropriations are provided.” According to the express language which the respective committees used the plain purpose was to permit the expansion of the Armed Forces to the extent required by the emergency and as provided in appropriations. The_integral interrelationship between the 502,000 personnel authorization, the 70-group Public Law 150, 82d Cong., approved September 19, 1951. authorization and the 24,000 serviceable aircraft authorization contained in the Authorization Act was repeatedly stressed in testimony and in the committee reports accompanying the Authorization Act. The Senate report contained the following: "It should also be pointed out that the number of personnel, the number of aircraft, and the airframe tons authorized in this bill are synonymous with the 70-air-group authorization as recommended by the various commissions and boards.' It is plain that the Congress believed and intended that the suspension of the personnel authorization would permit a balanced expansion of the Air Forcewings, aircraft, and personnel. Any other interpretation would ascribe to the Congress the intention to authorize the Air Force to recruit personnel who would have no airplanes to fly. Air Force witnesses in connection with the second supplemental appropriation bill 1951,3 made it perfectly plain that funds were being sought to build beyond 70 groups. In hearings on the fourth supplemental appropriation bill 1951, Air Force witnesses testified that there were then 81 combat wings on active duty and sought funds to permit expansion toward and modernization of 95 wings, which were authorized by the Congress. No clearer proof than this could be advanced that the Congress did not consider the 70-group provision to be operative. If further confirmation were required, it came with the enactment by the Congress of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1952.5 JAMES T. HILL, Jr., General Counsel. SUMMARY OF CONTRACTS AWARDED DURING 1951 The following information was supplied in response to interrogations by Congressman Gore beginning on page 419 of this hearing: Summary report, January 1951 NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS (OVER $5,000) PLACED AT EACH PERCENT OF PROFIT (ESTIMATED) NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS PLACED BY NEGOTIATION 237.. $5, 342, 643 NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS PLACED BY FORMAL ADVERTISING 199.. $4,030,885 279. NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS PLACED WITH SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS (EMPLOYS LESS THAN 500 PERSONS) $5, 903, 179 3 Enacted as Public Law 911, 81st Cong., approved January 6, 1951. 4 Enacted as Public Law 43, 82d Cong., approved May 31, 1951. Public Law 179, 82d Cong., approved October 18, 1951. Summary report, January 1951-Continued NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR AMOUNTS BY EACH FORM OF CONTRACT Summary report, Procurement Division, Hq., AMC, January 1951 NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS (OVER $5,000) PLACED AT EACH PERCENT OF PROFIT (ESTIMATED) NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS PLACED BY NEGOTIATION 837 38 $1,023, 847, 336 112,504, 518 NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS PLACED BY FORMAL ADVERTISING 444 NUMBER AND TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF CONTRACTS PLACED WITH $30, 919, 738 SMALL 549 2. $105, 152, 211 114, 774 |