formed, expert judgment. The Commission is entitled not only to appraise the facts of the particular case and the dangers of the marketing methods employed (Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 483, 494) but to draw from its generalized experience. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 801-805. Its expert opinion is entitled to great weight in the reviewing courts. But the courts are not ready to pass on the question whether the limits of discretion have been exceeded in the choice of the remedy until the administrative determination is first made. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. M. KRAUS & BROS., INC. v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 198. Argued December 14, 1945.-Decided March 25, 1946. 1. Section 1429.5 of Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269 (issued December 18, 1942, under the Emergency Price Control Act)-which provides that the price limitations on poultry prescribed by the regulation shall not be evaded by any method, direct or indirect, whether in connection with any offer or sale of a priceregulated commodity alone "or in conjunction with any other commodity," or by way of any trade understanding "or otherwise❞— held not to forbid all tie-in sales but only those which involve secondary products that are worthless or that are sold at artificial prices. Pp. 622-626. 2. Where the information in a criminal prosecution for violations of Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269 charged that the 614 Statement of the Case. accused "unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly evaded the provisions of" the regulation "by demanding, compelling and requiring" the retail buyer to purchase chicken feet or chicken skins at a specified price as a condition of the sale of poultry and there was evidence that the chicken skins and feet sold had value and were sold at their market price, a charge by the trial judge that the "one" question in the case was whether the sale of chicken parts was a necessary condition to the purchase of the poultry was a reversible error; since the jury may well have disregarded as irrelevant the evidence of value as to the secondary product and convicted solely on the ground that there was a tie-in sale. P. 626. 3. In order to sustain a criminal conviction, regulations prescribed by the Price Administrator under § 2 (g) of the Emergency Price Control Act to prevent circumvention or evasion of price limitations must be explicit and unambiguous and must adequately inform those who are subject to their terms what conduct will be considered evasive the dividing line between unlawful evasion and lawful action can not be left to conjecture. P. 621. 4. A prosecutor in framing an indictment, a court in interpreting the Administrator's regulations, or a jury in judging guilt can not supply that which the Administrator failed to do by express word or fair implication. P. 622. 5. Nor can the Administrator's interpretations of his own regulations cure an omission or add certainty and definiteness to otherwise vague language of a regulation. P. 622. 6. A criminal conviction for violation of an administrative regulation ought not to rest upon an administrative interpretation reached by the use of policy judgment rather than by the inexorable command of relevant language of the regulation itself. P. 626. 7. Where correct statements in a charge to a jury are so intertwined with incorrect statements as to negative the effect of the correct statements, the charge is a reversible error; since a conviction ought not to rest on an equivocal direction to the jury on a basic issue. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607. Pp. 626, 627. Petitioner was convicted of violating Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269, promulgated by the Price Administrator pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 149 F. 2d 773. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U. S. 699. Remanded for new trial. P. 627. Opinion of MURPHY, J. 327 U.S. Thomas Turner Cooke argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was I. Jonas Speciner. W. Marvin Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath, Robert S. Erdahl and Beatrice Rosenberg. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY announced the conclusion and judgment of the Court. The problem here is whether the petitioner corporation was properly convicted of a crime under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.1 The petitioner is engaged in the wholesale meat and poultry business in New York City. Poultry is a commodity subject to the provisions of Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269,2 promulgated by the Price Administrator pursuant to § 2 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Two informations, each containing six counts, were filed against petitioner. Each count alleged that, as an integral part of a specified sale of poultry on a day during the Thanksgiving season in November, 1943, the petitioner "unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly evaded the provisions of said Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269, Sec. 1429.5, by demanding, compelling and requiring" the retail buyer to purchase chicken feet or chicken skin at a specified price as a condition of the sale of the poultry. Petitioner's president was named as a co-defendant in the first information and the two informations were consolidated for trial purposes. The theory of the Government is that the petitioner was guilty of an evasion of the price limitations set forth in this particular regulation if it required the purchase of chicken feet and skin as a necessary condition to obtaining the primary commodity, the poultry. This practice is 156 Stat. 23; 50 U. S. C. App. § 901 et seq. 27 Fed. Reg. 10708; reissued with amendments, 8 Fed. Reg. 13813. 614 Opinion of MURPHY, J. commonly known as a "combination sale" or a "tying agreement." It is argued that the petitioner thereby received for the poultry the ceiling price plus the price of the secondary commodities, the chicken parts. The evidence was undisputed that the poultry was billed by petitioner at ceiling prices fixed by the Price Administrator and that no ceiling prices had been set for chicken feet or chicken skin. It was also undisputed that the demand for poultry during the Thanksgiving season far exceeded the supply and that petitioner voluntarily imposed a rationing system among its customers. The Government's case rested primarily upon the testimony of seven retail butchers who had purchased poultry and poultry parts from petitioner during the period in question. Only one of them testified explicitly that the sale of poultry to him had been conditioned upon the sale of poultry parts which he did not want and for which there was no consumer demand. His testimony, however, was disbelieved by the jury since it acquitted the petitioner. on the two counts involving sales to him. With two exceptions, the other butchers testified either that the feet and skins were loaded on their trucks without previous order or solicitation along with the poultry or that they were billed for both the poultry and the parts without comment. Five of them stated that they sold a small amount of the chicken parts and gave away the balance; one remarked that he could not sell any parts and was forced to dump them. There was no explicit evidence that any of the butchers protested, sought to return the chicken parts or asked to buy the poultry separately. It was reasonable, however, for the jury to find that the sale of poultry was conditioned upon the simultaneous sale of the chicken parts and no contrary claim is made before us. Several times the petitioner tried to introduce testimony establishing that there was a demand for chicken parts and that they were of value. Petitioner's counsel Opinion of MURPHY, J. 327 U.S. stated that "The government has inferred through all of its testimony that chicken skin and chicken feet are so much waste, that they are dumped; that they are not used and they have opened up the door to this type of testimony." But the trial judge ruled that the Government had not put that matter in issue and that the "only thing we are concerned with is whether or not the witnesses who testified purchased chicken feet to meet a demand in their stores." He accordingly refused to admit the proffered testimony from petitioner's witnesses, stating to petitioner's counsel that "I direct you not to put them on the stand..." On cross examination, however, petitioner's president was questioned as to the resale value of chicken skins from the retailer to the general public. He stated that the value was from 25 to 30 cents a pound and that the skin was used to make chicken fat. He also testified that chicken feet had a resale value of from 12 to 16 cents a pound and were used in making soup and gelatin. He further stated that the demand for chicken feet came from retail butchers such as had been on the stand. Petitioner's counsel then recalled one of the retail butchers whose testimony previously had been excluded by the court. He testified that he had bought chicken feet from the petitioner, had "created a demand" for them in his store, and had sold them for from 15 to 20 cents a pound. No further witnesses were called in regard to the retail value of chicken feet and skins. In submitting the case to the jury, the judge stated that "what these defendants are charged with having done is imposing as a necessary condition to the purchase of turkeys the simultaneous purchase of gizzards, chicken feet or chicken skin, that were utterly useless and valueless to the purchasers. In order to violate the law these defendants must have made more than the fixed price of 372 cents on the chickens, or the turkey price of 40 to 45 |