Opinion of the Court.

327 U.S.

types of property and concludes by referring to "all property that it [the Authority] deems necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act . . ." To make clear beyond any doubt the T. V. A.'s broad power, Congress in § 25 authorized the Authority to file proceedings, such as the ones before us, "for the acquisition by condemnation of any lands, easements, or rights of way which, in the opinion of the Corporation, are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."

All of these provisions show a clear congressional purpose to grant the Authority all the power needed to acquire lands by purchase or by condemnation which it deems necessary for carrying out the Act's purposes. These proceedings were preceded by a T. V. A. resolution that it did deem these acquisitions necessary for such purposes. Despite Congress' clear expression of its purpose to grant broad condemnation power to T. V. A. we are asked to hold that the Authority's power is less than the powers to condemn granted other governmental agencies, which under 40 U. S. C. 257 have been held to have a power to condemn coextensive with their power to purchase. Hanson Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 587. Neither the fact that the Authority wanted to prevent a waste of government funds, nor that it intended to cooperate with the National Park Service detracted from its power to condemn granted by the Act. The cost of public projects is a relevant element in all of them, and the Government, just as anyone else, is not required to proceed oblivious to elements of cost. Cf. Old Dominion Co. v. United States, supra. And when serious problems are created by its public projects, the Government is not barred from making a common sense adjustment in the interest of all the public. Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78. Where public need requires acquisition of property, that need is not to be denied because of an individual's unwillingness to sell. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371. When the need

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REED, J., concurring.

arises individuals may be required to relinquish ownership of property so long as they are given that just compensation which the Constitution requires. Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 531. Such compensation can be awarded these respondents by the District Court.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE REED, concurring.

I agree that the TVA has authority to condemn the tracts of land which the Authority seeks to acquire by these proceedings.

This authority flows from the power of eminent domain granted by §§ 4 and 25 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 58, as amended. The grant which allows condemnation of all property that the Authority “deems necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act," is in sufficiently broad terms, it seems to me, to justify these condemnations. When the Authority was faced with the problem of justly compensating the occupants of the fortyfour thousand acre area between the Fontana Dam lake and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, North Carolina and Swain County for the destruction of Highway No. 288, it could within its delegated powers purchase or condemn the lands affected or build a substitute highway whichever appeared cheaper. The United States is not barred from the exercise of good business judgment in its construction work. Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78. See United States v. Meyer, 113 F. 2d 387; Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 296 F. 20, 269 U. S. 55, 66. Such action is not "outside land speculation." 263 U. S. at 84. It follows that having this power, the Authority could contract, as it did, to reduce its expenditures

by the contract arrangements of July 30, 1943, with Swain County and North Carolina. With the Authority's power to turn over its lands to the National Park, we are not here concerned. Under the contract the public rights in Highway No. 288 were acquired by the Authority and it agreed to acquire the lands here in controversy. The acquisition of the whole area was a factor in these arrangements and the condemnation of these smaller tracts is a part of the transaction.

I do not join in the opinion of the Court because of certain language, ante, pp. 551-554, which implies to me that there is no judicial review of the Authority's determination that acquisition of these isolated pieces of private property is within the purposes of the TVA Act. The Court seems to accept the Authority's argument that a good faith determination by it that property is necessary for the purposes of the Act bars judicial review as to whether the proposed use will be within the statutory limits. This argument of lack of judicial power properly was rejected by the Circuit Court of Appeals although, as explained above, I think that court erroneously held that the TVA Act did not authorize these condemnations. 150 F. 2d 613, 616. It is my opinion that the TVA is a creature of its statute and bound by the terms of that statute, and that its every act may be tested judicially, by any party with standing to do so, to determine whether it moves within the authority granted to it by Congress. School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94; Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 369.

This taking is for a public purpose but whether it is or is not is a judicial question. Of course, the legislative or administrative determination has great weight but the constitutional doctrine of the Separation of Powers would be unduly restricted if an administrative agency could invoke a so-called political power so as to immunize its action against judicial examination in contests between

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FRANKFURTER, J., concurring.

the agency and the citizen. The former cases go no further than this. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 680; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 709; Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 66; Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 446.

Once it is admitted or judicially determined that a proposed condemnation is for a public purpose and within the statutory authority, a political or judicially non-reviewable question may emerge, to wit, the necessity or expediency of the condemnation of the particular property. These are the cases that led the TVA, erroneously in my view, to assert the action of its Board could "not be set aside by a court." Adirondack R. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335, 349; Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 58; Joslin Co. v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 678; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 708.

The CHIEF JUSTICE joins in this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.

I join in the opinion of the Court for I do not read it as does my brother REED. The Bill of Rights provides that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." U. S. Const., Amend. V. This Court has never deviated from the view that under the Constitution a claim that a taking is not "for public use" is open for judicial consideration, ultimately by this Court. It is equally true that in the numerous cases in which the issue was adjudicated, this Court never found that the legislative determination that the use was "public" exceeded Constitutional bounds. But the fact that the nature of the subject matter gives the legislative determination nearly immunity from judicial review does not mean that the power to review is wanting. All the cases cited in the Court's opinion sustaining a taking recognize and accept the power of judicial review. I assume that in citing these cases the Court again recognizes

the doctrine that whether a taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond judicial competence.

S. R. A., INC. v. MINNESOTA.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA.

Nos. 254 and 255. Argued January 3, 1946.-Decided March 25, 1946. Real estate, which had been acquired by the United States for public purposes with the consent of a State and over which the United States had exercised exclusive legislative jurisdiction pursuant to Art. I, §8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, was sold to a private party under a contract of sale giving the purchaser possession but retaining legal title in the United States until payment of the balance of the purchase price in installments. The contract contained no express provision retaining sovereignty in the United States; there was no express retrocession by Congress to the State; and the original act of cession contained no requirement for return of sovereignty to the State when the property was no longer used for federal purposes. While much of the purchase price was still not due and unpaid, the State levied taxes on the property "subject to fee title remaining in the United States." Under the state law, as construed by the Supreme Court of the State, the equitable interest alone could be sold for taxes, leaving the fee of the United States in its position of priority over any interests which might be transferred by the tax sale. Held:

1. The contract transferred the equity in the land to the purchaser, leaving in the United States only a legal title as security— the equivalent of a mortgage. Pp. 565, 569.

2. When the purchaser took possession of the property, it became subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the State. P. 565.

3. The construction by the state supreme court of the law of the State as to the effect of a tax sale of the purchaser's interest on the interest of the United States is binding on this Court. P. 565.

4. The property is not immune from taxation by the State. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, distinguished; New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547, followed. Pp. 566–569.

5. The tax is not invalidated by the inclusion of the interest of the United States in the valuation of the land, since its interest is for security purposes only and is not beneficial in nature. P. 570. 219 Minn. 493, 517; 18 N. W. 2d 442, 455, affirmed.