The Doctor represents this agency as extending to all the acts of men, both internal and external. This the reader must have already discovered. It will be seen more clearly from the following quotations :

"Mind cannot act, any more than matter can move, without a Divine agency. There must be the exercise of Divine agency in every human action; without which, it is impossible to conceive that God should govern moral agents, and make mankind act in perfect conformity to his own designs. This is the only scriptural representation of Divine Providence; and, according to this representation, it is easy to see that all actions, as well as all events, may be traced up to the over-ruling hand of God. It is a gross absurdity to suppose, that the providence of God is more extensive than his agency, or that he ever governs men without exerting a positive influence over them. It is God who worketh in men to will and to do in all cases, without exception." Vol. ii. p. 40, 41, 42.

From this language, the Doctor obviously considers the Divine agency as extending to all the events that ever take place in the minds of men; not only to

those acts of which, according to his account, the heart consists, "affections, desires, intentions, and volitions;" but also to all the acts of perception, reason, memory, imagination, conscience, and all other forms of operation of which the mind is the subject. He represents "Divine Providence" as extending to "all actions as well as events;" and declares it "a gross absurdity to suppose, that the providence of God is more extensive than His agency; or that He ever governs men without exerting a positive influence over them." If, then, God governs all actions and events, He governs all those of which men are the subjects: and if He never governs men without a positive influence over them, then He governs all the actions and events which take place in their minds by a positive influence; that is, according to the Doctor's theory, creates them.

The Doctor no where does, nor could with propriety, separate the "exercises of the heart, affections, desires, intentions, and volitions," and "the external actions," from the other operations of the mind, in such a manner as to denominate the former, the actions, and the only actions of men, in distinction from the latter. The mind acts as much in perceiving, judging,

recollecting, imagining, and other similar operations, as in loving or hating, desiring or intending. The difference in the state of the mind, when those two classes of operation occur, is, that the mode of its operation is different-not that it is active when the former, and inactive when the latter class takes place.

And had he made such a distinction between those two classes of acts, his views of the dependence of men must have led him to regard the latter, as produced by the same kind of agency, as the former.

His views of mankind, as absolutely destitute of power, presented in his argument on that subject, just quoted, employed to prove the necessity of a direct agency; his use of the scriptural passages, "In him we live and move and have our being, "we are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God," to prove the same necessity; and his unequivocal and unlimited declarations in the preceding quotations show, that he considers God's agency as extending in the same manner to "all the actions and events," both internal and external, of which men are the subjects.

The Doctor's theory therefore is compactly embodied in the proposition

GOD CREATES ALL THE ACTS OF MEN; or all the internal and external actions and events, be predicated of them.

which

may

According to this theory, God creates not only all the internal exercises and external actions themselves of men, but also of course the nature of those exercises and actions-the nature of all their perceptions, that is, that they are perceptions of such objects as they are, and not of others; and such kinds of perceptions of those objects, and not different ones; and perceptions of such degrees of strength and clearness, and not of other degrees: and so also the nature of all their acts of judgment, memory, imagination, conscience, &c.; and likewise the nature of all the exercises of their hearts, affections, senses, intentions, and volitions-that is, that they are virtuous and not vicious, or vicious and not virtuous; and so also the nature of their external actions. For as the agency of God is the sole cause that those exercises and actions possess existence, it must of course be the sole cause that they possess such an existence as they

desires

do. To suppose, that while they owe their existence solely to God's agency, they owe their nature to some other agency, is to suppose that some other agency than God's is concerned in giving them existence; since that, in its nature, which distinguishes each one of those acts from all others of the same kind, is a part of that act, as much as that in its nature, which distinguishes one class of those acts from another, is a part of that class: and it is also to suppose, that God's agency, that is, the exercise of His omnipotence, is controlled or modified by some other agency; both of which suppositions are

absurd.

As, therefore, according to this theory, God creates all the acts of men and their nature, the sole reason, that some of those acts differ from others is, that the exercise of God's power in creating them is different; or rather, that God's volitions, by which He exercises His power, are different. His omnipotent volitions, being the sole cause of their nature, a difference in His volitions must be the sole cause of the difference in their nature.

The volitions of men are, according to the theory, always produced in the view of motives. "Choice always implies mo