A thing "originates from a Divine efficiency," when the power which gives it existence is God's; for "efficiency" is the efficacious exertion of power. If men can no more act than exist without the constant aid and influence of the Deity; then, as they do not possess within themselves the power at all of existing, or are not at all self-existent, but are kept in existence entirely by Divine power; so they do not possess in themselves at all the power of acting, but all their actions are created by Divine power: and the fact, that all their "actions must originate from a Divine efficiency," arises from their being absolutely destitute of power.

Since, then, the Doctor regards the absolute dependence of men as consisting in an absolute destitution of power, and infers from it the impossibility of their exerting of themselves, acts which are the effects of their power, he cannot of course mean by the phraseology in question, to designate an agency by which the power of acting is communicated. For if he grant that the power of acting is communicated at all, he must, to be consistent, give up his views of the dependence of creatures, and abandon his argument erected on it, to prove that all the acts of men are the

production of Divine power; for it makes no difference in the nature of their dependence, nor in the fact that their actions are the effect of their own power, and not God's, whether the power of exerting them is communicated at the time it is exerted, or at the commencement of their existence. If they actually possess power, they are not absolutely destitute of it, as the Doctor teaches;-and if they possess the power by which their actions are exerted, then their actions are the productions of their own, and not of God's

power.

Since, then, the Doctor could not have used the phraseology under consideration, to designate an agency by which the power of acting is communicated, without contradicting his views and reasonings respecting the dependence of men, it is apparent that he cannot have employed it to denote such an agency. Nor can he mean to designate by those phrases, an agency by which God merely governs men in the exercise of their power; since merely to govern men, or exert on them an agency which simply determines the mode in which they act or exert their power, is nothing more nor less than to bring them into a state in which they are

disposed or choose to act in a given manner. But the Doctor denies that God can dispose men to act in any other way than by producing, that is, creating their volitions; and of course denies that He can govern them, or determine the mode of their acting, in any other way than by creating their actions. And moreover, he denies that men possess the power by which their actions are exerted. Their actions are, according to his representation, entirely the effects of God's power. Of course he cannot mean to denote by the language referred to, an agency employed in governing them in the exercise of power belonging to themselves. Nor can he, for the same reason, be supposed to use those phrases to designate an agency consisting of part, or all of the kinds of agency which have been mentioned, united.

If, therefore, as thus appears, he neither employed it to denote an agency which merely produces in men a disposition to act, or exert their own power, or excites men to act, or exert their own power; nor an agency which imparts the power of acting; nor an agency consisting of part, or all of those kinds of agency; then, if he intended to denote by it

any kind of agency, he must have employed it to designate a creating agency. For there are no other conceivable modes of agency by which God could, by a direct influence, call the volitions of men into existence, than either that by which he would merely produce in them a disposition to act, or excite them to act or exert their own power in a given way; in which case their actions would be the production or effect of their own power, and his agency only the cause or occasion of their exerting their power in such a manner; or, that by which he would communicate the power of acting; in which case their volitions would also be the effect of their own power, and his agency only the cause of their possessing that power; or, an agency both imparting power and producing a disposition to act, or governing the exercise of that power; or else a creating agency; an agency which is neither employed in producing a disposition, nor in governing men in the exercise of their own power, nor in imparting to them the power of acting, but which, without the intervention of any such steps, calls their volitions immediately into existence. And as he cannot, as we have shown, have designed to designate by the language in

question, either of the former kinds of agency, he must, if he intended to designate any kind of agency by it, have employed it to denote the last-a creating agency. And moreover, whether he intended by the phraseology under consideration, to designate a particular mode of Divine agency, or not, it is perfectly apparent, from the considerations adduced, to show that if he intended to designate any mode, it must be that of creating; that that is the mode of agency which be regards and means by his theory to exhibit God as exercising. For he denies, as shown, that God exerts any other conceivable mode of agency on mankind, beside that of creating; and therefore must regard and mean to exhibit God as exerting that, and only that mode.

Such, then, are the Doctor's views of the Divine agency on men. He considers its mode as that of creating. He represents God as calling the acts of men into existence, as He called the material world into existence at its creation. God then said, Let there be light, and there was light. According to the Doctor, He now says, Let the acts of men exist, and the acts of men

are.