own destruction, under his positive influence." p. 228.

"They never do act of themselves.They live and move and have their being in God, who constantly works in them, both to will and to do, in every instance of their conduct." p. 240..

"Men are no more capable of acting independently of God in one instance than another. if they need any kind or degree of divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind and degree of divine agency in doing evil. This is the dictate of reason, and the Scripture says the same. It is God who worketh in men, both to will and to do, in all cases without exception. He wrought equally in the minds of those who sold, and in the minds of those who bought, Joseph. He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren, when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared these persons to act, but made them act. He not only exhibited motives of action before their minds, but disposed their minds to comply with the motives exhibited.But there was no possible way, in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or

wrong volitions in their hearts. And if he produced their bad as well as good volitions, then his agency was concerned in precisely the same manner, in their wrong as in their right actions." Vol. ii. Vol. ii. p. 40.

"If God can work in moral agents both to will and to do of his good pleasure, then we may easily account for the moral depravity of infants." Vol. i. p. 235.

"He works in them, as he does in other men, both to will and to do of his good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts, in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists." p. 238.

"Their" [sinners'] "activity in all cases is owing to a divine operation upon their minds: they are not sufficient of themselves to think any thing of themselves." Vol. ii. p. 179.

"If they" [men] "do any thing whatever, it may be truly said, it was done by. the finger of God." p. 32.

Many other passages of similar import might be added from the Doctor's volumes; but from these it is seen with sufficient clearness, that he regards the mode of the divine agency as that of creating. In the passages from vol. i. pp. 231, 279, 280, and 281, he represents the agency

of God, in regard to the holy acts of men, as a creating agency; and in the passage from vol. ii. p. 40, he represents precisely the same kind and degree of divine agency as necessary to men in doing evil, as in doing good; and God's agency as concerned in precisely the same manner in their wrong as in their right actions; of course it is a creating agency. From his using the noun" production," in several of those passages, interchangeably with "creation;" and in many other passages, the verb "produce," interchangeably with "create," it is apparent that he employs them in those places to denote the same kind of agency.

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And we must infer, that he intends likewise to designate a creating agency, by the terms, "divine efficiency," "divine operation," "divine agency," positive influence;" and the phrases, "to work in men to will and to do"-" made them act" -"disposed their minds," and others of similar import, if he wishes by them to denote any mode of God's agency. As this phraseology itself, if you except the first term, does not determine what mode of agency it is employed to designate; it must be interpreted in accordance with those passages, in which the Doctor exhi

bits the mode of divine agency, as that of creating.

He cannot consistently employ it to denote any other mode, nor mean by it any thing less, than that God creates the acts of men.

He cannot mean by it, that God merely brings men into a state, in which they are disposed to act, or to act in a given way; leaving them to exert their volitions by their own power, instead of His creating those volitions; for he denies that any disposition can exist in the mind, which is distinct from and the cause of volition.

"Some," says he, "suppose that a good heart essentially consists in a good principle, taste, or relish, which is totally independent of the will. But this sentiment is totally repugnant to the law of love. This law requires no dormant, inactive, torpid disposition, inclination, or taste. There can be no such thing as an holy principle, disposition, or inclination, which is distinct from true love." "Some suppose that a bad heart consists in a bad principle, disposition, or inclination, which is entirely distinct from sinful, voluntary exercises. But it appears that all sinfulness consists in the various exercises

and modifications of self-love." Vol. i. pp. 265, 266, and 267.

"Moral exercises flow from a divine operation upon the mind of a moral agent, and not from any natural faculty, principle, or taste, enabling him to originate his own internal exercises, or external actions." Vol. ii. p. 195.

"But there was no possible way in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts." p. 40.

As the Doctor thus denies that a disposition, distinct from volition, and antecedent to it, enabling a moral agent to originate his own internal exercises, or external actions, ever exists; and denies also, that God can possibly dispose a moral agent to act right or wrong, in any other way than by producing right or wrong volitions themselves in his heart; he cannot of course mean by those phrases to designate an agency which produces such a disposition. Besides, under such a mode of agency, men, according to the Doctor, would be passive. "We know that love is a free, voluntary exercise, and not any taste, habit, or principle, which is totally inactive and involuntary. It is absurd to suppose, that God should require any