## Vagueness: A ReaderRosanna Keefe, Peter Smith Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole" -- have borderline cases (arguably, someone may be neither tall nor not tall); and they lack well-defined extensions (there is no sharp boundary between tall people and the rest). The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If you remove one grain from a heap of sand, surely you must be left with a heap. Yet apply this principle repeatedly as you remove grains one by one, and you end up, absurdly, with a solitary grain that counts as a heap. This anthology collects papers in the field. After an introduction that surveys the field, the essays form four groups, starting with some historically notable pieces. The 1970s saw an explosion of interest in vagueness, and the second group of essays reprints classic papers from this period. The following group of papers represent current work on the logic and semantics of vagueness. The essays in the final group are contributions to the continuing debate about vague objects and vague identity. |

### Contents

theories of vagueness | 1 |

2 On the sorites | 58 |

3 Vagueness | 61 |

an exercise in logical analysis | 69 |

5 Vagueness and logic | 82 |

6 Truth and vagueness | 85 |

7 The sorites paradox | 89 |

8 Wangs paradox | 99 |

12 Further reflections on the sorites paradox | 204 |

13 Concepts without boundaries | 251 |

14 Vagueness and ignorance | 265 |

15 Sorites paradoxes and the semantics of vagueness | 281 |

16 Vagueness by degrees | 294 |

17 Can there be vague objects? | 317 |

Evans misunderstood | 318 |

19 Worldly indeterminacy of identity | 321 |

9 Vagueness truth and logic | 119 |

10 Languagemastery and the sorites paradox | 151 |

11 Truth belief and vagueness | 174 |

338 | |

346 | |