As to place, in Phillips' Code Pleading (2d Ed.), § 414, it is said: "Whether the action is local or transitory, at common law every local fact alleged in any pleading must be laid with its true venue, on peril of a variance, should the fact be brought in issue. Under the code also, where place is material to the right of action or to the jurisdiction of the court, it must be alleged." At common law the rule was formulated that where the venue was laid with certainty, it was not necessary to allege with particularity descriptive matters of place. See Chicago City Ry. Co. v. MeMeen, 206 Ill. 108, 68 N. E. 1093, citing Chitty and Tidd. That case, however, applied the principle that where such unnecessary particulars of place were alleged, the allegations thus made must be proved as stated in order to avoid a variance. Under the codes it may be assumed that such degree of exact information is contemplated as to give the opposing party a fuller factual notice than was required in some connections at

common law. Hence in code pleading particular allegations of place, time, might be said to be

as well as

informative essentials.

At any rate, the above subdivision definitely makes such allegations of place as are made material for the purpose stated.

SUBDIVISION (G)
COMMENT

292. In general.

In providing that when items of special damage are claimed they shall be specifically stated, above subdivision appears to be expressive

of a principle already generally accepted by the courts. See, for example, the Iowa and Wisconsin cases cited in the "Source Authorities" of the notes to Rule 8 subdivision (a), ante.

Citing Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Roller (C. C. A. 9th, 1900), 100 Fed. 738, 49 L. R. A. 77; Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 193, 56 N. E.

497; Gagnier v. Fargo, 12 N. D. 219, 96 N. W. 841, it is said, in Phillips' Code Pleading (2d Ed.), § 507: "Under a general allegation of damages, the plaintiff may prove and may recover only general damagesthat is, such as naturally and necessarily result from the acts or omissions of which complaint is made. Such an allegation is sufficient to allow proof of pain, mental anguish, and any injury to the health of the plaintiff which was a natural, probable, and reasonable result of defendant's wrong."

Citing 1 Sutherland Damages (2d Ed.), 763; Mayne Dam. (10th Ed. 1929) 553-558; 2 Addison on Torts, 1339 (1881); Andrews Stephen's Pleading (2d Ed.), 164, it is said, in Phillips' Code Pleading (2d Ed.), § 508: "A plaintiff may be entitled to damages different from, or in addition to, those general damages which the law implies; he may have suffered injury which, though the natural consequence, is not the necessary consequence, of the wrong complained of, and for which he can not recover under a general allegation of damages. In such case, in order that the court may be advised as to the scope of the action, and to give the defendant notice of what will be subjects of proof at the trial, the facts out of which such special damages arise are required to be specially pleaded in the complaint."

In Shipman on Common Law Pleading (3d Ed.) p. 488, it is said: "When the damage claimed is the necessary and proximate consequence of the act complained of, the law presumes it to have resulted from that act, and it is sufficient to describe it in general terms, for the reason that the opposite party will not be unduly taken by surprise. But, when the plaintiff suffers some peculiar or unusual loss it is essential that the resulting damage, called 'special damages,' be shown with particularity."

such damages must be shown in order that there be any substantive right of action at all, as, for instance, in certain forms of slander; and, second, in the ordinary case above stated, where additional damages over the ordinary loss which is presumed are being claimed by the plaintiff." Clark's Code Pleading, p. 227.

299. Supreme Court cases.

In Roberts v. Graham, 6 Wall. 578, 18 L. Ed. 791 (1867), the court said: "Special, as contradistinguished from general damage, is that which is the natural, but not the necessary, consequence of the act complained of."

In Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225, 23 L. Ed. 308 (1875), a slander case, the court said: "Special damage is a term which denotes a claim for the

natural and proximate consequences of a wrongful act; and it is undoubtedly true that the plaintiff in such a case may recover for defamatory words spoken of him or her by the defendant. Even though the words are not in themselves objectionable, if the declaration sets forth such a claim in due form, and the allegation is sustained by sufficient evidence; but the claim must be specifically set forth, in order that the defendant may be duly notified of its nature, and that the court may have the means to determine whether the alleged special damage is the natural and proximate consequence of the defamatory words alleged to have been spoken by the defendant."

Where a declaration claimed injuries to a lot, which was in fact divided into sublots owned by plaintiff, damages to any portion of the whole might be recovered. Hetzel v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 169 U. S. 26, 42 L. Ed. 648, 18 Sup. Ct. 255 (1897).

The plaintiffs may not recover more, as principal, than the sum de