tion and functioning of the various departments and agencies and to make recommendations to the President, the Congress, and the departments in the interest of economy and efficiency. CREATION OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE Title III of the act provided for the establishment of a General Accounting Office, headed by a Comptroller General of the United States. Such appointee would be independent of the executive branch and responsible only to the Congress as its fiscal representative and auditor. The Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a period of 15 years. The Comptroller General is not eligible for reappointment. The Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General can be removed only by joint resolution of Congress, after notice and hearing, when, in the judgment of Congress, either has become permanently incapacitated or has been inefficient, or guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment. AUTHORITY CONFERRED UPON THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE Under section 304 of the act, all the powers and duties which had been previously imposed by law and exercised by the Comptroller of the Treasury and the six auditors of the Department of the Treasury, and the duties of the Division of Bookkeeping and Warrants of the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury relating to the keeping of the personal ledger accounts of disbursing and collecting officers, were vested in the General Accounting Office. This included the duty of rendering advance decisions, previously imposed upon the Comptroller of the Treasury by the Dockery Act. The offices of Comptroller of the Treasury and Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury and six auditors in the Department of the Treasury were abolished.* Section 305 amended section 236 of the Revised Statutes to provide that all claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States, or against it, and all accounts whatever in which the Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or creditor, should be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office. Section 309 of the act gave the Comptroller General the power to prescribe the forms, systems, and procedure for the administrative appropriation and fund accounting in the various departments and establishments and the administrative examination of fiscal officers' accounts and claims against the United States. The Comptroller General is required by section 312 to investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds, and to make to the Congress annually, and to the President when requested, a report on the work of the General Accounting Office containing recommendations for legislation he deems necessary, and to include in the regular For committee documents relating to audits by the Comptroller General, see S. Rept. No. 2685, 81st Cong.; S. Rept. No. 861, 83d Cong.; and S. Rept. No. 1572, 84th Cong. report or in special reports recommendations looking to greater economy and efficiency in public expenditures. Section 312 also required the Comptroller General to make such investigations and reports as ordered by either House or any committee of the Congress having jurisdiction over revenues, appropriations, or expenditures; to report on any expenditures or contract made in violation of law and on the adequacy of administrative examination and inspection of fiscal accounts and offices; and to furnish information requested by the Bureau of the Budget on expenditures and accounting. The act required the heads of all departments and establishments to cooperate with the Comptroller General by furnishing such information regarding the powers, duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and methods of business of their respective offices as he may from time to time require. The Comptroller General, or any of his assistants or employees, when duly authorized by him, was authorized, for the purpose of securing such information, to have access to and the right to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of any department or establishment. The scope and authority of the General Accounting Office has been extended by subsequent legislation, such as the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, the Post Office Department Financial Control Act of 1950, and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. The legislative history and provisions of these acts are discussed in parts I and IV of this report. VETO OF THE FIRST BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT BY PRESIDENT WILSON The Congress devoted a great deal of effort toward perfecting legislation and establishing procedures to insure that the new General Accounting Office would be independent of the executive branch and directly responsible to the Congress. Much thought was given to the inclusion of a provision by which the proposed heads-the Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General-would be appointed by the Congress as its agents without any Presidential influence or control. Two major objections were raised to this latter procedure: (1) That it might involve a constitutional question as to the authority of the Congress to make appointments of Federal officers or take action which might affect the power of the President with respect to the appointment of such officers, and (2) whether or not the terms of these officers might be terminated by succeeding Congresses on a possible. partisan political basis." To meet these objections, the appointive power was vested in the President, under conditions which were designed to guarantee tenure of office on a basis similar to the appointment of Federal judges, in the sense that they were not removable by the President. The original bill, as approved by the Congress, provided that the Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General were to serve during good behavior and could be removed only when either officer "is incapacitated, or has become inefficient, or has been guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving 5 See app. B, pp. 297-321, Staff Memorandum No. 83-2-33, dated Nov. 24, 1954. moral turpitude *** and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment," and that, where action was to be instituted to remove either of these officers, under the prescribed conditions, only action by the Congress itself, through the adoption of a concurrent resolution, would be effective in bringing about such removal. President Wilson on June 4, 1920, vetoed this bill, H.R. 9783 (H. Doc. 805, 66th Cong.), on the grounds that the provision authorizing removal by concurrent resolution of Congress was in violation of the constitutional authority vested in the Chief Executive to remove appointive officers, and its enactment would be an encroachment on the authority of the President. The first paragraph of the President's veto message had this to say: I am returning without my signature H.R. 9783, an act to provide a national budget system, an independent audit of Government accounts, and for other purposes. I do this with the greatest regret. I am in entire sympathy with the objects of this bill and would gladly approve it but for the fact that I regard one of the provisions contained in section 303 as unconstitutional. This is the provision to the effect that the Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General, who are to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, may be removed at any time by a concurrent resolution of Congress after notice and hearing, when, in their judgment, the Comptroller General or Assistant Comptroller General is incapacitated or inefficient, or has been guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment. The effect of this is to prevent the removal of these officers for any cause except either by impeachment or a concurrent resolution of Congress. It has, I think, always been the accepted construction of the Constitution that the power to appoint officers of this kind carries with it, as an incident, the power to remove. I am convinced that the Congress is without constitutional power to limit the appointing power and its incident, the power of removal derived from the Constitution. The President's veto of H.R. 9783 was sustained by the House of Representatives on June 4, 1920 (Congressional Record, p. 8613). APPROVAL OF THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 1921 At the beginning of the 67th Congress, a similar bill (S. 1084) was introduced and passed by both Houses, followed by a conference in which the conferees reported (H. Rept. 96, 67th Cong.) : The Senate bill provides that the Comptroller General and named in the bill. The bill as agreed upon in conference This bill was approved by President Harding on June 10, 1921, as the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Changes made in the new bill, as compared with the original bill vetoed by the President, provided that the term of office of both the Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General was fixed at 15 years; the Comptroller General's tenure was limited to one term; and provision was made for removal of either official for cause by Congress by joint resolution, instead of by concurrent resolution. The effect of this latter change was to require Presidential approval of the congressional action, and a subsequent overriding of a Presidential veto in the event that the President refused to sign the resolution. BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACTIVITIES, 1930-40 A number of proposals for changes in the financial management of the Federal Government were considered during the 10-year period 1930-40. Some of the proposals were submitted to the Congress either under reorganization authority granted to the President or under authority vested in the President by statute. Two major studies made during this period contained significant recommendations relating to financial matters. They were the President's Committee on Administrative Management, appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Senate Select Committee To Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government, created by Senate Resolution 217 of the 74th Congress. Action taken on recommendations made to the Congress as a result of these two studies, and other changes affecting the financial operations of the Federal Government, follow: PROPOSED TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY OVER ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS FROM THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE TO THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET Title IV of the act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 413), generally known as the Economy Act, gave the President power to reorganize, by transfer or consolidation, the functions of executive departments and agencies. The power conferred did not include authority to abolish any function. Action by the President was to be by Executive orders, which were to be transmitted to Congress and were not to become effective until 60 days after their transmittal. The Congress could veto any such Executive order, or any part thereof, by the passage of a resolution of disapproval by either House within 60 days of its transmission. Recommendations of President Hoover Under this authority, President Herbert Hoover submitted to Congress Executive Orders 5959-5969 on December 9, 1932, reorganizing the executive branch of the Government. One of these orders (Ex H. Doc. 493, 72d Cong. (76 pp.) contains the Executive orders and supporting material. ecutive Order 5959), relating to the financial affairs of the Government, recommended that the following functions be transferred to the Bureau of the Budget: 1. The powers and duties now exercised by the General Accounting Office which relate to the designing, prescribing, and installation of accounting forms, systems, and procedure in the several executive departments and independent establishments, except that the Comptroller General shall retain the power and duty to prescribe the form and manner in which accounts shall be submitted to his Office for audit. 2. The powers and duties now exercised by the General Accounting Office which relate to the administrative examination of fiscal officers' accounts and claims against the United States, and the adequacy and effectiveness of the administrative examination of accounts and claims in the respective departments and establishments, and the adequacy and effectiveness of departmental inspection of the officers and accounts of fiscal officers. President Hoover's reason for this recommendation was stated in his message, as follows: " *** It is not, however, a proper function of an establishment created primarily for the purpose of auditing Government accounts to make the necessary studies and to develop and prescribe accounting systems involving the entire field of Government accounting. Neither is it a proper function of such an establishment to prescribe the procedure for nor to determine the effectiveness of the administrative examination of accounts. Accounting is an essential element of effective administration, and it should be developed with the primary objective of serving this purpose. *** The House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, to which the message had been referred in the previous Congress, recommended the passage of a resolution disapproving the Executive orders. The resolution was adopted on January 19, 1933.9 As a result of this action, the transfers recommended by President Hoover in Executive Order 5959, under authority of the act of June 30, 1932, did not become effective. AUTHORITY TO APPORTION FUNDS TRANSFERRED TO THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXECUTIVE ORDER 6166 1 The act of June 30, 1932, was amended by the act of March 3, 1933 (Public Law 72-428, 47 Stat. 1517), vesting in the President power to abolish as well as to consolidate or transfer functions of any executive agencies in order to reduce Government expenditures. The amended act increased the Executive power in that it did not provide for a congressional veto of Executive orders issued by the President. Such orders became effective 60 days after transmittal to Congress, unless the Congress set an earlier effective date. "H. Doc. 483, 72d Con. (p. 70). 8 H. Res. 334, H. Rept. 1833, 72d Cong. Congressional Record, Jan. 19, 1933, p. 2126. |