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The committees were authorized to employ staffs of independent, qualified specialists in their respective fields, appointed on a basis of merit, to aid the committees in carrying out their legislative responsibilities and in keepng watch over the execution of the laws affecting Federal activities coming under their respective legislative oversight jurisdictions.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

One of the fifteen standing committees created in the Senate by the act was the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is set forth in section 102 of the act. The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (name changed to Committee on Government Operations on March 3, 1952) 1 was established under subsection 102 (1) (g) of that act as a standing committee.

1

The committee was charged with the responsibility for all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to budget and accounting measures other than appropriations and reorganizations in the executive branch of the Government. In addition, the committee has the duty of—

(1) Receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General of the United States and of submitting such recommendations to the Senate as it deems necessary or desirable in connection with the subject matter of such reports;

(2) Studying the operation of Government activities at all levels with a view to determining its economy and efficiency;

(3) Evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the Government; and

(4) Studying intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the States and municipalities, and between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member.

STRENGTHENING FISCAL CONTROLS

One of the major aims of the Legislative Reorganization Act was to strengthen the congressional power of the purse. To this end, the act provided for a legislative budget; a joint committee on the budget; 2 expenditure analyses by the Comptroller General; development of a standard appropriation classification schedule; studies by the Comptroller General of restrictions in the appropriation acts; studies by both Appropriations Committees of permanent appropriations and of the disposition of funds resulting from the sale of Government property or services, and expansion of the staffs of the Committees on Appropriations.

Two sections of the Legislative Reorganization Act, still in effect after 14 years, have long since been ignored. They are the legislative

1 S. Res. 280, 82d Cong.

2 See pt. VII of this report for a discussion of Senate action to create a permanent Joint Committee on the Budget.

budget provision (sec. 138), and the requirement that the Comptroller General make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the Government to enable Congress to determine whether public funds have been economically and efficiently administered (sec. 206).

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET

One of the most far reaching provisions for strengthening fiscal controls of Congress was contained in section 138, which provided for fixing a ceiling on the maximum amount to be appropriated for expenditures in each ensuing year.

The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in its report (S. Rept. 1011, 79th Cong.) pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution 18 of the 79th Congress, made the following recommendation:

We recommend that the revenue and appropriations committees of each House, acting jointly, be required to submit to each House, within 60 days after the opening of a congressional session (or by April 15), a concurrent resolution which would set out the anticipated receipts as estimated by the revenue committees, and the total amount of Federal expenditures as estimated by the Appropriations Committee for the next fiscal year.

The Joint Committee reported that no effort had been made to effect improvements in the system in existence prior to the 79th Congress with the objective of establishing an adequate fiscal policy, and that, if there was such a policy, it could not be followed. To provide the necessary machinery to effectuate such fiscal policy, and to put its recommendation into operation, the committee proposed the formation of a legislative budget committee to consist of the four principal committees of the Congress having control over revenues and the expenditure of public funds-the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Committee on Finance. In accordance with the provisions of the act, the legislative budget committee would be required to meet at the beginning of each session of the Congress and, after due deliberation and consultation, submit a legislative budget by February 15 of each year which would include (1) an overall limit on Federal expenditures for the ensuing fiscal year and (2) an estimate of total receipts. Congressional approval of the expenditure ceiling was recommended to make it obligatory. With relatively little objection, the legislative budget proposal was approved by the 79th Congress as section 138, as follows:

SEC. 138. (a) The Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, or duly authorized subcommittees thereof, are authorized and directed to meet jointly at the beginning of each regular session of Congress and after study and consultation, giving due consideration to the budget recommendations of the President, report to their respective Houses a legislative budget for the ensuing fiscal year, including the estimated overall Federal receipts

and expenditures for such year. Such report shall contain a
recommendation for the maximum amount to be appropri-
ated for expenditure in such year which shall include such
an amount to be reserved for deficiencies as may be deemed
necessary by such committees. If the estimated receipts
exceed the estimated expenditures, such report shall contain
a recommendation for a reduction in the public debt. Such
report shall be made by February 15.

(b) The report shall be accompanied by a concurrent
resolution adopting such budget, and fixing the maximum
amount to be appropriated for expenditure in such year.
If the estimated expenditures exceed the estimated receipts,
the concurrent resolution shall include a section substan-
tially as follows: "That it is the sense of the Congress that
the public debt shall be increased in an amount equal to the
amount by which the estimated expenditures for the ensu-
ing fiscal year exceed the estimated receipts, such amounts
being $_____."

Efforts were made in 1947, 1948, and 1949 to carry out the provisions of section 138, without success. However worthy and wellintended were the provisions of that section, 3 years' experience demonstrated that it was impracticable and unworkable.

Reluctance of Congress to commit itself

The Congress was reluctant to commit itself to a spending plan, fashioned by the Legislative Budget Committee established by section 138 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, in advance of congressional action on appropriation measures. This reluctance is deep seated, and grows partially out of the belief that no general conclusion relative to a spending policy can be determined and certainly not made mandatory-until a minute appraisal of expenditure requests has been completed by the Appropriations Committees. Members of Congress who share this view feel that the Congress cannot adopt a ceiling which can be applied effectively in handling supplemental and deficiency appropriations, legislative authorizations, and changing budgetary conditions in general, 6 months prior to the fiscal period. Representative Cannon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, on February 7, 1949, during debate on the legislative budget stated (Congressional Record, p. 880):

*** Mr. Speaker, of all of the unworkable and impractica-
ble provisions in the Reorganization Act none is so unwork-
able and impracticable as the legislative budget. It cannot be
made effective. We can no more expect success, Mr. Speaker,
with this well-meant but hopeless proposal than we can expect
a verdict from the jury before it has heard the evidence. ****

Legislative budget ineffective

Congress made three attempts to carry out the objectives of section 138, calling for a legislative budget, but none of them were effective. The first attempt in 1947 failed. The Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget reported a concurrent_resolution (H. Con. Res. 20, 80th Cong.) which was adopted by the House on February 20, and by the

Senate with amendments on March 3, 1947, but the conferees could no agree upon the division of the expected surplus between tax reduction and debt retirement.

The Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget also reported of February 9, 1948, Senate Concurrent Resolution 42 of the 80th Con gress establishing a ceiling on expenditures for fiscal year 1949, which passed the Senate on February 18, and the House on February 27, 1948. This was the first and only time Congress complied with th legislative budget provision. The ceiling placed upon appropriation by the 1948 resolution, however, was not effective since total appro priations during the 2d session of the 80th Congress exceeded it by more than $6 billion. The following are excerpts from comment made in the House of Representatives during consideration of Senat Concurrent Resolution 42:

Representative Brown of Ohio:

In my opinion that provision (sec. 138) of the Reorganization Act is not of any great value. Certainly, we cannot fix this early in any congressional session, with any accuracy, just what the spending requirements will be in the year which starts next July 1. If we wait until later, until the appropriations Committees of the House and Senate have an opportunity to hear testimony as to the needs for appropriations and to reach some definite decision and conclusion as to what those needs are, then of course there will be no necessity of fixing the ceiling ***. (Congressional Record, Feb. 27, 1948, p. 1875.)

Representative Taber of New York:

*** Frankly, it is almost impossible for anybody to take the figures which are herewith submitted or which may result from the consideration of this resolution and arrive at any conclusion which will jibe with the appropriations that so far have been made and which will be made in the rest of the session of this Congress. However, the statute requires that this [passage of a concurrent resolution] be done, and I see nothing to do but put the resolution through (Congressional Record, Feb. 27, 1948, p. 1878.) Representative Cannon of Missouri:

***

* I strongly support the objective sought in this provision of the Reorganization Act. The only difficulty is that the method prescribed is not practical. It is not workable. *** In the two brief sessions of the joint committee it was agreed by every Member of both the House and Senate delegation that the law should be amended or repealed, preferably repealed ***. (Congressional Record, Feb. 27, 1948, p. 1879.)

Both Houses passed House Concurrent Resolution 22, 81st Congres postponing the date for reporting the legislative budget from Febr ary 15 to May 1, 1949. By May 1, 11 appropriation bills had passe the House and 9 had passed the Senate. The deadline date passe without further action.

Although section 138 has not been repealed, no further action has been taken by succeeding Congresses to comply with this provision. Many reasons have been given why the legislative budget, which provided a ceiling on expenditures, was unworkable. Among those

are:

1. The time allowed for preparation of the legislative budget was too short.

2. The joint committee was not adequately staffed to do the job expected of it, and the committee itself, with more than 100 members, was unwieldy.

3. Unpredictable expenditure demands render it impossible to keep total appropriations below the ceiling agreed upon early in the session.

4. The budget ceilings, though approved by Congress, are not binding.

5. The practice of separately passing from a dozen to a score of appropriation bills makes it difficult to enforce overall ceilings. 6. A ceiling on total expenditures cannot be enforced as long as appropriations are based upon obligations whose liquidation in the form of expenditures is frequently spread over more than 1 year.

EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Section 206 of the act directed the Comptroller General to make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the Government (including Government corporations) which, in his opinion, would enable Congress to determine whether public funds have been economically and efficiently administered, and to report the results of his findings to the Committees on Appropriations, the Committees on Government Operations and the appropriate Legislative Oversight Committees of the two Houses. However, up to the present time no appropriation has been made by Congress to carry out this program.

The General Accounting Office has on a number of occasions requested funds from Congress to carry out the provisions of section 206. In fiscal year 1948, the sum of $1 million was included in the budget estimates for the operation of the General Accounting Office to begin the work required by section 206. This amount was not included in the appropriation bill when reported by the House Committee on Appropriations.

In 1950, the Senate Committee on Appropriations included the sum of $800,000 in the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for the General Accounting Office to begin to carry out the duties under section 206. The amendment was approved by the Senate, but the amount was eliminated in conference at the insistence of the House conferees. In 1952, the former Comptroller General appeared before the House Committee on Appropriations and again pointed out that, if it was the desire of the Congress that the General Accounting Office proceed with the work contemplated by section 206, it could not be done within the regular appropriations allocated to the GAO. It was estimated that the General Accounting Office would need $1 million to make a start. The committee, in reporting the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1953, made no mention of section 206 and no funds

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