hibition of withholding or impounding of appropriations by the executive branch, (g) requiring submission of reports on debts, commitments, and uncommitted appropriations on a semiannual basis, and (h) providing for legislative and fiscal sessions of Congress. Although certain aspects of some of these proposals are covered in various sections of this report, the following sections set forth a review and brief summaries of the provisions of these proposals, their objectives, and actions taken by committees and the Congress.

BALANCED BUDGET

Each year as the President's budget for the Federal Government is sent to Congress, the paramount question arises as to the effect it will have on the national debt, and whether or not it is a balanced budget. During the past 10 years (1950-60) the annual budgets have usually called for expenditures in excess of revenues with the result that there has been an ever-increasing growth in the size of the national debt. For the period 1952 through 1959, in only 2 fiscal years, 1956 and 1957 did receipts exceed expenditures. The President announced on July 20, 1960, that fiscal year 1960 ended with a surplus of $1.1 billion. During this 10-year period the Federal debt has increased by over $27 billion to a record figure of $285 billion for which Congress appropriated over $9 billion for interest payments alone in fiscal year 1960.

The Government has gone far past the advice of Thomas Jefferson when he said:

To preserve our independence, we must not let our leaders load us with perpetual debt. We must make our election between economy and liberty, or profusion and servitude.

Many Members of Congress, over the years, have proposed various methods of achieving the objective of assuring a balanced budget, and of bringing to the attenion of responsible officials of the Federal Government the need for restricting expenditures to available receipts. Some of the bills and actions taken by this and other committees on this problem follow.

INCREASING COST OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (S. DOC. 150,

81ST CONG.)

Throughout the 81st Congress, the Committee on Government Operations emphasized the interest and growing concern in the rising cost of the Federal Government. On February 22, 1950, Senator McClellan, chairman of the committee, took the floor of the Senate to warn of the dangers that are inherent in incurring large annual deficits and maintaining a standard of governmental services beyond revenues available. In his remarks he stated that:

For 16 of the last 18 years our Federal Government has run a heavy deficit. In only 2 of those 18 years have Federal revenues exceeded expenditures. That means that we have continuously and tremendously increased the national debt from about $20 billion to some $256 billion. We may readily concede that most of those deficits and our increased debt were

occasioned by war and by the acute economic depression that
preceded it. The necessity for such expenditures in a period
of real crisis is not challenged, but in this postwar period of
high-level national income and prosperity, spending on a scale
and to the extent of creating huge annual deficits can neither
be justified nor long pursued if we are to possess and main-
tain the economic strength and power that is essential and
indispensable to our survival.

Senator McClellan submitted a table on some 15 new programs and expanded governmental services requested in the President's 1951 budget and legislative program, and pointed out that if these programs were enacted into law the aggregate annual cost would be more than $25 billion. Without undertaking to discuss or pass final judgment upon the merits or lack of merits of each of the proposed measures, the chairman emphasized that only the most indispensable additional items should be undertaken until the long-continued, recurring Federal budget deficits have been eliminated.

A few days later much debate in the Senate centered on the fact that the Federal expenditures had increased so markedly within only 2 years-from $34 billion in the fiscal year 1948 to $43 billion in the fiscal year 1950, or a rise of $9 billion. As a result the committee chairman addressed the Senate on March 22, 1950, incorporating in his remarks another extensive analysis prepared by the committee staff covering the more important aspects of the above 2-year overall trend which was extended to include a small overall decline for the year ahead.

At the request of the chairman, the staff, in collaboration with the Bureau of the Budget, prepared detailed tables indicating the trend of expenditures in the executive branch of the Government by functions and activities for fiscal years 1949, 1950, and 1951. This information, along with other tables showing the increased trend in expenditures, was submitted to the Senate on March 28, 1950, entitled "Increasing Cost of the Federal Government." (S. Doc. No. 150.) The document attracted much interest and was widely distributed to official and nonofficial sources.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 131, 81ST CONGRESS

On September 23, 1949, Senator McClellan introduced Senate Joint Resolution 131, to require the submission to Congress of a balanced budget for the fiscal year 1951, which was referred to the Committee on Government Operations. This proposed balanced budget was to be in addition to such other budget as the President saw fit to introduce at that time, in accordance with usual procedures. Senator McClellan made the following statement in behalf of the resolution:

It conforms exactly with the letter and spirit of the budgeting and accounting laws. It disturbs in no way whatsoever the right of the President to bring in whatever budget he wishes, however much out of balance it may be, including revisions of both estimated revenues and estimated expenditures to cover the legislative proposals which are included in

the President's budget message. All that this resolution does
is to require that in addition the President must also transmit
a balanced budget which, on the basis of existing legislation,
reduces estimated expenditures to balance out with antici-
pated revenues.

On the submission of such a balanced budget, the Congress
would then have an opportunity to examine each item of ex-
penditure and its conformity with substantive program legis-
lation, and to study the impact which anticipated reductions
would have on the national programs previously approved by
the Congress. Such changes as may be found desirable and in
the best interest of the public could then be properly adjusted
by the Congress.

The proposed requirement of a second alternative budget which is in balance will give us a clear-cut test of those who do and those who do not favor the commonsense doctrine of only spending as much as we can collect during the present period of economic prosperity.

Senator McClellan was joined by Senators Ferguson, Byrd, Eastland, and Stennis in offering Senate Joint Resolution 131 as an amendment to H.R. 1689, the Executive Pay Raise Act. On September 29, 1949, the amendment was adopted by unanimous vote; subsequently the pay raise bill was passed by the Senate and sent to conference. The amendment was eliminated in conference, with no reference to it in the conference report (H. Rept. 1411, 81st Cong.).

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 108 (S.J. RES. 94, S.J. RES. 97, AND S.J. RES. 102), 81ST CONGRESS

Senate Joint Resolution 108 would have required the President to make an overall cut of not less than 5 percent nor more than 10 percent in total estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1950, to bring them within estimated Federal receipts. After hearings had been completed on the three original resolutions, Senate Joint Resolution 108 was filed as a committee resolution by Senator McClellan, and reported favorably on June 13, 1949 (S. Rept. 498). Minority views by members of the committee opposing Senate Joint Resolution 108 were filed as part 2 of Senate Report 498 on July 25, 1949. Senate Joint Resolution 108 combined features of Senate Joint Resolutions 94 (Tydings, O'Connor, and Reed), 97 (Wherry, Bridges, and Ferguson), and 102 (Reed).

Consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 108 was delayed on the Senate floor, despite a petition of 63 Senators representing most of the States requesting a vote on the merits of the proposal. Finally, Senate action was forced by a motion to attach the text of Senate Joint Resolution 108 as a rider to an appropriation bill which would require a two-thirds vote to suspend the rules of the Senate. After vigorous debate the final results of 49 yeas, 28 nays, with 19 Senators not voting, fell short of the two-thirds vote required.

Although Senate Joint Resolution 108 was rejected, a somewhat similar provision was adopted as section 1214 of Public Law 759, the General Appropriation Act of 1951, approved September 6, 1950,

which required an overall reduction of $550 million in 1950 nondefense appropriations for domestic program expenditures as follows:

SECTION 1214. Appropriation, reappropriations, contract authorizations and reauthorizations made by this act for departments and agencies in the executive branch of the Government shall, without impairing national defense, be reduced in the amount of not less than $550 million through the apportionment procedure provided for in section 1211 of this act.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 108

In considering Senate Joint Resolution 108, the Senate Committee on Government Operations inquired of the American Law Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, whether this resolution could be sustained on a constitutional basis. The first paragraph of its report to the committee, dated June 27, 1949, states:

Article I, section 1 of the Constitution vests all legislative powers in the Congress of the United States, and under the doctrine of separation of powers, Congress cannot constitutionally delegate these legislative powers to the executive branch of the Government. But the Constitution also vests in the President the responsibility to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" (art. II, sec. 3), thus of necessity conferring on the President a certain amount of discretionary power in order that he may effectively enforce and execute congressional laws and policies. (Sayre, the Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 751, 759.) Yet, if Senate Joint Resolution 108 is to be upheld, and the power therein conferred is to be effective, it must be determined whether Congress has itself sufficiently laid down the law and policy and has not conferred real legislative authority on the President.

In reaching the conclusion that Senate Joint Resolution 108 was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the last paragraph of the report from the Library of Congress states:

An examination of Senate Joint Resolution 108 discloses that the resolution (1) contains a declaration of purpose on the part of Congress, (2) confers authority upon the President to be exercised in a certain manner, (3) states certain express restrictions on the exercise of the authority granted, and (4) requires detailed quarterly reports to be made by the President during the fiscal year. The resolution, therefore, outlines a policy to be followed, establishes standards for Presidential action and the manner thereof, and defines the sphere within which the President may exercise his discretion. Thus the resolution does not give the President a "roving commission" or a free rein to determine what he may or may not do, but instead declares an "intelligible principle" which he must follow and within which his actions are circumscribed. In light of the cases and authorities previously cited, Senate Joint Resolution 108 accordingly appears to be valid legislation and not an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power. With respect to this proposed measure,
the statement of the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Rock Royal
Cooperative, Inc. ((1939) 307 U.S. 533, 574), seems particu-
larly apropos :

"From the earliest days the Congress has been compelled
to leave to the administrative officers of the Government
authority to determine facts which were to put legislation
into effect and the details of regulations which would imple-
ment the more general enactments. It is well settled, there-
fore, that it is no argument against the constitutionality of an
act to say that it delegates broad powers to executives to de-
termine the details of any legislatíve scheme. This necessary
authority has never been denied. In dealing with legislation
involving questions of economic adjustment, each enactment
must be considered to determine whether it states the purpose
which the Congress seeks to accomplish and the standards by
which that purpose is to be worked out with sufficient exact-
ness to enable those affected to understand these limits. With-
in these tests the Congress needs specify only so far as is
reasonable practicable. The present act, we believe, satisfies
these tests."

AMENDMENT TO S. 913, 82D CONGRESS

The Senate Committee on Government Operations, in reporting S. 913 favorably (S. Rept. 576, 82d Cong.), creating a Joint Committee on the Budget, also approved by majority vote an amendment providing for annual submission by the President of an alternate balanced budget. The latter budget would parallel the regular budget which the President is required to submit at the beginning of each session of the Congress. While a majority of the committee endorsed this proposal in executive session, the committee preferred that its consideration by the Congress be kept separate from Senate debate on other aspects of S. 913. An annual alternate balanced budget would have brought to Congress for the first time a report on the detailed and varying cuts in appropriations that would be required all along the line, in order to achieve a balanced budget, including program cutbacks which the President believes to be necessary. During the Senate debate on this amendment to S. 913, Senator McClellan endorsed the principle involved under more normal conditions, but pointed out that it would be an empty gesture to require the President under the then existing conditions to make heavy cuts in huge defense appropriations in order to eliminate a budget deficit. The Senate thereupon rejected this proposal.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 57 AND SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 119 (H.J. RES. 352), 82D CONGRESS

These two resolutions differed somewhat in their provisions, though they were both directed toward the same end of bringing about a balanced Federal budget for fiscal year 1953.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 57 requested the President of the United States to transmit to the Congress a revised budget for the fiscal year 1953 "at the earliest possible date." This resolution was