ment and industrial facilities. Many airdrop and flight tests demonstrated the suitability of the design. Of interest is the fact that while our particular design concept was considered radical, the validity of our concept has been accepted by other activities engaged in developing ballistic missiles. During the past year (ending July 1, 1959) it was planned to confirm basic design parameters by flight and ground tests. This has been achieved. Remaining development work is to conduct flight tests with a dummy warhead as passenger and to obtain additional verification of the initial operational design by flight tests. GUIDANCE SYSTEM Objectives of this program were to design and develop the components and test them in ground and flight tests to assure meeting ballistic missile requirements. Because of the small size of the Polaris missile, an extremely small guidance package had to be devised. For the first year and one-half, a number of flight and sled tests, over 200 other environmental tests using ground facilities and innumerable circuit design and compatibility tests, have demonstrated the suitability of design and durability of the components. Our objectives during the past year were the firming up of the hardware for the overall guidance system and furnishing of these systems for flight and ground tests and fire control checkout purposes. These objectives have been accomplished. Work planned from now on is keyed to qualification, by flight vehicle tests and ground tests, of the guidance system for the 1960 operational missile. PROPULSION SYSTEM Our objectives, which were met, in the propulsion system development program for the first year and one-half were development and test of the following components and techniques : (1) High-energy propellants for ballistic missiles application, (2) thrust termination scheme, (3) jetevators as a means of thrust vector control, (4) lightweight motor case materials, and (5) propellant and motor cases manufacturing techniques. Numerous full-scale and small-scale motors were ground tested and several vehicles were flight tested for various purposes. During the past year, it was planned to qualify the motors for full-scale vehicle tests. The latter phase required the confirmation of reliable motors with the higher specific impulses demonstrated earlier in motor firings. Again numerous full-scale and small-scale motor ground tests and additional flight vehicle tests were conducted. A high degree of confidence in powerplant design has been achieved. Current objectives are to confirm all aspects of the powerplant design for the 1960 operational missile by flight and ground tests. With this general outline of the Polaris missile subsystem development program for background, I would now like to take up groups of Polaris test vehicles and tell you something of the nature of the results we have obtained on which we base our assessment of progress. The first group of flight test vehicles were especially configured to allow us to successfully develop instrumentation, telemetering, and analysis techniques while, at the same time, obtaining some information on thrust termination. Flying the second block of flight test vehicles gave us much usable information on thrust termination. From a third group of flights, using another configuration vehicle, we obtained valuable information and confirmed many aspects of reentry body shapes, materials, and behavior. In another block of vehicles we obtained verification of design concept for flight control components and the effects of thrust termination. The fifth group successfully tested flight control concepts using early developmental hardware and gave us valuable environmental information on guidance system components. By another block of test vehicles, we proved feasibility of underwater missile launching and compatibility of the missile and the launching tube. This was achieved by many successful launchings: from our pop-up facility off the California coast-including some conducted through waves generated by cruisers--from our land-based launcher, Peashooter; from our ship motion simulator at the Atlantic Missile Range, and from our weapon system test ship the U.S.S. Observation Island. Last September, on the accelerated schedule, we commenced flight testing of the first development model of the 1960 operational missile. This flight test vehicle incorporated for the first time in one vehicle those components developed at that point in time in the program. The previously developed systems-re entry body, powerplant, the ballistic shell, flight controls-were married so that integrated missile system flight tests could commence. We conducted captive tests at our Santa Cruz, Calif., facility of the "integrated" vehicle prior to commencement of flight tests. This gave us assurance of overall system compatibilty and operation on the ground. Before discussing the results to date of the flight tests with this "integrated" test vehicle, let me state that this was a major sep forward and we knew and hoped that we would uncover deficiencies. We expected more problems in this phase than we had experienced in development of the missile subsystems. I knew, however, that basic design of the individual subsystems had been proven and that any problems unearthed would be susceptible to straightforward engineering solutions. I am pleased that we have uncovered no major problems to date and that we have obtained all the information we planned and more than we expected and required at this phase of the development. To date, in "integrated" missile system test vehicle firings we have confirmed compatibility and operation of the overall system less guidance in three fully successful flights. We have achieved repeated motor stage and reentry body separations, thrust and flight control operations, reentry body operational confirmation and second stage motor ignition, and guidance system operation in a flight environment appears good. There have also been problems as we have proceeded with the flights. Some of these we consider random, others were attributable to vehicle components required only for range safety or evaluation purposes all of the problems uncovered in the partially successful and the one unsuccessful flights of these test vehicles have been solved or solution is in sight. The work ahead of us involves demonstration and confirmation of missile guidance control, ship motion firings from our ship motion simulator, flight tests from surface ship and submarine and proving repeatability of complete missile operational sequence. For our 1960 operational missile, we are well advanced developmentwise on lightening up structures, increasing propulsion power, and removal of a great deal of instrumentation not required for tactical missiles which is necessary for-and so heavily weighs down-our flight-test vehicles. We plan on firing the first prototype 1960 operational missile late this year. I expect problems ahead of us but I know we can handle them. In summary, we have met or exceeded every objective as scheduled for the development program. Against this general background of Polaris missile development test program, I will describe briefly the results of the most recent flight test conducted about 2 weeks ago, on July 15. To a casual observer, this test might be considered an apparent failure. In reality, from a point of view of getting a successful missile, it was stimulatingly successful. One of the primary purposes of the flight was to test the missile brain. Although the test vehicle went into unexpected acrobatics, the missile brain performed beautifully even under most vigorous conditions. On takeoff, this bird lost part of a jetevator-something which has never happened in any previous flight. This jetevator was recovered and is now undergoing intensive metallurgical and other tests as a basis for developing inspection procedures to prevent a recurrence. The acrobatic behavior of the test vehicle established a test condition for the missile brain we could never have planned. The ruggedness and the performance of the missile brain in this test were so outstanding that we are considering foreshortening this phase of the missile development. Since the primary objective purpose of the flight was to gain information on the adequacy of the guidance component in a flight environment, it was a most significant and helpful milestone. I have a movie of this flight which I will be happy to show you in closed session. I do not believe that this point of flight test evaluations can be overemphasized. The success or failure of individual tests whether they be the spectacular type of tests conducted at the Atlantic Missile Range or the thousands of tests in closed laboratories must be measured in terms of contribution toward ultimate goals. I recently read with interest the staff report of the DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, titled "Reliability Efforts in Ballistic Missile Programs." In this report it was noted, and I quote: "Managers of missile programs are required to make extremely delicate and difficult decisions in trying to achieve optimum balance between such factors as weapon capability, weapon reliability, and cost. One of their managerial re sponsibilities is to temper haste with caution; and a mistaken public reaction can subject them to undue pressures from outside, thus complicating critical decisions. Managers may be tempted to avoid making tests which are necessary, but which would look like failures, or to make spectacular tests of little engineering value, or to advance firing schedules for propaganda purposes." In the Polaris program we have adhered to strict technical discipline in all of our testing, including decisions to fire the "integrated" missile flight test vehicles. Finally, the outlook for this missile development test program is as follows: We plan on continuing our full-scale flight test vehicle firings from Cape Canaveral and to begin live firings afloat from our weapon system test ship, the U.S.S. Observation Island, this year. We will continue the underwater launching test program from the ocean bottom off the California coast. Next year, when the first Polaris submarine will be available, the first missile firing from a submerged submarine will take place. Every step taken in the tests to date, and to be taken between now and that time, has one purpose in view. That purpose is to make certain that every component in the system will function dependably and efficiently. This purpose is to remove every possible element of uncertainty in advance. As of today, and based on analysis of all data at hand, I feel, and state again, that we have every reason to predict success in achieving a dependable missile system by the end of next year. Under current appropriations, nine fleet ballistic missile submarines have been authorized. Additional units, if authorized, could follow at intervals of about 1 month. The number of submarines to be built and the number of missiles to be provided for them will be determined, of course, by national policy, through its legislative and executive authorities. Our responsibility as the development team is to design, test, and produce hardware which can be depended upon, should the need for the fleet ballistic missile weapon system ever arise, to do its job with certainty. I am glad to be able to report that such a Polaris weapons system is clearly in sight. STATEMENT BY DR. JAMES W. MCRAE, VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH Co., AND MEMBER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BALLISTIC MISSILES SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is James M. McRae. My occupation is vice president of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., responsible for the defense activities of the Bell System. I appear before you today as a consultant to the Department of Defense and member of the Department of Defense Ballistic Missiles Scientific Advisory Committee a committee appointed by the Secretary of Defense to advise and assist the Department of Defense in matters of technical policy relating to the national ballistic missiles program. It is my understanding that this hearing is being held because of your concern about failures in recent test firings and the implications of those failures on the success of our ballistic missile and space programs. I also understand that qualified representatives of the agencies responsible for the various test programs are available to give you an analysis of the test results in each of the programs, including the specific causes of failures where these occurred and the corrective measures taken in each case. Accordingly, with your permission, I will confine my remarks to the nature of complex development programs, the reasons for having tests, the kinds of tests which are required, and the significance of the tests in establishing confidence in the final product. The creation of an intercontinental ballistic missile system is a tremendously complex and difficult undertaking. At the outset the number of scientific and engineering problems requiring solution, although different in nature, were at least as great in number and complexity as those associated with the creation of the atomic bomb. Success could not be achieved without extending the frontiers of knowledge and technology in every major technical area: aerodynamics, propulsion, electronics, mechanics, materials, instrumentation, etc. The development of the many system elements was further complicated by the almost total lack of knowledge of the environment in which they would have to operate. The temperatures, accelerations, vibrations, noise, and radiation levels to be encountered could only be guessed at until some experimental verification of the theoretical calculations could be provided. For this reason, a very extensive component and subsystem test program had to be established. Initially the various components and system elements were tested individually. Later, because interactions of noncompatible elements can be critical, components were tested in assemblies and subsystems. Then the major subsystems were tested and finally the complete system must be tested. These final phases are the ones which are most spectacular and have attracted most public attention. However, they bear somewhat the same relation to the total test program that the visible part of an iceberg does to its total mass. With respect to "failures": One must know what the test objectives are before one can classify a test as a success or failure. From a development point of view, there are very few tests which can be classed as complete failures in the sense that nothing new is learned. In fact, one frequently learns more from "failures" than from successes. To date, I would say that the ballistic missile test program taken as a whole should instill a feeling of confidence rather than of doubt that success will be achieved. I know of no complex development programs in other areas which have not encountered similar difficulties in their test phase. I am sure that you understand that the development process is different from our usual day-to-day experience which, in this mechanical age, accepts as a normal part of our daily lives all manner of mechanical devices-from our automobiles to our television sets-without pausing to question how they came into being. Actually complex systems such as a modern bomber, normally require up to 9 or 10 years from initiation of development to introduction into service use. In the ballistic missile programs, we are attempting to combine development tests with demonstrations of performance and tests of manufacturing quality in order to shorten the leadtime to 4 or 5 years. We must not become discouraged when troubles are encountered, since one of the main purposes of a test program is to reveal these troubles and verify the corrective measures taken. As long as the failures are random, that is, not attributable to specific design deficiencies and as long as they are not a large proportion of the total number of tests, I would consider it unwise to make drastic alterations in the test programs which have been carefully planned to yield the experimental data needed to establish the performance and dependability of our advanced missile systems. Obviously, we should build on our experience as we acquire it, both from failures and successes, and refine our testing techniques which of necessity have been developed coincident with the systems to be tested. We are entering a new technological era, an age of guided missiles, satellites, and space vehicles. We have only begun to develop the tools needed for this era. These tools include the vehicles themselves, the test ranges and instrumentation required for their development, and the reservoir of knowledge and trained personnel, materials, and components and manufacturing processes which make them possible. As these tools are refined and improved and as our experience grows, many of the problems which plague us today will be reduced to standard practice. However, I never expect to see the day when new and improved systems can be developed without encountering similar problems. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, July 30, 1959, on another subject.) |