project on which NASA is being supported by this committee, you are going to have a split authority, that is all. I think you more or less have to have some overall scientific cooperation.

Mr. ANFUSO. Am I correct in the conclusion that the jurisdiction of this committee has been established, and that in the future we will receive a separate Defense budget in order that this committee can pass upon it?

Mr. FULTON. May we hear that again? I would rather not have the witness get into jurisdiction questions that affect this committee. I hate to act as corporate counsel here, but I think it is beyond his capacity to comment on the jurisdiction affecting this committee in a separate branch of Congress that is completely independent.

Mr. ANFUSO. To rephrase that question, we have already established the jurisdiction of this committee. Is that correct?

Mr. FULTON. It is established by law. I have cited the law to you. Mr. ANFUSO. It is one thing to establish the jurisdiction, and another thing to have it carried out. How are we going to get this jurisdiction

Mr. FULTON. I think we in a committee meeting must sit down and talk about the extent of our jurisdiction, but I don't think we can examine the executive department as to what that department feels as to legislative jurisdiction. That's us. If we have any differences among ourselves, I would rather go into executive session and talk it out and take it up with the leaders.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think there is any difference among ourselves.

Mr. ANFUSO. I don't think there is any difference among ourselves either.

Mr. FULTON. Then I would rather not get into that question of jurisdiction of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I think what Mr. Fulton has in mind is that he doesn't want the Secretary up here on the spot so that one committee would call him in and say: "You said this." Another committee will say: "You said this," and he will be in a difficult spot.

Mr. ANFUSO. That is the furthest thing from my intention, to put the witness on the spot. I guess you understand that.

Mr. MCNEIL. I appreciate the understanding of this committee very much.

Mr. ANFUSO. Then I think I am perfectly willing to let the matter drop so we can discuss it later on in executive session. May I proceed with another point?

Mr. FULTON. Would you yield at that point? I would like to assure the Secretary that this committee on both sides wants to see the continuation of the scientific teams that have been set up, and the continuity of them on a permanent basis. We don't like them disrupted and cast to the winds, and I would rather see in that regard what is done in Russia, where they pick the team up and if they have been successful on one thing, move them over to something else as a team. So I am sure you will get our cooperation on that.

Mr. ANFUSO. May I proceed with another point?

Mr. Secretary, this emergency fund that you spoke about on page 8 of your statement-without revealing any classified informationwould you say that some of that fund sometimes goes for political considerations as well as secret weapons?

Mr. MCNEIL. None that I know of, sir.
Mr. ANFUSO. None that you know of?

Mr. MCNEIL. No, sir. It would be over my dead body if it did. I would like to think that we in Defense are trying to do that job in such a way that our credit is good. Our credit can only be good with this Congress if we do the thing as well as we know how, and live up to our oral as well as written commitments.

There was a time some years ago that departments in the executive branch were given very limited leeway. In today's operations, whether it is operating aircraft, ships, research or any other facet of our work, to meet today's conditions you have to have some flexibility. The only way we can get it through Congress-and to keep it—is to treat it right when we get it. Congress has been good enough to give us an emergency fund, give us some latitude and leeway.

We would like each year when we come back to Congress to have them think we have done a good job as to how we have used it.

Even if we didn't want to, we have a very selfish reason for trying to do this thing as well as we know how.

Mr. ANFUSO. I am very much satisfied with that answer. Let me ask you this: Is this the same fund that the Secretary of Defense saw fit only a few days ago to refund a great part of it that he didn't use, and therefore he refunded it? Is this the same fund? It was reported in the newspapers that the Secretary of Defense had a secret fund, an emergency fund, and that he used only about $3 million of it and returned the rest.

Mr. MCNEIL. No, that is another account. The specific title of that appropriation is "Contingencies, Department of Defense." That is a much smaller amount. It is $30 million.

Mr. ANFUSO. About $90 million?

Mr. MCNEIL. No, $30 million. That is for use to take care of very unusual situations around the world. Several years ago there was an occasion in Europe where it seemed that by moving on a timely basis-some material, there might be a defection, and there was. That is the kind of a thing it has been used for-moving certain equipment and material where the use of regular appropriations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would have been known to everybody, before it was time. Second, there might even have been a legal question as to whether it was a proper use of a particular appropriation at that time.

Frankly, we have a commitment, an oral commitment, with the Appropriations Committees, that we aren't going to use this fund unless it is something of that particular type. But it does not deal with research in any way, shape or form, or procurement in any way, shape, or form. Neither do we want to use it for political purposes, although in the instance I mentioned perhaps it did have international implication. But in the research and development account and the procurement accounts there is none of that fund used.

Mr. ANFUSO. That $30 million fund sometimes is used for political considerations and for secret operations?

Mr. MCNEIL. Secret operations, but no political considerations—if I could say it that way. There was some early work we wanted to do some time ago to see what the opposition was doing with missiles, the results of which are reasonably well known at the moment.

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Mr. ANFUSO. I think it is very commendable that the Secretary did not find some excuse to spend it when he had no reason to spend it. Mr. MCNEIL. Thank you, sir. That is what we are trying to do. The CHAIRMAN. At this point I want to say this: We have had all the members of the committee- this is foreign to the Secretary's testimony-all the members of the committee have had a copy of this "Ground Cushion Phenomenon" report, which is a very able report. I read it and reread it. I read it this morning early again. Everybody has had a chance to look it over. Mr. Fulton has to step out in a few moments, because of a bill in another committee. Before he leaves, I want to submit it to you.

Mr. FULTON. I move its adoption.

Mr. ANFUSO. I second it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is duly moved that it be adopted and duly seconded. If there is no objection, the committee report entitled "Ground Cushion Phenomenon" is hereby adopted as part of the committee report. I want to thank Colonel Schuppener who prepared this report; he is doing a good job for the committee. Not only is it well prepared, but it is so prompt in its preparation.

If there is no objection, it is adopted.

(No response.)

Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask you a few questions. You referred here to obligational authority of $48 billion. You didn't say, however, what portion of that was for research and development-$481⁄2 billion. It is on page 12 of your testimony. What part of that is research and development?

Mr. MCNEIL. The total would be about $4,700 million.
The CHAIRMAN. For research and development?

Mr. MCNEIL. And tests and evaluation. But the big part of that is test and evaluation, and the big part of the difference between the 4.7 and 3.7, which we discussed here as being in the bill, was the difference in the Zeus program, which I think has been discussed before this committee in closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. Test and evaluation, you would consider that scientific; wouldn't you; scientific testing?

Mr. MCNEIL. We are trying to put everything into that account, in that category, that does not, when delivered, give us something that the "troops" can use.

The CHAIRMAN. If it isn't test and evaluation, it becomes operational. In other words, if you approve it after your test and evaluation, then it is an operational weapon, isn't it?

Mr. MCNEIL. Yes. I don't want to be too technical at this moment, but we believe the basis for classification should be somewhat different. We tried for a long time to make this division on the basis of a decision that something would be operational or still continue in research. But that doesn't give you a very good answer. So we are now coming around to the thinking that the easiest and the sharpest way to define these two areas is put into procurement everything you buy that you expect will go to the fighting forces, or go into inventory. And, those things you plan to use for development and test will be in R. D. T. & E.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't that really when it becomes operational?
Mr. MCNEIL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You make your decision that your test period is over or not-that is, that the weapon or the materiel is ready for use by the troops-then it ceases to be experimental and it becomes to that extent operational; isn't that right?

Mr. MCNEIL. Yes. But unfortunately we have to do our planning and budgeing and so forth 1 or 2 years ahead of the time we can make that decision. So we have to make it on the best guess of when it will go into inventory.

The CHAIRMAN. I can see also you have something like the DC-3 that would be operational for many years and yet you call it in for further tests as to improve that?

Mr. MCNEIL. You could.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it would become experimental again?

Mr. MCNEIL. There we would only consider the extra gadget we were putting on the machine as research.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the basic plane, but simply the part of it that is subject to test for improvement purposes?

Mr. MCNEIL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you this: You refer here on page 9 to laboratories and test facilities. We have already had a request from some of the members of the committee to visit these laboratories and these test facilities during the vacation period of Congress. Would we have your support and cooperation when the members of the committee decide that they would like to visit those laboratories and those test facilities in order to acquaint themselves physically with what you are doing?

Mr. MCNEIL. Yes, sir. I think it would be helpful to the Department as well as, I hope, to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too, and I hope the members do avail themselves of that opportunity and of your cooperation.

I want to know this: Can you tell us here in open session the cost for the fiscal year of the following programs: Jupiter, Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and the Nike programs collectively, and the Nike-Zeus in particular?

Mr. MCNEIL. I believe, Mr. Chairman, it would be best if that were given in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us in open session generally how these programs are moving along? Frankly, I think the more we have in open session, the better it is going to be.

Mr. MCNEIL. I agree. First you mentioned Jupiter and Thor, I believe, was it, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Jupiter and Atlas, first.

Mr. MCNEIL. The Jupiter, of course, is an intermediate range missile. On the basis of our present plans when the number of squadrons and the material for those squadrons presently on order are delivered, the program will come to an end.

In other words, we are not putting more money into procurement of that article nor on further development of it as such. There will be three squadrons when the deliveries are completed. I will take these out of order for convenience.

The Thor is also an intermediate range missile. Five squadrons of those is the limit of the present program.

In the case of Atlas, that is a continuing program. I believe it would be best not to mention the program limits in open session. But it is a continuing program and is being pursued as vigorously, I think, as we know how to get that missile in place and in operation.

That will continue, I am sure, for several years to come. Titan-our present plans call for continuance of that. As you know, it was started pretty much as a backup missile to the Atlas. Very naturally it is running some time behind the Atlas. It has I am told, some very excellent characteristics, and development will continue. The present plans call for deployment of some units, but again somewhat later than Atlas.

The other missile you asked about was Minuteman. Minuteman is still largely in the development stage. It is not in the production stage as yet. But it is being pursued vigorously because of its solid fuel characteristics.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any statement on the development that you can give publicly?

Mr. MCNEIL. I think, sir, Dr. York discussed that, and I don't believe I should go any further on that.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Nike program?

Mr. MCNEIL. In the Nike program, of course, the Ajax was the first short-range surface-to-air, antiaircraft missile. That is essentially complete.

The CHAIRMAN. That is operational?

Mr. MCNEIL. That is operational. The Nike-Hercules is becoming operational, with some units already in place. That is an antiaircraft missile also. That is one of the missiles that is involved in the reevaluation of the air defense system now underway and which Secretary McElroy expects to bring to Congress in the next few days.

The Nike-Zeus, of course, is entirely different-there is the word "Nike," but other than that, there is very little similarity.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we get into the Zeus, the controversy on the Hercules is with the Atlas?

Mr. MCNEIL. No, sir, it is with Bomarc.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. That will be disposed of by a decision in a few days?

Mr. MCNEIL. Yes, sir; I think a plan will be presented in a few days which will be at least the recommendation of the Department. As you know, the House Appropriations Committee, when they were reporting the bill to the floor-and the floor supported them-reduced the procurement dollars for Bomarc. In the Senate the Construction Committee deleted some of the authorization for Nike-Hercules requested for 1960 and asked that construction for 50 batteries that were not yet under contract-authorized for 1959-be withheld until a decision was made as to the use of Bomarc or Nike or the combination of the two.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee was put at a disadvantage, too, when that report came in because we had not at that time been properly informed as to the Bomarc. I say "properly" -we had not been informed as to the capabilities and the amount of development on the Bomarc missile.

Consequently we were not in a position to debate it on the floor. This committee, by the terms of section 17 of the rules, specifically is given