existence to be an effect—and hence to admit efficiency. In every case of operation and influence the object of which is abiding or enduring, we are led to conceive continued exiftence; continued existence is the effect, and efficiency in that refpect cannot be denied.-Efficiency is the result of the operation and influence of fire on gold, for its being melted is the definite influence or effect. Efficiency is the refult of the operation and influence of a prop in respect of a tottering house, for its abiding and enduring is the definite influence or effect.-Those who are fond of tropes may conceive efficiency the flower, or ripe fruit of power, operation, and influence.

Operation and influence may exist, which is not immediately dependent on power, but efficiency cannot. True efficiency, or efficiency philofophically conceived, is like power effentially connected with value and excellence, its object must be what is good on the whole, good eternity confidered, and good in the estimate of the infinite mind, that is of God. There is bad operation and bad influence, but, in my judg ment, there cannot be bad efficiency; for however ftriking fuch operation and brilliant such influence, the effentials of the influence include mischief and lofs on the whole and in the unering estimate of the Divine Being.

Notwithstanding we can thus diftinguish in conception, power, valuable operation, influence,

and

and efficiency, yet they are effentially connected, so that their separate exiftence is impoffible. There is no power where fuch operation is not the confequent-No power and operation where influence is not the refult, and no power, operation, and influence, which does not involve, or is not accompanied with efficiency. Efficiency is the effential confequent of power and valuable operation.

Efficiency depends immediately on influence for its existence, remotely on operation, more remotely on power, and still more remotely on ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances, yet they all co-exist as to order of time.

If any reader fhould find it difficult to reconcile the order of nature in thefe cafes with co-existence as to time, let him examine a pocket watch. He may therein contemplate respecting the spring, the barrel, the chain, wheel after wheel, and the verge, pow. er, operation, influence, and the effect motion in each individually: Yet muft, however his intelligence may totter, admit that all co-exift the fame inftant, not one wheel or one tooth moves before all the others begin to move; yet the spring forceth the barrel, the barrel the chain, the chain the first wheel, that the fecond, &c. till the last wheel forceth the balance. The fame is alfo exhibited in a chain of many links drawn by the first link.

By

By the notion of power we are directed to operation-by operation to influence—and by influence to efficiency; for the new or continued exiftence, that is to say, the definite influence, in any given inflance, is the effect.

We call, for facility of speech, the person or thing to which we afcribe ability, and which actually operates respecting an effect, an efficient. Thus we fay, an archer is the efficient in respect of bending his bow; and thus we say, that some defire was efficient to his endeavour fo to do. In merely material causes, we also call it the agent. Alfo, for facility of expreffion, we ascribe efficiency to ability and operation.

common.

The

An efficient is the perfon or thing, which poffeffes active property, and which operates. Efficients are either primary or primary efficient is one, that is God, and his efficiency is abfolutely independent. The common efficients, by courtefy taking that name, are creatures, and the efficiency of any or every creature depends on numerous other creatures, and primarily and ultimately on God.

We are now naturally led to the doctrine of cause and effect, which will be the subject of the next fection.

SECTION

I

SECTION III.

Of Caufes and Effects.

Use the word cause to exprefs the fource or principle, or that which produces, or which is the ground of the reafon of an effect. Any kind of fpring, or fource of valuable exiftence whatfoever, I account a caufe. Generally speaking, a caufe is that which makes a thing to be.

According to Mr. Locke, we get the notion of caufe, and alfo of effect, to which it is related and ftands opposed, from our obfervations of the viciffitudes of things, while we perceive fome qualities or fubftances begin to exist, and that they receive their existence from the due applications and operations of other beings. That which produces is the cause, and that which is produced, is the effect.

Active property, related paffive property and fuitable circumftances are effential to power. Power is effential to valuable operation; operation to influence, and influence to efficiency: But all thefe together with their fubjects, taken as an aggregate or whole, are effential to the existence of a caufe-conftitute a caufe, or co-exift with a caufe.

Caufes

Causes are truly distinguished into primary and fecondary. The first is a cause, itself uncaused; that is, it can be in no fenfe the effect of a preceding caufe, but is an eternal immutable cause. God only is this primary, eternal, all-involving, all-comprehending caufe. The fecond is a caufe itself caufed by a preceding, and ultimately by the first cause. Secondary causes are dependent on foregoing, and were their effects. Active proper ty, paffive property, and due application with operation and influence, in concrete with their effentially requifite fubjects, feem the conftituents of these causes, which we now more particularly confider.

Cause, like power, has been in my opinion, treated very abfurdly by ontologifts. They diftinguish what they call causes, into material and formal, efficient and final, whilft they acknow-ledge, that in many inftances, all are needful to one effect, and notwithstanding their definition of a caufe is inapplicable to either of them confidered fingly or detached from the reft. I am inclined to think that Ariftotle, or whoever first discovered the diftinction of material, formal, efficient, and final in respect of causes, never conceived them to make so many sorts of causes. I rather ascribe this confufion to his more erro.. neous editors and expofitors.

Effect is ever acknowledged to ftand in oppofition to cause: now if all thefe are effential to

the