On June 12, 1967, an urgent, minor construction project costing under $200,000 to house the maximum security unit was approved as an interim measure pending construction of the new brig.

Since the March 1969 inspection by the Marine Corps, efforts have been underway to relieve the crowded conditions within the brig. In July the correctional custody unit was removed from the brig confines and relocated in a barracks-type building in another area. Other companies were relocated in an effort to provide improved billeting

space.

The staff

To function properly, a military confinement facility in addition to a proper physical environment, must have a staff of sufficient numbers with adequate training. In view of the poor facilities and little hope for immediate physical improvement, maintenance of an adequate brig staff should have been a matter of the utmost urgency.

Our observation of the staff situation at the Pendleton brig during the period from June 30, 1969, indicated that it matched the physical facilities in its inadequacy. This statement is not intended as criticism of the officers and men of the cadre. They undoubtedly performed as well as possible under the circumstances, but were woefully weak in numbers and were further weakened by lack of training. The brig officer had no training or experience whatsoever, and the vast majority of his staff were similarly unprepared. Because of the shortage of personnel, guards at times were working 36 out of 48 hours. In fact, it is surprising with the high prisoner population, shortage of guards and harassment by prisoners that there hadn't been much greater numbers of incidents of duty personnel mistreating the confinees. It is also surprising that more rioting and other disturbances did not result from such serious undermanning.

Another byproduct of the staff situation was low morale. These young marines, lacking correctional training, and working long hours in an assignment few desire ("these are tough jobs; there is not one volunteer on duty there") quickly became the victims of this low morale. In turn, this reflected in their performance and caused increased tensions in the confinement atmosphere.

The subcommittee heard substantial testimony that reports concerning the low cadre manning level in the brig and the attendant serious internal problems were repeatedly made to the brig officer and by him to his superiors. There was a general awareness of the problem, but significant improvement was slow in coming and was not finally attained until November 1969, after support by the reports of an inspector general in February 1969, a correctional facility survey in March 1969, the findings of local investigations, and considerable national publicity.

During the course of this investigation, Marine Corps representatives repeated several times the high priority of the training function at Pendleton and the necessity for appropriate staffing to meet that training commitment. This subcommittee does not for one moment underestimate the special importance of the training mission performed at Pendleton in fulfilling manpower requirements in Southeast Asia. Our membership on the House Armed Services Committee makes us completely and acutely aware of the magnitude of that mission. However, all concerned should have recognized the minimum require

ments for staffing the Camp Pendleton brig, with its constant challenge in handling hundreds of young men who have been confined in an emotionally charged, rundown facility with barbed wire perimeters. Over 85 percent of these men are confined for absence violations, and based upon past experience at least 75 percent are to be returned to what is hoped will be useful service in the corps. Confronted with this obviously serious mission, it would appear that at no action level did the Marine Corps establish a staffing priority for the brig consistent with basic requirements.

In December 1968, records showed that the brig was faced with a population crisis of serious proportions. The prisoner count had grown from 638 men on June 30, 1968 to 806 on December 31, 1968-an increase of 26 percent. Meanwhile, the staff was increased only 19 percent. This augmentation was inadequate to cope with the prisoner load, for the brig cadre was seriously undermanned when a rise in population became evident 6 months earlier. In June 1968, the staff consisted of 271 officers and men, a figure which was 25 percent below an antiquated, austere, and unrealistic 1967 table of authorized strength.

The staff additions lowered the understrength figure to 11 percent in December 1968 but on that date, the base strength was 11 percent over authorized complement. Thus, the manning level at the brig was 22 percent under the figure for the base as a whole. Indeed, in the face of an increase in authorized staff strength to nine officers and 421 enlisted men effective in July 1969, the brig cadre was allowed to reach a low of 271 during that month which was reminiscent of the exact figure 1 year earlier. But in July 1969, the prisoner population was about 20 percent greater in a brig experiencing serious internal problems.

Testimony presented to this subcommittee showed that the Commandant of the Marine Corps visited Camp Pendleton in October 1968 and apparently was able to observe personally the serious staff conditions existing in the brig. Following that visit and an exchange of communications concerning total base strength, the commanding general, Camp Pendleton, submitted a request for 1,300 additional officers and men in December 1968.

Although it would appear that there was a recognition that the brig was inadequately manned as early as October 1968, it wasn't until November 1969, 13 months after the Commandant's visit and 15 months after the commanding general reported to Camp Pendleton for duty, that the brig cadre reached the July 1969 increased allowance of 430 officers and men. During the same 15 month period, brig staff strength did not reach the old 1967 authorization of 364 officers and men until October 1969.

It should be noted that the commanding general has the local authority to distribute his manpower strength throughout the base as he deems appropriate, using the table of organization of each command as a guide, but not as a limitation on personnel assignment.

This subcommittee can only conclude that recognition of the need was apparent, but the response failed to indicate a sufficient sense of

urgency.

The prisoners

The average Marine confinee is 19 or 20 years of age, has not completed high school, is confined because of unauthorized absence, is

destined to be in the brig about 3 months, and, actually, is typical of the prisoners in any military confinement facility. He asserts that his plight is rooted in family problems, or an inability to orient to military life, or a dislike for duty in Southeast Asia, or some combination of these circumstances. This young offender sees unauthorized absence as either an escape from his self-styled situation, or an uncertain remedy for his difficulties, real or imagined. Regardless, his answer is to go on unauthorized absence.

He may be apprehended in Portland, Maine, but if he is on Pendleton rolls, he is flown across country, with a stop at Great Lakes to aggravate the brig population there, so he may answer for his offense at Camp Pendleton. This is "the deserter east, deserter west" program employed by the Marine Corps. The Pendleton brig population problem could be eased considerably by revamping this deserter transfer program and processing the offender at an earlier date in a locale. closer to the point of return to military control.

Once in the brig, this young Marine, with inadequate supervision and not enough to occupy him except his frustration, might turn to the type behavior discussed earlier in this report, or thoughts of escape, use of medications as drugs, or to suicidal gestures. Unquestionably, under the poor overall conditions that existed, there were more instances of this type of conduct-especially escape-than one might expect in any confinement facility. But we hasten to add that these situations were not the common everyday ways of prison life at the time, and through recent changes, have been materially reduced. We would add, also, that this subcommittee heard competent evidence that many absence offenses could be avoided in the first instance with proper guidance and discipline at the company level.

The investigations

The Pendleton brig is probably the most repeatedly investigated facility in the Marine Corps.

As early as January 1969, the inspector general conducted an investigation at the brig and found conditions to be grave. He recommended that the Commandant of the Marine Corps appoint a special study group to conduct a security/manpower survey at that facility. Accordingly, a joint Navy-Marine Corps team was appointed and in March 1969 that panel conducted a highly professional and objective study at the brig. It found that:

"The inadequate facilities, heavy prisoner population and lack of staff to properly supervise and control in relation to the [brig] program, have all contributed to the *** problem."

Sweeping changes were recommended in the wake of the many irreg ularities and deficiencies reported. These recommendations highlighted the proper philosophy of Naval corrections, prisoner treatment, improvements in guard and staff, temporary improvement in physical facilities pending construction of the new brig, improvement in the "bull pen" area, abolition of the "ice box," improvements in prisoner processing and classification, an enhanced security program, work programs, brig organization, the counseling program and others.

Another Marine Corps investigation was commenced at Pendleton in June 1969, headed by the provost marshal, with the purpose of inquiring into the operation and administration of the brig. Still another investigation of the allegations concerning the brig as contained in a

national magazine, was convened in September 1969. Both reports at last notice were awaiting final command action.

On October 10, 1969 a formal board of investigation was appointed at Pendleton to inquire into any form of mistreatment of prisoners at the brig, and its report also awaits final command action.

This subcommittee, with assistance from a staff inquiry in September 1969, has completed its probe of matters in the brig at Camp Pendleton.

We gather from various sources that a common impression left with these service investigations was that a principal cause of the difficulties in the brig was "tired leadership." If that be so, there must be a determination of the extent of that fatigue. We gained the distinct impression after extensive testimony that the problem could be better classified as frustrated leadership. The leaders were frustrated with the inadequate facilities about which they could do nothing; frustrated with their own inexperience and training which was not of their doing; frustrated with the undermanned and untrained staff, and, most significantly, frustrated with their singular lack of success is getting

assistance.

As a result of these extensive inquiries, noticeable and encouraging improvements have been made in the overall operation of the Pendleton brig, not with all the speed and sense of urgency that the situation demanded, but, nonetheless, with what now seems to be a clear concept of the seriousness and magnitude of the task at hand.

Facilities

THE CURRENT SITUATION

Commendable improvements have been made to alleviate overcrowding and make the compound more workable pending construction of the new brig.

The correctional custody facility has been completely removed from the brig area and is in a separate barracks building with a full-time officer in charge. Minimum custody prisoners and parolees have been moved into an adjacent barracks building. These moves provided more berthing space for other prisoners and allowed a reduction in hut population. In turn, the huts are now much more susceptible to control. Sixteen quonset huts have been added to the compound for additional administrative space, medical facilities, classrooms, storage, etc. General housekeeping and internal refurbishing projects are in progress to improve the liveability of the compound.

The "ice box" and "bull pen" no longer exist.

Personnel, training and brig administration

Brig population has been reduced by removal of the correctional custody facility and by effective implementation of updated administrative regulations concerning confinement and processing of offenders. By January 16, 1970, the prisoner population count had been reduced to 363 men.

As of November 1969, staff strength reached and exceeded the allowance of nine officers and 421 enlisted men.

The newly assigned brig officer is well trained, experienced, and motivated, as are other officers on the current staff.

A commendable program of staff training is in effect utilizing professional training facilities and locally organized classes.

An improved prisoner evaluation and classification program has resulted in a better understanding of the prisoner and the determination of restraint necessary in each case.

Programs for daily work details, recreation, military rehabilitation and academic instruction have been enhanced and improved.

There is now a more functional arrangement for prisoner transfer through the various brig elements.

Prisoner regulations have been updated and compliance with the Navy Corrections Manual has improved.

A larger, more professionally competent and well-motivated staff of counsellors has been formed along with the inauguration of a wellorganized team counselling program.

Close and tight prisoner supervision has markedly reduced polarization and the formation of cliques.

There is clear evidence of improved communications from prisoners and brig staff to command.

Positive efforts are being made to improve the status and morale of staff personnel.

FINAL STATEMENT

It is the expectation of this subcommittee that as a result of our investigation the Secretary of Defense and all branches of the armed services will be made completely aware of the explosive situations and problems that can develop where a confinement facility is inadequate and the staff is deficient in strength and training. The classic for; mula for turbulence is to overpopulate an ill-suited confinement facility, and then assign a staff that is undermanned, unmotivated and low in morale. There is a significant degree of professionalism necessary to operate a brig properly, and the failures at Pendleton clearly indicate that the day has passed when any military service can indulge in the luxury of detailing an untrained and undermanned staff to duty in a correctional facility.

We feel confident that the root causes of the difficulties in the brig at Camp Pendleton have been exposed by this inquiry and we fully expect that appropriate measures will be taken in all of the services to minimize the possibility of a repetition of these occurrences in any brig or stockade. For our part, we are prepared to support construction of necessary and adequate confinement facilities as those items reach the Congress.