[H.A.S.C. No. 91-43]

REPORT ON INQUIRY INTO THE REPORTED CONDITIONS IN THE BRIG, MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF.

INTRODUCTION

The Subcommittee To Probe Disturbances on Military Bases was originally appointed to investigate racially or ideologically motivated disturbances on or near military installations. Our initial investigation centered on the riot occurring on the evening of July 20, 1969, at Camp Lejeune, N.C., and the findings were released in a subcommittee report issued on December 15, 1969 (H.A.S.C. No. 91-32).

Upon the focusing of national attention on the Camp Pendleton brig through press releases in September and October 1969, the Honorable L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, directed this subcommittee to broaden its inquiry to cover allegations of maltreatment in military brigs and stockades. Thereupon a probe to determine the validity of the Camp Pendleton allegations was commenced and the subcommittee held hearings in Washington, D.C., and at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, covering some 850 pages of testimony, a considerable volume of documents, and reports of independent inquiries on the subject. The subcommittee's inquiry was augmented by a preliminary staff investigation at Camp Pendleton during September 1969.

FINDINGS

1. The present brig facilities are totally inadequate; however, there is provision for a new brig costing $2.5 million in the 1970 military construction legislation which was passed in the first session of the 91st Congress and signed by the President.

2. Until November 1969, the brig staff was continuously under strength while the brig prisoner population increased materially.

3. The staff had little or no training and experience in operating a correctional facility.

4. Efforts to increase effectively the number of personnel assigned to the brig were made on several occasions by the brig staff over an extended period.

5. Brig difficulties were intensified by the persistent harassment tactics of some prisoners who were determined to foment trouble and create problems for other confinees.

6. There were some instances of maltreatment of prisoners, of racial tension, black polarization, kangaroo courts, servitude, and some indication of forced homosexual acts.

7. There was cause for concern over prisoners beating other prisoners.

8. The disciplinary diet of diminished rations used in the brig was, and is, medically adequate, is administered in accordance with approved regulations, and is an effective part of the correctional program.

9. There was no real evidence that prisoners were "whisked off” to Vietnam.

10. The current leadership is well trained, experienced, and highly motivated to implement the ambitious program for overall improvement in the operation of the brig.

11. This subcommittee has been assured that:

(a) Brig racial problems have been minimized and are under control;

(b) Prisoner maltreatment is infrequent and, when uncovered, prompt disciplinary action is taken;

(c) Harassment and provocation on both sides has been markedly reduced;

(d) There is no existing evidence of hut leadership, servitude, or forced homosexual activity;

(e) Medical treatment and hospital outpatient care has been improved; and

(ƒ) Through improved brig administration and security measures, escapes and suicide gestures have been reduced.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The setting for the problems which arose in the brig at Camp Pendleton was provided by the poor physical facilities: a staff which was undermanned, il trained, and unmotivated; and frustrated leadership.

2. Until the summer of 1969, higher levels of command, despite the fact they were fully cognizant of personnel conditions in the brig, did not move with a sufficient sense of urgency to relieve those conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The implementation of current recommendations for establishing a primary MOS for officers and men in the field of military corrections. 2. Utilization, to the maximum extent, of the professional corrections training available to Marine Corps personnel.

3. Appropriate action be taken to maintain the brig cadre at necessary strength.

4. Establish within the Defense Department servicewide and public information programs to explain to commanders and the news media, as one extremely competent witness put it, "what correction is all about."

5. The Secretary of the Navy conduct an annual inspection of all Marine Corps confinement facilities, with emphasis on all facets of brig operation.

6. Prisoners be processed at the competent command nearest the point of surrender or apprehension so as to eliminate costly and dilatory transportation.

7. Maximum possible compliance with the provisions of the Navy Corrections Manual.