797

Dissenting Opinion by Judge Madden

tenant commanders and lieutenants of the Staff Corps of the Navy *** whose total commissioned service equals that of lieutenant commanders of the line of the navy, drawing the pay of this period." The prevailing opinions translate this long expression into two words, "fourteen years." I think that if Congress had meant fourteen years it would have said so in two words rather than seventeen words.

The record gives us little light on our problem. It seems that lieutenant commanders who have been commissioned since the Act of 1913 removed the right to count time spent in the Naval Academy as a part of the period of service must have fourteen years of commissioned service to draw fourth period pay. That means, I suppose, that nearly all lieutenant commanders of the line who are at the present time drawing fourth period pay have had fourteen years of commissioned service. The prevailing opinions take the language of the fourth subdivision of the section to mean "lieutenant commanders of the line who are in the normal status of present day lieutenant commanders of the line, drawing the pay of this, (the fourth) period." But this rendering of the text is nothing but a still longer way of saying "fourteen years."

Without any real light on the subject of what Congress meant, I think the natural conclusion from what it said is that it meant that staff corps lieutenants, such as plaintiff, were to be paid fourth period pay if any lieutenant commander of the line, who had no longer period of commissioned service than they had, received fourth period pay. If Congress didn't mean this, it meant "fourteen years," which, as I have indicated, I doubt. If Congress did mean this, plaintiff can compare his service with Robertson, though Robertson's career was unusual because of his long period of retirement which kept him, upon reentering active service, in the fourth period pay group, though he was appointed to Annapolis before the Act of 1913.

What would be the practical consequences of holding as I would hold does not appear in the record. If they would be so disrupting or burdensome as to make it apparent that Congress could not have intended them, we have not been informed.

Per Curiam

98 C. Cls.

BEN WHITE, ARCH ROBINSON, LEE WELLS, WILLIAM S. WELLS, ARCH J. McLAREN, ARTHUR D. BARKELEW, OSCAR CLAYTON, ROBERT L. CULPEPPER, WILLIAM B. EDWARDS, THE ESTATE OF CHARLES E. WELLS, THE ESTATE OF JOHN MCLAREN, THE ESTATE OF THEODORE BOWEN v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 45710. Decided February 1, 1943]*

On Defendant's Demurrer

Jurisdiction; act conferring jurisdiction vetoed by the President; statute of limitation.—It is held that the bill conferring upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims, having been returned to Congress by the President with his veto, within the ten days specified in the Constitution, the Court is without jurisdiction.

Same. As to other matters referred to in the petition of plaintiffs, it is held that said matters are not within the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court of Claims; and, further, that if otherwise within the Court's jurisdiction, the right to sue is barred by the statute of limitation. (U. S. Code, Title 28, sections 250, 262.)

Mr. W. B. Edwards for the plaintiff.

Mr. Thos. L. McKevitt, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Norman M. Littell, for the defendant.

The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion per curiam, as follows:

Plaintiffs sue for the value of lands in California of which, they allege, they were dispossessed about the year 1912, and for damages for false arrests, imprisonments, and malicious prosecutions brought about, they allege, by officials of the Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice. They allege that Congress in 1941 passed a bill giving this court jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims, and that the President, because he was misled by officials of the departments named above, vetoed the bill. They further allege that the veto was not within the ten days specified in the Constitution. The defendant demurs to the petition.

*Petition for writ of certiorari denied June 7, 1943.

804

Per Curiam

As to the bill conferring special jurisdiction upon this court, it never became a law, as it was, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, returned to Congress by the President within 10 days, Sundays excepted, after it was presented to him. We have no jurisdiction to give a remedy for the alleged misconduct of department officials in inducing the President to veto the bill. As to the other matters of which plaintiffs complain, the petition shows on its face that they are not within the ordinary jurisdiction of this court, and that, if they would otherwise be within our jurisdiction, the right to sue on them has long since been barred by the Statute of Limitations. (U. S. Code, Title 28, sections 250, 262.) The defendant's demurer is sustained and plaintiffs' petition is dismissed. It is so ordered.

CASES DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF CLAIMS ON MOTION OF PARTIES OR OF THE COURT FOR NONPROSECUTION

Cases Involving N. I. R. A. Act of June 25, 1938

ON FEBRUARY 1, 1943

ON MARCH 1, 1943

44285. Bartgis Brothers Company. 44334. Joseph M. Herman Shoe Com- 44512. Fidelity and Deposit Company

Cases Involving Pay and Allowances

ON FEBRUARY 1, 1943

45238. Carrie Marshall Trunk, extr'x. 45434. Charles M. Savage.