in the image of himself; he fees his own eyes roll in their heads, hears his own voice on their tongues, while his own blood frolics through their veins; how could he make the divifion? how could he decide on one, for a victim? Would he not rather give his own flesh to be their meat, and his own blood to be their drink, and fervently pray for plenty! But is the Almighty poor? Has he not enough, and to spare? When the prodigal came home, did the father turn away his brother, fo that he might have a plenty for him? Is there not fulness enough in God, to fatisfy the wants of all his creatures? Why the neceffity, then, of making fome miferable eternally? My opponent will fay, the blessed are happified, in confequence of the mifery of the wretched : But what reafon can be given, for fuch an idea? How do we look on a perfon, in this world, who manifefts joy and happiness in the mifery of one of his fellow creatures? Do we fay, he manifefts a godlike difpofition? Surely no. From whence came charity; from heaven, or hell? If fouls in heaven poffefs it, they cannot be happy, in confequence of the mifery of any rational being; and fhould the divine principle be found in hell, it would banish misery, and annihilate the place!

Again, if a foul in heaven derives happiness, from feeing, fay one half, or two thirds, of the human race in mifery, would he not yet enjoy more, providing the whole, except himfelf, were in the fame torment? If it be granted that he would, then, in order for a foul to be made as happy as poffible, the whole human race, except that one, must be endlefsly as miferable as poffible! If it be argued, that it is not the number or multitudes of individuals who are made miferable, that thus conftitutes or enhances the happiness of the bleffed, but that it is the nature, juftice and intenseness of this mifery, which is neceffary for the above purpose, it makes

it very plain, that the eternal mifery of one would produce as much good, as of ten thousand, or more.

We have now got fo far, even on our opponent's ground, as to fee, that there is no need of more than one foul's being endlessly miserable; and it ftill further appears to me, that the mifery of this one may be difpenfed with, without departing from what my opponent has acknowledged; and that, by letting each individual of the human race, for a moment, or any limited time, experience the nature of the mifery contended for, and then giving them a memory to retain it fresh in mind forever; this muft, of neceffity, produce the effect as well, and without the expense of a single soul. I do not think it would abfolutely require omnifcient wisdom to concert a better plan than the one I am oppofing.

Suppose we alter the circumftance of the father and his ten children: Suppofe the father has provifions enough for the whole, and his object, in the bestowing of it upon them, is to caufe the greateft poffible happinefs among his children. Which way would good fenfe and parental affection chufe, either to feed five to the full, or ftarve the reft to death, that their dying groans might give the others a better appetite, and their food a good relish, or to let them all be hungry enough to relish their food well, and all alike partake of it?

I will take notice of a certain paffage of fcripture, in this place, which fome have endeavored to accommodate to the argument which I am difputing; fee Rev. xiv. 10, 11, "The fame fhall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation; and he fhall be tormented with fire and brimftone in the prefence of the holy angels, and in the prefence of the Lamb: and the smoke of their torment afcendeth up forever and ever and they have no rest day nor night, who worship the

beaft and his image, and whofoever receiveth the mark of his name." It is not becaufe I am afraid of wounding this beaft, or of affronting its rider, that I do not enter into a particular explanation of the paffage recited; but because it deferves the labor of more time than I have now to fpare. However, the idea of my opponent is easily refuted; and this is as much as the reader ought to expect, in this work. The common idea is, that the punishment here fpoken of is altogether in eternity, and not in this world of mortality; that it being in the prefence of the holy angels, and in the prefence of the Lamb, it indicates that it affords pleafure in thofe heavenly manfions where they dwell.

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First, I request the reader to obferve, that the verbs, af cendeth, have, worship, and receiveth, are all in the fame tense, which at leaft favors the idea, that the fulphureous finoke of this torment afcendeth up, at the fame time that the tormented quorfhip the beast. If the apocalypical beast be worshipped to an endless eternity, it follows, that his worshippers will be tormented as long. Until it is proved, that fome will worship this beaft, in another world, or endlessly, it cannot be proved, from this paffage, that any will be tormented, in another world, or endlessly. It is faid, in the text, that, the worshippers of the beast have no rest day nor night. If it can be proved, that day and night are reckoned in another world, or in eternity, my opponent has better ground for his argument than I think he has.

This beaft, undoubtedly, is Antichrift; the worshippers of the beast are apoftatized chriftians of all denominations, fince the chriftian apoftacy: They have always been in wars and commotions, and have had no reft; and as for their being tormented, in all their public worship, with fire and brimfone, no argument is neceffary, to make it obvious.

Another objection, which has often been ftated against the falvation of all men, ftands in a pretended axiom, viz.

A God all mercy is a God unjust. The force of this pretended axiom, as ufed against the falvation of all men, is, if God fhould do juftly, by all men, he would be an unmerciful being; or, if he should fhew mercy to all men, he would be an unjust being. There is nothing felf evident, in this axiom, that I can fee, but its own want of propriety; it reprefents juftice and mercy at an eternal variance. According to this axiom, and the argument deducible from it, justice may be compared to a monftrous wolf in purfuit of a number of lambs, and mercy to a shepherd who is obliged to give up a large number of them, to gorge his omniverous appetite, while he makes off with the reft.

I have, already, fufficiently refuted the idea of justice requiring the endlefs mifery of the creature; and, until that notion can be fupported by fcripture, or reason, an objection against the falvation of all men, cannot be ftated, from the nature of juftice. I have, alfo, fhewed, that, in order for juftice to require the endless mifery of any moral being, it muft, of neceflity, require the endless continuance of fin; than which, nothing is more abfurd. Again, it is objected, as many are going out of this world daily, in a state of finfulnefs and unreconciliation to God, and there being no alteration in the foul, for the better, after it leaves this natural life, millions must be miferable, as long as God exifts. The force of this objection ftands on the declaration, that there is no alteration for the better, after death. Could this declaration be proved, I grant it would fubftantiate a formidable, and (I think) an unanswerable objection against the final holinefs and happiness of all men. I have often heard the objection made, but never heard an evidence brought from fcripture, or reafon, to fupport the declaration. Divines being fenfible of the want of fcripture, to fupport this (their)

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declaration, have, very liberally, been at the expense of making fome; and the notable paffage which they have coined, and brought into very frequent ufe, is not to be found in the fcriptures of the Old, or New Teftament; but is frequently to be heard from the pulpit, read in many of their writings, and recited by many of their adherents. It is as follows: “As the tree falls, fo it lies; as death leaves us, fo judgment will find us." I fhall not contend about a different explanation, of this addition to the fcriptures, from the ufual one; but will only fay, if the thing, which my opponent would prove by it, be true, viz. that fouls cannot be altered for the better, after death, all our christian people must remain eternally as unfanctified, as they are in this world of infirmities.

Again, many contend, that God deals with mankind as moral agents; that he sets life and death before us, and leaves us to make our own choice, and to fare accordingly: That, as our eternal state depends on what use we make of our agency, millions will prove rebellious, and, therefore, mifs of falvation. But I query, if one foul can obtain falvation, on the principle of moral agency, why another cannot, as well? If it be granted he can, I afk, again, why all men cannot, as well as any? If it be ftill granted, I fay, as I have before faid, that, which can be done, may be done; therefore, the objection fails. But the objector will fay, it renders univerfal falvation uncertain; I answer, no more than it rendersuniverfal damnation certain : All may be loft forever, as well as one; therefore, my opponent's hopes are fubject to the fame shipwreck, to which he would expose mine. I would further inquire, if God deals with man upon a system of moral agency, is it God's revealed will, that all men fhould be faved, agreeably to their agency? If it be granted that it is, I further inquire, whether God's will, in the moral agency of man, will be eternally fruftrated? If not, no objection