essentially three strategic options available to it: 1) to deter strategic war, 2) to deter a theater war with conventional or nuclear weapons, and 3) to conduct military R&D programs which will enable us to maintain a dynamic deterrent. The industrial and economic resources of the U.S. could be employed as an additional means of indicating credible intent to the Soviets and thereby inhibit their threatened aggressive actions. At present, there are no plans or programs by means of which the industrial base could be caused to respond in order to indicate to the Soviets our intention of deterring them from exercising various of their strategic options. The longer the period of warning (and the more proper the response to this warning), the greater can be our readiness posture at all levels. The intent warning signals by which measures may be instituted to accelerate the production rate of the defense industrial base may be perceptible long before strategic warnings of impending enemy military action can be discerned. Such strategic warning time is typically greater than the tactical warning time available for the tactical employment of forces and materiel. Current policy guidance fails to distinguish between strategic and tactical warning time, and does not recognize intent warnings by which the industrial base could be caused to accelerate production rates as a means of indicating to the Soviets our intent to respond to the threat. 2. Planning Factors Planning factors (principally attrition and loss rates) are critical to the calculation of requirements for wartime logistic support. The factors now being used may not be realistic. Although logistics planning and analysis techniques have improved through the use of advanced analytical tools such as computer simulation of combat situations and more effective techniques to identify the critical sensitivities, concerted efforts must be made to upgrade logistics planning under a range of factors and through the use of new analytical techniques as they become available. 3. Industrial Preparedness Planning Nearly all existing IPP policies and procedures are incapable of providing for an adequate defense industrial base. The Prime Contractor IPP Schedule (DD 1519) is ineffective for major weapon systems, since only very limited vertical planning is actually accomplished. Support to our allies and the contribution of the Security Assistance Program (which can be positive or negative) to the logistic support of our operating forces under any level of conflict has not been determined. An assessment should be made of the impact of support for the allies and of the Security Assistance Program on the defense industrial base under both peacetime and wartime conditions. Special consideration should be given to the impact of a requirement to provide resupply and consumable (especially munitions, maintenance support, and spares) to our foreign allies during a short war situation. This requirement could result as a consequence of Security Assistance commitments made prior to the onset of the conflict or where it may become necessary to insure the successful outcome of the war to protect our vital interests. The National Stockpile for Strategic and Critical Materials and the DoD Industrial Preparedness program are at best only loosely coupled. This loose coupling, however, seems to be the proper relationship. In the case of planning for the longer duration war, however, there should be increased participation by the DoD in the development of future National Stockpile requirements. 6. Questions of the Joint Committee on Defense Production The Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production in its 1975 Annual Report 1/ stated that the principal concern driving its activities is the question: "Is the United States economically prepared to meet a military emergency?" This question was broken down into ten components. The tenth and last question was: "Are current readiness plans and programs keyed to realistic threat estimates and scenarios or do they merely reflect lessons learned from World War II and the Korean War?" The Task Force finds that current readiness plans and programs are keyed to specific threat estimates and scenarios, but determined that these plans and programs are not adequate for the most important of these estimates and scenarios. (Evaluation of the realism of the specified threat estimates and scenarios lay outside of the Task Force's charter.) 17 Annual Report of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Congress of the United States. House Report No. 94-771, 94th Congress, 2d Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. viii. While the current readiness plans appear to the Task Force to be generally responsive to the designated threat estimates, the real shortcomings were found to be in the funding of programs to implement these plans. These shortcomings seem to be, in most cases, driven principally by tradeoff decisions to meet fiscal constraints. C. PRINCIPAL CONCERNS The Task Force concluded that the U.S. can better achieve its goals of dynamic deterrence and effective war fighting posture by: D. Attaining the required level of War Reserve Materiel to Establishing a realistic capability to rapidly accelerate Creating effective industrial mobilization plans through an interagency civil effort for the entire U.S. industrial base o Using selected Industrial Preparedness Measures as a means of signalling U.S. resolve and intent to a potential enemy 1) 2) 3) Establishing consistent planning ground rules. The Task Force also concluded that the relative priorities Upgrading and improving the readiness of the existing Achieving the optimum (budgetarily feasible) mix of WRM stocks Accomplishing military preparedness planning of the Industrial Base for an extended conflict, including the maintenance of an adequate National Stockpile of Strategic and Critical Materials. The President and the Congress should be frequently informed about logistics considerations with respect to current and future central policy positions, major options, and fashionable scenarios. Communications should be required on a continuing basis among the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders in Chief, and the Service Chiefs regarding shortfalls in the estimates of logistic support and their implications for the alternatives which will in fact be available to the National Command Authority and to the commanders in the field. The results of these periodic assessments should be made available to the Theater Commanders. 2. Cover the Conflict duration Spectrum Due to the exclusivity of the logistic support required by the nature and duration of the conflict being supported, the Task Force believes that our preparedness would be enhanced if the IPP program were carried out on the following basis: a. Short War - A short, intense war (followed by theater nuclear exchange if not concluded successfully by conventional weapons) should be supported completely by on-hand WRM stocks plus existing production from the Defense Industrial Base. It is imperative that the current and anticipated funding and acquisition realities be brought into consonance with the conflict scenario, force level and utilization, and logistic support capability. b. Long War In the case of an indefinite length conventional war, the necessary resources should be planned and allocated so as to provide an industrial capacity sufficient to meet the assessed requirement by M-Day plus two years, assuming that full national mobilization conditions will exist from M-day. Elements of the industrial base (e.g., new facilities for selected weapons such as tactical aircraft, tanks, guns ships, etc.) that would be expanded beyond a peacetime configuration should be identified as a part of this planning process. It should be noted that this is primarily a comprehensive planning requirement; acquisitions should be made only to the extent needed to meet the two year requirement. Such a program will undoubtedly result in conflicting Service requirements on the industrial base and will also have a major impact on the civilian sector. Therefore, it should probably be directed from a single point in the Executive Branch. Further, there will be distinct advantages in creating a consistent and uniform planning system--which does not now exist. C. Short to long Transition - To provide for the transition from the short intense war case to the indefinite length conventional war, a surge capability should be established that will expand the existing production output of the Defense Industrial Base by a significant factor. This surge capability will permit the Defense Industrial Base to more effectively support a spectrum of conflict situations. The suggested approach for establishing the surge capaility is to plan and fund the industrial Preparedness Measures necessary to expand existing production to 3 work shifts per day, 8 hour shifts, 5 days per week (3 x 8 x 5) or to 2 shifts per day, 10 hours per shift, 6 days per week (2 x 10 x 6)--or on some other basis which will provide the equivalent production capability based on the particular commodity. Initial planning of this surge capability should be based on reaching the maximum achievable production rate (within existing facilities) in either six months or one year, but not to exceed a maximum mobilization requirement. A decision should be made on which time period is the most suitable and economically feasible, and long lead items should be procured and stockpiled on a basis which will support the selected period. The responsibility for planning and implementation of the surge capability should be assigned to the designated materiel acquisition manager who is normally responsible for peacetime procurement of the end item being planned. Where various items are in competition for the available production capacity, support analysis and analysis and allocation should be controlled by a central focal point within the Services and in OSD. d. Deterrence Ways should be planned for how to use our industrial and economic power in order to deter the Soviets mobilization Department of Defense Initiate a resource analysis study to determine the responsiveness potential of the Defense Industrial Base and of the National Economy to the "Surge" and "Long War" cases. о Issue a directive revising the guidance by which Industrial Develop and issue guidance to separate "intent or industrial warning" from "strategic warning" for use of the Defense Industrial Base as an element of deterrence and to improve its responsiveness to industrial warning signals when received. Integrate "Surge" and "Mobilization" planning requirements Develop plans for making use of the Defense Industrial Base as an element of deterrence. 96-305 - 77-8 |