it be civil or ecclesiastical, resist the ordinance of God." He who is the Lord of the conscience has also instituted the authorities in church and state; and it would be in the highest degree absurd to suppose that he has planted in the breast of every individual a power to resist, counteract, and nullify his own ordinances. When public and private claims interfere and clash, the latter must give way to the former; and when any lawful authority is proceeding lawfully within its line of duty it must be understood as possessing a rightful power to remove out of the way every thing which necessarily obstructs its progress. The Confession proceeds, accordingly, to state: "And for their publishing of such opinions, or maintaining of such practices, as are contrary to the light of nature, or to the known principles of Christianity, whether concerning faith, worship, or conversation, or to the power of godliness; or such erroneous opinions or practices, as either in their own nature, or in the manner of publishing or maintaining them, are destructive to the external peace and order which Christ hath established in the church; they may lawfully be called to account, and proceeded against by the censures of the church, and by the power of the civil magistrate." Now, this does not say that all who publish such opinions and maintain such practices as are mentioned, may be proceeded against, or, punished (if the substitution of this word shall be insisted for) by the civil magistrate; nor does it say, that any good and peaceable shall be made liable to this process simply on the ground of religious opinions published and practices maintained by him, For, in the first place, persons of a particular character are spoken of in this paragraph, and these are very different from good and peaceable subjects. They

are described in the former sentence as "they who oppose lawful power or the lawful exercise of it," and "resist the ordinance of God." The same persons are spoken of in the sentence under consideration, as appears from the copulative and relative. It is not said "Any one for publishing," &c. but "they who oppose any lawful power &c. for their publish. ing," &c. In the second place, this sentence specifies some of the ways in which these persons may become chargeable with the opposition mentioned, and consequently "may be called to account;" but it does not assert that even they must or ought to be prosecuted for every avowed opinion or practice of the kind referred to. All that it necessarily implies, is, that they may be found opposing lawful powers or the lawful exercise of them in the things specified, and that they are not entitled to plead a general irresponsibility in matters of that kind: notwithstanding such a plea, "they may be called to account and proceeded against." For, be it observed, it is not the design of this paragraph to state the objects of church censure or civil prosecution: its proper and professed object is to interpose a check on the abuse of liberty of conscience as operating to the prejudice of just and lawful authority. It is not sin as sin, but as scandal, or injurious to the spiritual interests of Christians, that is the proper object of church-censure; and it is not for sins as such, but for crimes, that persons become liable to punishment by magistrates. The compilers of the Confession were quite aware of these distinctions, which were then common. Some think that if the process of the magistrate had been limited to offences "contrary to the light of nature," it would have been perfectly justifiable; but the truth is, that it would have been

so only on the interpretation now given. To render an action the proper object of magistratical punishment, it is not enough that it be contrary to the law of God, whether natural or revealed; it must, in one way or another, strike against the public good of society. He who " provides not for his own, especially those of his own house," sins against "the light of nature," as also does he who is "a lover of pleasures more than of God;" but there are few who will plead that magistrates are bound to proceed against and punish every idler and belly-god. On the other hand there are opinions and practices" contrary to the known principles of Christianity," or grafted upon them, which either in their own nature, or from the circumstances with which they may be clothed, may prove so injurious to the welfare of society in general, or of particular nations, or of their just proceedings, or of lawful institutions established in them, as to subject their publishers and maintainers to warrantable coercion and punishment. As one point to which these may relate, I may mention the external observance and sanctification of the Lord's Day, which can be known only from "the principles of Christianity," and is connected with all the particulars specified by the Confession" faith, worship, conversation, the power of godliness, and the external order and peace of the church." That many other instances of a similar description can be produced, will be denied by no sober-thinking person who is well acquainted with popish tenets and practices, and with those which prevailed among the English sectaries during the sitting of the Westminster Assembly; and he who does not deny this, cannot be entitled, I should think, upon any principles of fair construction, to fix the stigma of persecution on the passage in question.

In support of the objection under consideration ́some have referred to chap. 23. of the Confession, in which it is stated to be the magistrate's duty to "take order that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed," &c. But as certain means by which he is to endeavour to effect this end are there mentioned, without one word about coercion or punishment, every person must perceive that that passage gives no occasion for such an inference.-Others appeal to passages in the private writings of presbyterians at the period when the Confession was compiled. But it is evidently unjust to attempt in this way to fasten on a public deed an odious sense which its own language does not natively and necessarily imply. Would all those who wish to make Rutherford's treatise on Pretended Liberty of Conscience an authentic interpreter of the passages in question, be willing to make the same use of his treatise on Spiritual Antichrist with reference to the doctrine taught by the Confession on the Covenant of Grace? Or, would they be willing that the same use should be made of the writings of individuals in the present day in disputes about the principles of the bodies with which they are connected, before the public or before courts of judicature?

Another objection brought against the Confession is, that it subjects matters purely religious and ecclesiastical to the cognizance of the civil magistrate, and allows him an Erastian power in and over the church. This, if true, would be very strange, considering that the Assembly who compiled it were engaged in a dispute against this very claim with the Parliament under whose protection they sat, and that owing to their steady refusal to concede that power to the State (in which they were supported by

the whole body of Presbyterians), the erection of presbyteries and synods in England was suspended. Independently of this important fact, the declarations of the Confession itself are more than sufficient to repel the imputation. It declares "that there is no other head of the church but the Lord Jesus Christ." (chap. 25. § 6.); and that, he, as "king and head of his church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate. To these officers the keys of the kingdom are committed." (chap. 30. § 1. 2.) Yea, the very passage appealed to in support of the objection begins with the following pointed declaraation : "The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the keys of the kingdom of heaven." (chap. 23. §3.) "The keys of the kingdom of heaven" include all the power exercised in the church, under Christ, its sole king; not only that which is ordinarily exercised in the government of particular congregations and in censuring offenders, (chap. 30.) but also the power "ministerially to determine controversies of faith, and cases of conscience, to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and government of his church, to receive complaints in cases of mal-administration, and authoritatively to determine the same." (chap. 31. § 3.) The Confession teaches that magistrates cannot warrantably assume to themselves the power of doing these things, and what it adds must be understood in a consistency with this declaration. It is true, that it allots to the magistrate a care of religion, and asserts that "he hath authority, and it is his duty to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the church," &c. But is there no order which he can take for having these things