6. Controversies between; celerity required of parties. Even if the question in litigation is important and should be disposed

of without undue delay, a State cannot be expected to move with the celerity of an individual; a motion made in this case by complainant that the court proceed to determine all questions left open by the decision in 220 U. S. 1, denied without prejudice. Virginia v. West Virginia, 17.

7. Controversies between; scope of conference suggested in 220 U. S. 1, 36. The conference suggested by this court, 220 U. S. 36, is one in the cause to settle the decree and not to effect an independent compromise out of court. Ib.

8. Execution and authentication of legal instruments; regulation by. A State has power to prescribe the form and manner of execution and authentication of legal instruments in regard to property, its devolution and transfer. (Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311.) Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 225.

9. Federal authority paramount.

As between the Federal Government and the States one authority must be paramount and when it speaks the other must be silent. Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 424.

10. Federal power; effect of exercise on essential power of States. No essential power is taken from the States in preserving the balances of the Constitution and giving to Congress the power which belongs to it. Ib.

11. Penalties imposed by; determination of amount; quære as to. Quare: Whether conceding that a State may impose a penalty does not concede the State to be competent to determine the amount. Ib.

12. Police power; extent of.

The power of the State extends to so dealing with conditions existing in the State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people. (Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311.) Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 225.

13. Police power; limitations upon.

Police power is but another name for the power of government; it is subject only to constitutional limitations which allow a comprehensive range of judgment, and it is the province of the State to adopt by its legislature such policy as it deems best. Ib.

14. Police power; assignment of future wages; regulation within. A State may, as a police regulation, make assignments of future wages invalid except under conditions that will properly restrict extravagance and improvidence of wage-earners. Ib.

15. Police power; assignment of future wages by married men; regulation within.

A State may, under conditions justifying it, prescribe that an assignment by a married man of wages to be earned by him in future shall be invalid unless consented to by his wife. Ib.

16. Police power over Federal subjects; cessation of, during intermediate period between action by Congress and date at which act goes into force. Congress by enacting a statute in regard to a subject within its exclusive power manifests its purpose to call that power into effect, and at once removes that subject from the sphere of state action and even if Congress provides that the statute shall not go into effect until a subsequent date the States lose control of that subject during the intermediate period from the enactment to the active operation of the statute. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Washington, 370.

17. Same.

The enactment by Congress of the Hours of Service Law, March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415, was a manifestation by Congress of its intent to bring the subject of hours of labor of employés of interstate carriers under its control; and, although the act did not go into effect for a year after its passage, the various state laws on the subject became inoperative at once on the enactment. Ib.

18. Police power; when right to exercise ceases with action by Congress. The right of a State to apply its police power to subjects under the

exclusive control of Congress, but in regard to which Congress has been silent, ceases as soon as Congress acts on the subject and manifests its purpose to call into effect its exclusive power. Ib.

19. Police power; oil as subject of regulation.

The fact that oil inspection laws have been passed in a majority of the States shows that oil is a proper subject for police regulation. Red "C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 380.

20. Police power; powder as subject of.

An article, such as powder, which is dangerous to handle in proportion

to the quantity handled, is properly subject to police regulation in regard to quantity from which harmless articles of commerce are exempt. Williams v. Walsh, 415.

As between opposing views in regard to the construction of a statute the court in this case accepts the one in accord with the manifest purpose of Congress. Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 20.

2. Power manifested and not motive initiating it considered.

In construing a statute the court must be controlled by the power manifested by the act and not by the motive which initiated it; the scope of the act may extend beyond the generating causes thereof. Berryman v. Whitman College, 334.

3. Application of rule against imputing to Congress intention to depart from long enforced uniform policy.

The rule of construction that an intention to depart from a long enforced uniform policy will not be imputed to Congress, applied in construing the act of April 28, 1904, 33 Stat. 552, c. 1772, relative to coal lands in Alaska. United States v. Munday, 175.

4. Reference to reports of committees of Congress.

In this case the court referred to the report of the committee of Congress having the legislation in charge as indicating the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Washington, 370.

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5. Known policy of Congress considered.

In construing an act of Congress, the known policy of Congress in regard to the subject-matter of the statute will be considered. Richardson v. Harmon, 96.

6. Measure of meaning; when character of statute and when words used constitute.

If there be ambiguity, the character of the statute determines for strict or liberal construction, but where there is no ambiguity the words of the statute are the measure of its meaning. States v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. R. Co., 8.

United

7. Meaning given to general words following words descriptive of particular actions.

Where general words follow words descriptive of particular actions they should, unless clearly manifested to the contrary, be construed as applicable to cases or matters of like kind with those described by the particular words. United States v. Stever, 167.

8. Legal expressions in; presumption as to.

Congress will be presumed to use familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense. United States v. Fidelity Trust Co., 158.

9. Phrases used; presumption as to consciousness of meaning by Congress and intention in use.

This court assumes that Congress uses a phrase in a statute with a consciousness of its meaning and with the intention of conveying such meaning. United States v. Garbish, 257.

10. Exceptions in favor of offenders against criminal law, rule against. A statute will not be construed as grafting exceptions on the criminal law in favor of offenders against that particular statute in the absence of clear and unambiguous expressions. United States v. Morgan, 274.

11. Silence as to prosecution not construed as permitting perjury. A statute in regard to giving testimony, which does not provide for prosecution of perjury, will not be construed as permitting perjury because in other statutes in that regard Congress has, from abundant caution, inserted provisions as to prosecution of perjury. Glickstein v. United States, 139.

12. Codes; subsequent legislation; effect to supersede provisions of. In view of the custom of embodying National legislation in codes and

systematic collections of general rules, it is the settled rule of decision of this court that subsequent legislation upon a subject covered by a previous codification carries the implication that general rules are not superseded by such subsequent legislation except where it clearly appears. United States v. Barnes, 513.

13. Same.

Where there is a codification of revenue laws to prevent fraud, the inference is that subsequent legislation is auxiliary to the earlier, and only in case of manifest repugnancy will it be construed as an abrogation thereof. (Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363.) Ib.

14. Law imposing graduated tax; effect of partial unconstitutionality. A statute imposing a graduated tax would not necessarily be held unconstitutional as to the initial rate, even if the provisions as to the higher rates were unconstitutional. Keeney v. New York, 525.

15. Penal; strict construction.

Courts are not inclined to make constructive crimes, and in this case the general rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed applies. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. R. Co., 8.

16. Penal; confounding of willful and unwillful acts avoided. A penal statute should not be construed as confounding unwillful with willful acts by uniting in criminality and penalties parties to whom no notice need be given with those to whom notice must be given. Ib.

17. Repeals by implication; presumption against inefficiency of statute. Repeals by implication are not favored; nor is there a presumption that a law passed in the interest of public health was intended to hamper prosecutions of offenses against the statute itself. United States v. Morgan, 274.