general provisions of chapters 1 and 2, save as in the Oleomargarine Act it may be provided otherwise.

Much of our national legislation is embodied in codes, or systematic collections of general rules, each dealing in a comprehensive way with some general subject, such as the customs, internal revenue, public lands, Indians, and patents for inventions; and it is the settled rule of decision in this court that where there is subsequent legislation upon such a subject it carries with it an implication that the general rules are not superseded, but are to be applied in its enforcement, save as the contrary clearly appears. Thus, in Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363, where a question arose as to what effect should be given a general provision of an early customs law in view of a later enactment upon that subject, it was said: “And it may be added that in the interpretation of all laws for the collection of revenue, whose provisions are often very complicated and numerous to guard against frauds by importers, it would be a strong ground to assert that the main provisions of any such laws sedulously introduced to meet the case of a palpable fraud, should be deemed repealed, merely because in subsequent laws other powers and authorities are given to the custom-house officers, and other modes of proceeding are allowed to be had by them before the goods have passed from their custody, in order to ascertain whether there has been any fraud attempted upon the government. The more natural, if not the necessary inference in all such cases is, that the legislature intends the new laws to be auxiliary to, and in aid of the purposes of the old law, even when some of the cases provided for may equally be within the reach of each. There certainly, under such circumstances, ought to be a manifest and total repugnancy in the provisions, to lead to the conclusion that the latter laws abrogated, and were designed to abrogate the former." In Saxonville Mills v. Russell, 116 U. S. 13, 21, it was said, in disposing of a like

question: "It would be an unsound and unsafe rule of construction which would separate from the tariff revenue system, consisting of numerous and diverse enactments, each new act altering it, in any of its details, or prescribing new duties in lieu of existing ones on particular articles. The whole system must be regarded in each alteration, and no disturbance allowed of existing legislative rules of general application beyond the clear intention of Congress." And in Catholic Bishop of Nesqually v. Gibbon, 158 U. S. 155, 166, 167, where the question was, whether general statutes defining the powers of the officers of the Land Department were applicable to a grant of public lands by a subsequent act of Congress, it was said: "While there may be no specific reference in the act of 1848 of questions arising under this grant to the land department, yet its administration comes within the scope of the general powers vested in that department. It may be laid down as a general rule that, in the absence of some specific provision to the contrary in respect to any particular grant of public land, its administration falls wholly and absolutely within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. It is not necessary that with each grant there shall go a direction that its administration shall be under the authority of the land department. It falls there unless there is express direction to the contrary."

We conclude that, while the express extension of perticular sections in chapter 3, dealing with special taxes, to the like taxes imposed by § 3 of the Oleomargarine Act may operate as an implied exclusion of the other sections in that chapter, it does not in any wise restrict or affect the operation of any of the general sections in chapters 1 and 2. And as § 3177 is a part of chapter 2, is general in its terms, and does not appear to be repugnant to any provision in the Oleomargarine Act, we think the ques

tion first above stated must be answered in the affirmative.

The cases of Craft v. Schafer, 154 Fed. Rep. 1002; Tucker v. Grier, 160 Fed. Rep. 611, and Hastings v. Herold, 184 Fed. Rep. 759, although not involving § 3177, disclose some contrariety of opinion in the lower Federal courts upon the matter principally discussed herein, and we deem it appropriate to observe that our conclusion has been reached only after a careful consideration of those cases.

Reversed.

SOLIAH v. HESKIN ET AL., DRAIN COMMISSIONERS OF TRAILL COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAILL COUNTY, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA.

No. 76. Argued December 5, 1911.—Decided January 9, 1912.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers, nor whether they shall be appointed, or elected by the people. The Fourteenth Amendment does not invalidate an act authorizing an appointed board to determine whether a proposed drain will be of public benefit, and to create a drainage district consisting of land which it decides will be benefited by such drain, and to make special assessments accordingly, if, as in this case, notice is given and an opportunity to be heard afforded the landowner before the assessment becomes a lien against his property.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to compel a township, as one of its political subdivisions, to levy and collect taxes for the purpose of paying the amount assessed against such township for the public benefits accruing from the construction of the drain.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Edward Engerud, with whom Mr. P. G. Swenson was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error.

The court declined to hear further argument, but Mr. J. S. Watson filed a brief for defendants in error.

Memorandum opinion by direction of the court. MR. JUSTICE LAMAR.

Under the North Dakota statute (ch. 23, Political Code; Rev. Codes 1905) the County Commissioners are authorized to appoint a Drainage Board in each county. On the petition of six persons, owning land to be affected, or of a sufficient number to show a public demand where the drain is intended to benefit a township, the board makes a preliminary examination. If it finds that the drain is for the public good and will cost less than the benefits, "notice containing a copy of the petition is published and an opportunity to be heard upon the matters pertaining thereto afforded the owners of all lands to be affected." "If it shall appear that there was sufficient cause for the making of such petition, and that the proposed drain will not cost more than the amount of the benefit," the board shall establish the drain. Their assessment of benefits is subject to review, but, when confirmed, is final, and is then extended on the tax list and collected as other taxesthe amount assessed to any township is required to be included in its first general tax levy thereafter.

The plaintiffs in error, owning land in Mayville and Morgan Townships, North Dakota, brought proceedings to enjoin a Drainage Board appointed by County Commissioners from making and collecting special assessments against plaintiffs in error and the townships for their proportion of the cost of a drain ordered to be constructed.

The Supreme Court of the State held that, while taxes could only be levied by elected officers, special assessments

for benefits conferred by such drains might be imposed by appointed officers, and that the statute afforded due process of law. So far as the Federal questions are concerned, the judgment must be affirmed. For

1. The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers, nor whether they shall be appointed, or elected by the people. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71; 83; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 211 U. S. 210; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 706; Fallbrook District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 167.

2. Neither does that Amendment invalidate an act authorizing an appointed board to determine whether a proposed drain will be of public benefit, and to create a drainage district consisting of land which it decides will be benefited by such drain, and to make special assessments accordingly, if, as here, notice is given and an opportunity to be heard afforded the land owner before the assessment becomes a lien against his property. Ibid.

3. Nor does that Amendment deprive a State of the power to compel a township, as one of its political subdivisions, to levy and collect taxes for the purpose of paying the amount assessed against such township for the public benefits accruing from the construction of the drain. Ibid; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 589–593; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 703-704.

Affirmed.