The CHAIRMAN. The language of this section, if you will read it and analyze it, is where the confidential relationship exists between an employee who is under the immediate supervision of the head of the Department. That applies to a secretary to a member of the Commission, and the only position that I heard him discuss in connection with that was a secretary. Now, I think the language he selected may be so broad that it might be better to specifically enumerate that position. But the purpose was to give to the head of a Department, as this section reads, the right to appoint his own secretary, and when administrations change you would not be required to have as your personal secretary the secretary of your predecessor and your political opponent in the preceding election, favoring policies entirely different from yours. I agree that language can be devised, and I may give you some comfort to tell you that that was his view. Certainly it was my view. I cannot speak for other members of the committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not disagree with that.

Senator BYRD. Does not this law take away the right to appoint the secretary? It takes it from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The language was very unfortunate, if it says that. Senator BYRD. Section (c) takes away that right of the Interstate Commerce Commission to appoint their own secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it does?

Senator BYRD. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know. I am not undertaking to interpret that language. I am saying that if there is any doubt about it it ought to be removed.

The CHAIRMAN. There isn't any question about that, but I am just telling you it was the intention of Senator Robinson, who had introduced the legislation, that because of the confidential relationship between the head of a department and one immediately under his supervision, he should be permitted to select that employee. All that you meant is that you would like to have language expressing that so it might not be left in the future to the determination of some person who might construe as policy-making many positions that you do not believe should be so classed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I had one brief conversation with the former chairman of this committee, the late Senator Robinson, for whom I had a very high regard, and I felt this morning, when you made the statement that it was not his intention to interfere with the functioning of the Commission, that was the feeling that I got, that he did not intend to do that all. Now, naturally, he had not devised all this language, he could not have time to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. This language as to policy-determining was drafted by the Senate with the legislative draftsmen and the clerk of this committee, who is familiar with the language. It is solely a discussion as to whether or not that language accomplishes what was desired, and you are pointing out if it is left as it is in the bill it might be construed in a way that would be very injurious, in your opinion, to the administration of the Commission.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Fulbright, if you will refer to clause (c), is it not true, under that, that the commissioners would not have the power to appoint their own secretaries?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On page 4 are you talking about?

Senator BYRD. Page 4, yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It might be so construed, Senator. I do not think it was intended to mean that at all.

Senator BYRD. I am not asking what it was intended to mean. You are a lawyer. Will you tell the committee if in your opinion it would prevent the appointment of their own secretaries by the Commission?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think I can take a case to court and put that interpretation through.

The CHAIRMAN. If you took the case on the other side, that there is no confidential relationship there, it would be placed outside of the civil service.

Senator BYRD. There are two questions involved under section (c). It has been repeatedly stated here that all the personnel will be appointed by the executive department to which the functions are transferred.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The appointment of personnel is not limited.
Senator BYRD. It is all inclusive.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. When you get over into civil service they say over here that

Upon the expiration of one year after the enactment of this Act, all offices and positions in the various agencies of the government shall be covered into the classified civil service, except offices and positions

then they enumerate from (1) to (5), but there is nothing there that I see that covers the Interstate Commerce Commission. Therefore I am rather at a loss to know how to interpret this law.

Now, right there, gentlemen, I want to make my parting observation. The selection of examiners for the Interstate Commerce Commission, the selection of experts on valuation, experts in traffic and rates, selections of expert statisticians on railroads are all matters that require somebody with an expert knowledge to determine whether a man is capable to do that or not. Now, with all of the time that I have spent in appearing before the Commission, I would not consider myself capable to select some types of men that they employ over there. Now, when you have got a body of that sort, charged with the carrying out of your own legislative policy, which you have laid down, acting in a legislative capacity, making investigations in support of that legislation, please do not let anything come into this law that would make it so the Commission could not determine what kind of examination should be given to these people, and then, when they are covered into that service, whether or not they need to be promoted in the service.

Now, since 1916, they have worked in harmony with the Civil Service Commission. They write out the examinations; the Civil Service Board does not write them. They, in the last analysis, judge certain of the qualifications, but the Civil Service Board conducts the examinations, determines which ones pass, what records they make, and so on, and then the Interstate Commerce Commission determines how they may progress in its own organization.

Now this would freeze that, would substitute for what has been a voluntary arrangement, working satisfactorily to the Commission and, I believe, in the interest of the public, by making it so that some civilservice administrator might some day say, "Well, I am going to take

charge of all of this. I will fix examinations, and I will tell you when you can promote a man from P-4 to P-5 class", or whatever it may be. Gentlemen, the Interstate Commerce Commission is doing a job which meets the general approval. Now mind you, I do not mean I agree with all their decisions, Senator. What I am talking about is as a body. I sometimes think the Supreme Court is wrong. I know they have been wrong in three cases that I have had on a 5-to-4 decision against me, but we are talking about that body as an administrative body, performing a legislative function almost entirely.

Now when that first report came out, soon after that, there was a meeting of the Association of Railway Labor Executives, and I was told by the chairman of that committee that they voted unanimously to oppose having anything done that would take away the regulation of safety devices, and such as that, from the Interstate Commerce Commission. That is the uniform expression that I have heard.

Now, I have taken more time than I intended, and I apologize to you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to have had you make your state

ment.

Mr. Hooker, will you come forward?

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that Judge Hooker is on the State Corporation Commission of Virginia. He is one of the Virginia gentlemen that has filled that position on the body.

The CHAIRMAN. With that introduction, I would like you to make your statement.

Senator BYRD. That applies to all Virginians.

The CHAIRMAN. It could not be a better introduction.

STATEMENT OF H. L. HOOKER, ASSOCIATION RAILROAD AND UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS

Mr. HOOKER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is H. Lester Hooker. I am a member of the State Corporation Commission of Virginia and have been a member of this commission for more than 12 years. I am at present its chairman. I was president of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners in 1933 and am now chairman of the legislative committee of this association. It is in this last-mentioned capacity that I am appearing before you to discuss briefly Senate bill 2700.

Our national association maintains a central organization in the city of Washington, in charge of our general solicitor, Hon. John E. Benton, for the purpose of disseminating properly all important information, aiding the various State commissions, and coordinating their activities so far as practicable.

On behalf of, and at the request of, the executive and legislative committees of our association, Solicitor Benton prepared a memorandum relative to Senate bill 2700, but being unavoidably absent at this time, left his memorandum, and as I concur fully with the views expressed therein, I have, in the interest of brevity and to avoid any possible duplication of our statements, adopted the views expressed by Solicitor Benton as also expressing my own views.

The National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners represents in its membership the regulatory commissions of the several States of the United States, except Delaware, which has no

commission, and New York, the commissions of which are not at present actively affiliated with the association.

The association membership also includes the members of the commissions of Puerto Rico and Hawaii and the District of Columbia and of the Federal regulatory commissions.

Upon matters of legislation, however, the State commission members determine the policies of the association. They make no attempt to represent in any way the views of Federal commissions. What I shall say today, accordingly, must be understood as said on behalf of the State commissions represented in the membership of the association.

After the Brownlow committee report was made, a joint meeting of the executive committee of the association and of its committee on legislation was held for the purpose of considering the proposed reorganization, insofar as it might affect the Federal regulatory commissions, which exercise jurisdiction over public service companies, which are likewise subject to the regulation of the State commissions. At this meeting there were present 14 representatives of State commissions, members of said two committees. After a full discussion, a resolution was adopted by unanimous vote of said representatives which I will read in full as follows:

Resolved, That this association is unalterably opposed to any change in the status of the Federal regulatory commissions which will weaken or impair their independent character or will subject them to partisan political influences or control.

A supplementary vote was also adopted specifically stating that the regulatory commissions referred to in the resolution were the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

I wish to present this resolution to the committee, and to state briefly the attitude of the association concerning Senate bill 2700, insofar as it relates to the four Federal regulatory commissions which I have just mentioned.

These commissions are those which exercise regulatory power over railroads and public utilities, insofar as the Federal Government may exercise such power, and the Congress has adjudged it necessary in the public interest to provide Federal regulation.

Over these same railroads and public utilities the State commissions exercise regulatory power with respect to intrastate business. Many of the States, by statutes, have made it the duty of their State commissions to represent the interest of their citizens upon matters pending before the Federal commissions.

I may also add that in 1920 the Congress authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to hold joint conference and joint hearings with the State commissions and to avail itself "of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of such State authorities in the enforcement of any provision of this (Interstate Commerce) Act" In the Federal regulatory statutes which have been enacted since 1920, relating to communications companies, power companies, and motor carriers, the Congress has included corresponding provisions Such provisions are also included in the Lea bill to regulate the interstate transportation and sale of natural gas, which bill has passed the House and is now pending before the Senate.

Congress has thus recognized the close connection which must necessarily exist between Federal regulation and State regulation under our dual form of government.

From the foregoing it results that the State commissioners have a very great interest in these Federal regulatory commissions. It is not a financial or selfish interest. They have nothing to gain or to lose personally from any legislation which Congress might enact affecting the Federal commissions either in emoluments of office or in any financial advantage or disadvantage which may accrue to them personally. Their interest is only that of public officials charged by law with the protection of public interest. Their desire is that Congress shall preserve the independence and the efficiency of these Federal agencies.

We urge that regulatory commissions ought to be as independent of political influence and control as the courts. Their decisions affect the financial interests of millions of rate payers, on the one hand, and of millions of investors in these public-service properties, on the other. The commissions should be independent, and they should be able, and equipped with experienced and competent staffs.

It is not enough that a commission be composed of honest men of good ability. It must be supported by a competent organization. Especially is this true of the Federal commissions which exercise jurisdiction throughout a country composed of 48 States. Most of what these commissions do must necessarily be done in their name by others. The Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, performs its functions through various bureaus and a large number of employees. With such a commission, the selection and organization of its employees is its most important function, for upon the character of its organization and of the employees who compose it, depends the success of the commission in all branches of the work with which the Congress has charged it.

Congress, when it created the Federal regulatory commissions, recognized these facts. It made those commissions independent in the exercise of their functions and independent in the choice and organization of their employees. Furthermore, to insure, so far as humanly possible, their independence from political influences, it made these commissions bipartisan. This has represented the deliberate policy of Congress for more than 50 years, persisting through all changes of party control.

The result has been such as to bear witness to the wisdom of this congressional policy. The independent commissions have acquitted themselves well.

The Interstate Commerce Commission this year ended 50 years of service. During that time it has won the confidence alike of the ratepaying public, and of the carriers. From each side, from time to time, may have come complaints and criticisms, which fact may be proof of the impartiality of its administration of the law. Shippers and carriers alike, however, recognize the fairness and the devotion to duty, and the incorruptible character of the Commission and its staff.

Congress, itself, has placed the stamp of approval upon the manner in which it has handled its functions, for it has repeatedly enacted statutes to extend its jurisdiction.

When the Commission was created in 1887 the powers granted were small. The Commission could gather statistics. It could investigate and admonish. It could award reparation for unjust rates collected