Now, prior to the effectiveness of such legislation as is here proposed it must be assumed that the head of such an agency will have purged his organization of those whom he does not feel should longer continue, and then to require that an additional recommendation from the head of the agency must be had before such an employee can even qualify, or attempt to qualify for continuance in office, seems to us unnecessary and unreasonable.

We wish to say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, what seem to us, under title II, the three most important points, the extension of the merit system, the extension of the classification and the setting up of a civil-service administration, we are in hearty accord on those.

There are certain things, some of which I have attempted to enumerate, which can be changed that will immeasurably strengthen S. 2700, and to permit them to continue would do damage out of all proportion to their apparent importance at this time. That, in the main, we are very strongly in favor of legislation on those three important points being enacted at the earliest possible date.

Let me emphasize as one who has been, in a way, connected with Federal personnel matters for more than 40 years, that the greatest evils today in regard to our Federal personnel system are those of omission and not of commission, and the imposing as a definite, unqualified duty upon some responsible official or agency of the doing of all of these things that are recognized at the present time as necessary to build and maintain a proper personnel system, is put right in there. It becomes someone's job to do these things, and it will not longer be possible for officials to give lip service, or to pass the buck and say, "We think it ought to be done but it is not our job to do it." We want something done.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Steward. The next witness I will call will be Mrs. Harris T. Baldwin.

STATEMENT OF MRS. HARRIS T. BALDWIN, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Baldwin, you represent the National League of Women Voters?

Mrs. BALDWIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You desire to address the committee with regard to what feature?

Mrs. BALDWIN. With regard to the personnel feature, Mr. Chair

man.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mrs. Baldwin.

Mrs. BALDWIN. The National League of Women Voters supports the civil-service recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. To the extent that the bill under discussion carries out those recommendations, it has the support of the League. We are not in a position to speak on other phases of the report or the bill.

After years of participating as citizens in the democratic processes of government, members of the League of Women Voters have reached the conclusion that the effective control of government by the will of the people the fundamental principle of democracy-is thwarted by the patronage system. It destroys party responsibility by substitut

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ing the bribery by jobs for adherence to principles, and is one of the contributing factors to lack of public confidence in government.

The growth of patronage in the Federal Government is demonstrated by the figures showing the number of Federal employees exempt from the merit system, which have been filed with your committee by other witnesses. I wish especially to speak of the growing inclination of the Congress to extend patronage through the device of senatorial confirmation. No one questions the necessity for exempting policy-determining positions from the merit system, but those positions are very few in number. Only such positions should be subject to senatorial confirmation. We cannot go along with the opinion that was once expressed to us by one of your body to this effect: "My own view is that Senate confirmation is an important check on executive appointments. Agreeing with your views about the extension of civil service and its principles, I feel that the public interest is best safeguarded by adequate checks and balances between the different departments." A system of checks and balances can be carried too far. It might be carried to a point where it is impossible for government to function at all. The inability of a democratic government to meet the needs of the people promptly and effectively would inevitably lead to its destruction.

We consider the extension of control by the Congress of appointments to the important administrative positions an invasion of the rights and responsibilities of the executive branch of the Government. We believe that responsibility for government must be fixed clearly so that citizens may best exercise their functions of holding officials responsible for their acts. When the responsibility is so diffused among the various branches of government that no one agency or person can be held accountable, then the citizen is helpless. When the Senate shares in the naming of persons for the important administrative posts of government, it is performing a function which it is unprepared to fulfill effectively by the very nature of its organization. The Senate cannot, as a body or even as individuals, have the degree of knowledge of the kind of duties to be performed in the particular job that the head of the department concerned must have. Inevitably considerations other than merit will enter into the selection of Government workers when senatorial confirmation is necessary. This is equally true when it is superimposed on an examination system. The individual applicant will be dependent upon the favor of Senators. In many instances the best qualified will not attempt to enter the Government service because of this necessity. Senatorial confirmation also causes delay and confusion destructive to the efficient functioning of government.

Senatorial confirmation should not be extended but curtailed, by limiting it to the positions which are purely policy-determining. The Senate has such important policy decisions to make in regard to the complicated social and economic problems of the day that it should not be harassed by the nagging necessity to act as an employment agency for its constituents."

We believe that the growth of the Federal service necessitates a reorganization of personnel administration. Our experience in the field of government has convinced us that a board is not an efficient administrative device. Unless the administration of personnel is sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the service, the merit system comes into

disrepute. We have heard that it is imperative to exempt personnel in new agencies from the Civil Service Act because of the cumbersome, slow procedure. We have heard of the sterility of the service-clerks in dead-end jobs-the difficulties of discharge-favoritism in promotions-the long delays in selecting personnel. Probably only a portion of this criticism is justified and can be traced to the inherent administrative weaknesses of a board or commission, which prevents quick and decisive action. We therefore approve the provision of S. 2700 to the extent that it establishes a single executive as Civil Service Administrator, rather than the present form of a board of three members. We believe that the changes in methods of recruitment and in other factors involved in the development of career service will be facilitated under the direction of an experienced public personnel director. We do not approve of the method of selection of this administrator as provided in the bill, nor do we approve of the elimination of this proposed advisory board of seven members to act as watchdog of the merit system. We believe that it is sounder administrative practice to protect the integrity of the position of Civil Service Administrator by the method of selection, rather than by the method of discharge. The Civil Service Administrator must be above reproach and eminently well qualified for his position. The best method of securing such a person is to provide for a thorough review of his qualifications by a special examining board. Members of such a board would have to be persons themselves experienced in the field of personnel administration. This examining board would certify a group of applicants for the position of Administrator.

The bill does not extend the merit system to any appreciable degree. On the contrary it extends the patronage system, by increasing the number of Presidential appointees subject to confirmation by the Senate. To satisfy the large number of citizens who are increasingly interested in elimination of the patronage system, these sections of the bill must be changed to provide unequivocally for extension of the merit system to all but policy-determining positions.

That there is a steady increase in public interest in the abolition of patronage appointments cannot be denied. Other witnesses have cited the platforms of the major political parties, the Gallup Poll of Public Opinion, and to some extent the action of State legislatures, the fact that five States have enacted State-wide merit systems this year-the first such laws to be passed in 16 years-is one indication of the growth of public interest in this field. In addition to these 5 States, the legislatures of 15 other States seriously considered merit legislation. Three of the nine States having merit system laws prior to 1937 enacted new legislation effecting improvements of major significance. A large number of cities installed merit systems for the first time. This rapid and widespread increase in formal merit systems could only come about through aroused and directed public opinion, which will not be satisfied until the patronage system is abolished. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Rice here?

STATEMENT OF M. W. RICE, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rice, you appear on behalf of the Veterans of Foreign Wars?

Mr. RICE. That is right, as legislative representative for the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Our organization is concerned, primarily, in two features of this bill. First, under title I, we fear that there would be vested in the President the authority to transfer the present Veterans' Administration to some executive department and to abolish it as an independent agency. We can find nothing under title I which would serve as a protection or assurance that the Veterans' Administration would be kept as an independent establishment, or an independent agency, whichever it should be classified as, and that it might, therefore, be covered into some executive department and become a part of it. That, we think, would be undesirable. We believe that the Veterans' Administration should continue as an independent agency, and we consider this of paramount importance to the future welfare and the administration, the service, and benefit to veterans who are suffering with disabilities caused by their military service during war periods. Let me say that on page 7, under the classification of "definitions" the term "independent establishment" does not appear to include the Veterans' Administration; that, therefore, it would appear that the Veterans' Administration is classified as an agency. That being the case, it would appear that section 2, subsection 1 (1) on page 3 would authorize the transfer of such agency to some other agency, or to some executive department. Subsection (b) of section 2 would not seem to have any protection to the Veterans' Administration against the possibility of such transfer, because it says nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to authorize the President to abolish any executive department or indepdnent establishment. The Veterans' Administration is certainly not an executive department, and according to the definition of an independent establishment on page 7 it does not appear to be classified as an independent establishment, therefore there is no protection afforded to it against its transfer into some executive department or independent establishment.

That could be corrected by adding to subsection (2) of section 5 the inclusion of the Veterans' Administration as being one of the independent establishments.

At the same time it would appear that the provisions of subsection (c) of section 2, authorizing the President

to transfer to an executive department any of the routine administrative and executive functions of any independent establishment which are common to other agencies of the Government such as the preparation of estimates of appropriations; the appointment of personnel and maintenance of personnel records; the procurement of material, supplies, and equipment; the accounting for public funds; the rental of quarters and related matters

would be very dangerous authority if it were made applicable to the Veterans' Administration. It would seem to be entirely inconsistent with the proper control of the Veterans' Administration to provide that some other agency could prepare its estimates of appropriations, or to take care of its rentals, or to take care of the appointment of personnel, the maintenance of personnel records, or to provide for the procurement of material, of supplies or equipment, and we most emphatically would request that subsection (c) of section 2 should not be applicable as to the Veterans' Administration, if, in fact, it ought to be applicable as to other agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rice, you have pointed out that that section applies to independent establishments. Mr. RICE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Veterans' Administration is not included as an independent establishment.

Mr. RICE. I grant you that.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore it would not apply to the Veterans' Administration.

Mr. RICE. It would not at the present time, but the other sections permitting transfer and retransfer and regrouping of the activities of an agency would permit that to be done as to the Veterans' Administration if it is to be regarded as an agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Only if it should be transferred to an independent establishment, because it is only as to independent establishments that the provision applies to which you refer.

Mr. RICE. Yes, as to subsection (c).

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and the only way it may be applied to the Veterans' Administration is if the Veterans' Administration should be transferred to one of these quasi-judicial independent establishments as defined there. It would be an impossible thing to transfer the Veterans' Administration to one of these quasi-judicial establishments, like the Board of Tax Appeals, the Federal Power Commission, and so forth. I do not think you need to have a reasonable fear on that point.

Mr. RICE. But the point is this: If it is to remain in the classification of an agency, then it is subject to the other provisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Like any other department of the Government. Mr. RICE. In subsection (a) of section 2.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the same fix as any other department of the Government, with the exception of these quasi-judicial establishments that are set forth.

Mr. RICE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not opposed to Congress giving the President the power to transfer other executive agencies, but you want the specific provision inserted that he shall not have the power to do so as to the Veterans' Administration; is that right?

Mr. RICE. That is right, precisely. I am not trying to speak as to other agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. You are just speaking of the Veterans' Administration?

Mr. RICE. That is it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand every person appears for the one in which he is interested.

Mr. RICE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in favor of consolidating as a general thing, instead of having 106 or 107 independent agencies, you believe, as a general thing, it would be in the interest of efficient administration to make some effort to merge these 106 or 107 agencies, do you not?

Mr. RICE. I have not said that, but you have made a very broad statement with which I can agree.

The CHAIRMAN. As a general principle.

Mr. RICE. As a broad principle, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then when it comes to the one that you are interested in, you want us to leave it out.

Mr. RICE. If you want to get more specific, I will not agree with you. I say I agree with your broad statement.