STATEMENT OF CHARLES I. STENGLE, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stengle, you represent the American Federation of Government Employees?

Mr. STENGLE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you desire to make a statement with reference to any provisions of S. 2700?

Mr. STENGLE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to hear you.

Mr. STENGLE. With your consent, Mr. Chairman, I will complete the statement before answering questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. STENGLE. I have made a study of this measure with the result that I am convinced that it holds grave dangers to Government personnel. It is not an exaggeration to say that this bill would virtually wipe out the merit system, contribute nothing to a career service, and substitute a spoils system more obnoxious than that which prevailed prior to our present civil service.

Through its continuing power to reorganize, transfer, consolidate or abolish Government agencies, this bill can have no effect other than to keep the Federal service in a state of constant anxiety and turmoil. Its grant of authority to withdraw from the classified service any positions that may be deemed policy-determining in character would forever blast our hopes for a career service.

I make these statements without impugning pernicious motives to anyone. What is stated in this analysis by way of comment on the bill should not be understood to apply to any person now in an executive or administrative capacity. I will say that we know those who are now holding the reins of government, but we do not know those who are to come, and that is the disquieting feature of it all.

While this measure may have been intended to accomplish many worth-while purposes, it is apparent to anyone who reads it carefully and attempts to appraise its effects, that it is filled with numerous inconsistencies and is needlessly complicated. Although it is designed to bring into the classified civil service many positions now outside its scope, the bill is contradictory and confusion, nullifies many of its own provisions, and, in last analysis, could, by the use of the broad discretionary authority it contains and through its confusing terms, actually result in the exclusion of many positions in the classified civil service and the replacement of many faithful civil servants with persons whose only claim to employment would be influential political backing.

To appraise the effects of this Senate reorganization bill, I have endeavored to study each of its provisions from this viewpoint: Does it supply the necessary legislative authority to make Government employment a career, or does it intensify and extend those degenerating remains of the spoils system. I am compelled to report that this bill does much more to further Government employment as a matter of political spoils than it does to develop the civil service as a career based on meritorious performance of duty.

POSSIBILITIES FOR EXTENDING THE MERIT SYSTEM

I will discuss first those possibilities which are contained in the bill for extending the merit system and building up a career service. I use the word "possibilities" advisedly, for the provisions in question, for the most part, either contain the word "may" which makes the authority discretionary whereby it may not actually be utilized for the advantage of the Government employee, or they are couched in such vague and general terms as to permit of various construction.

Committed as our Federation is to the cause of good government, we can have no quarrel with five of the six major objectives of the bill as outlined in section 1, but their advantage to the employee is completely nullified by these four words: "From time to time", which clothe the President with authority without limitation as to time to carry on a reorganization of the Government without end.

Those major objectives contained in section 1 of the bill authorize the President to: (1) Reduce expenditures consistent with efficient operation; (2) increase efficiency; (3) group agencies and functions of the Government according to major purposes; (4) reduce the number of agencies by regrouping, consolidation, or abolishment wherever it is found they are not necessary; (5) eliminate duplication of effort; (6) segregate routine administrative and executive functions from regulatory functions.

REMOVE CONTROL OVER PERSONNEL

The first five objectives in themselves look toward efficient operation of the Government, but, reduced to the terms of this bill, their achievement will fall far short of the goal. The sixth might appear sound on its face, but when it is interpreted to mean that regulatory bodies will not have control over such vital administrative phases of their operation as selection of their own personnel, this item has farreaching and dangerous implications.

In title II, which covers civil service and classification, there is the provisions relating to the appointment of a Deputy Civil Service Administrator, "subject to the civil service laws." This is a step in the direction of a career service, yet it must be pointed out that it is inconsistent with the intent of the bill to remove policy-making positions from the civil service, and there is a later provision in this bill giving the President authority to remove positions from the classified civil service if he finds they are of a policy-making character. Thus no position in the higher brackets is safely in the classified civil service. Does that point to the establishment of a genuine career service? I think not.

Section 202 (a) stipulated that the Civil Service Administrator "shall prepare and recommend to the President plans for the development and maintenance of a career service in the Federal Government.' This is a general statement of a policy, the details of which are left to the future and one which, in the light of the possibility of removing many positions from the classified service, may in practice go by the boards.

IMPROVEMENTS AUTHORIZED NOT DIRECTED

In section 202 (b), the Administrator is "further authorized" to do such things as plan employee training programs, obtain information relating to personnel standards, cooperate with public personnel

agencies of State, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and assist in the installation or development of personnel standards. Incidentally, the main clause of this section covers the Federal but omits mention of the District Government. But good as subsection (b) is in its terms, the fact that the Administrator is "authorized" rather than directed to do those things, is no definite guaranty that they will be done.

Section 208 (a) provides for the extension of the Classification Act, but the keynote of its weaknesses is struck in these opening words, "Subject to the limitations hereinafter provided," and is further emphasized by the stipulation that the President "may" extend the provisions of the Classification Act after various surveys and investigations. A survey looking to this end was authorized by the Welch Act of 1928 and actually was made. A report was made to Congress but still the Classification Act has not been extended to the field services.

Section 208 (b) and (c) grant the President authority to fix new rates of pay and establish new grades within the existing classification schedules as the need arises. Unless this lends itself to adverse interpretation, the authority herein granted can be beneficial.

Section 211 provides that a Government employee may be advanced to a vacancy in a higher class. This provision already is contained in civil-service law.

PROVISIONS THAT MAY OR WILL DEVELOP A SPOILS SYSTEM

What has already been said about section 1, subsections (a) to (f), inclusive, may be emphasized here with the further statement that the laudable purposes therein contained are almost certain to fall short of attainment in practice. This apprehension is definitely borne out by succeeding provisions of this measure.

The dangerous implications of subsection (f) which directs the President "to segregate routine administrative functions from regulatory functions," are first indicated in the word "routine." What one person may believe is routine, another may deem important, so that the fact that this word must first be defined to put the provision into effect is hazardous at the outset.

But the fuller meaning of this provision, which reveals its harmful possibilities, is indicated in section 2 (c) which authorizes the President "to transfer to an executive department any of the routine administrative and executive functions of any independent establishment

* such as the preparation of estimates of appropriations, the appointment of personnel and maintenance of personnel records

One could imagine no better way of hamstringing such an agency as the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Tariff Commission as to deprive it of authority to prepare its own budget and select its own personnel. To take from the members of a quasijudicial board or commission its control over personnel, many of whom assist in the preparation of data on which decisions must be made, is highly dangerous undertaking from the standpoint of public policy. This situation is further aggravated by clause 4 of subsection (b), section 2, which would prevent the President from abolishing any functions of an independent establishment or to transfer any of its functions to an executive department except as provided in subsection (c) on which comment already has been made.

The outstanding contradictions of the bill are contained in section 2 (a) which enumerates the powers of the President to revamp the structure of Government. The powers therein stated are broad as one will see in the wording of this portion:

SEC. 2 (a). Whenever the President, after investigation shall find and declare that any transfer, retransfer, regrouping, coordination, consolidation, reorganization, segregation, or abolition of the whole or any part of any agency or the functions thereof is necessary to accomplish any of the purposes set forth in section 1 of this title, he may by Executive order subject to the limitations hereinafter provided:

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This subsection clothes the President with the broadest possible powers and immediately fixed broad limitations. What contribution these powers might make toward the advancement of the spoils system are not difficult to visualize, and because the limitations are conflicting, they do not afford any great protection.

Let us examine those powers as set forth in item (1) to (4) inclusive, in section 2 (a), from the standpoint of their direct contradiction by limitations prescribed in section 2 (b).

SOME CONTRADICTIONS

While the President is authorized in section 2 (a) (1) to

Transfer or retransfer the whole or any part of any agency or the functions thereof to the jurisdiction and control of any other agency.

He is restricted from doing this in section 2 (b):

Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to authorize the President (2) to transfer to any other agency all of the functions of any executive department

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Since the definition of "agency" in section 5 is that it "means any executive department," the President is given authority to transfer an entire department and is later prevented from so doing. Of course, there would be organic acts and other legislative bars to putting it into practice, but the net result appears to be that so much of a department could be transferred as to leave a mere skeleton of its former self. What could happen in such a wholesale transfer might well be imagined, with other provisions in the bill creating policy-making jobs and positions with expert status. Another possibility of spoils. Further the President is authorized in section 2 (a) (3) toAbolish the whole or any part of any agency, or the functions thereof But in two limiting items in subsection (b) we find that "nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to authorize the President(1) to abolish any executive department or independent establishment

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or

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(4) To abolish any of the functions of any independent establishment Bearing in mind that in section 5 (1) the term "agency" means any executive department, independent establishment, and so forth, one is led to interpret this contradiction to mean that the President is authorized to abolish a department or independent establishment but cannot abolish its functions. Here appears to be a tangle out of which little good can come for the defeat of the spoils system.

In section 2 (f)

The President is authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out his functions under this title

a delegation of authority as to details to which there can be little inkling in advance.

LIMITS POWER OF CONGRESS OVER REORGANIZATION

As I already point out in my first statement, section 4 requires the Chief Executive to submit his Executive orders to Congress, but it would require legislation to prevent them from becoming effective and then only would such legislation succeed by passing it over the President's veto by a two-thirds vote.

Section 201 (a) provides for the appointment of a Civil Service Administrator by the President and confirmation by the Senate. It does not limit his reappointment and provides that he "may be removed by the President." Contrast this with section 303 (c) which gives Congress the authority to remove the Auditor General and prohibits the reappointment of that official.

The description of the Civil Service Administrator's qualifications is so broad that it contains small assurance that he will be eminently qualified:

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SEC. 201 (a) The Administrator shall be selected without regard to any political affiliations, shall be a person specially qualified for the office of Administrator by reason of his executive and administrative qualifications, with particular reference to his actual experience in, or his knowledge of, accepted practices in respect to the functions vested in that office by law

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Again the phraseology is so general that the selection of the Administrator becomes a matter of opinion as to whether a certain individual meets the specifications laid down. This could well open the door to a purely political appointment.

Section 201 (c) abolishes the Civil Service Commission and vests its functions in the Civil Service Administration, functions which may or may not be utilized as in the past. Personnel of the Commission would be transferred to the Administration. With a later provision that permits reclassification of transferred personnel, this subsection opens to the spoilsmen the door of the new administration in that its key positions may be declared "policy-making" and thereby susceptible to political appointments.

Section 201 (d) authorized the Administrator to make rules and regulations to carry out the functions of his office, a further centralization of control over the civil service in the hands of the President and his administrator. With other provisions in the bill, which clothe the President with broad authority to exclude positions from the classified civil service, the dangers of attack on the merit system by a politicalminded Chief Executive in the years to come are apparent.

Filled as the bill is with loopholes up to this point, there are more to come. One provision that creates a multitude of these assaults on the merit system is section 203. Both of its subsections are far from being conducive to developing Government employment into a

career.

Section 203 (a) relates to appointments "to be made by the President alone", a phrase difficult to understand in that appointments to higher positions for the most part are required to have Senate confirmation.