Because of the request that we expedite the submission of our comments on this proposed legislation, we have not ascertained whether our views as expressed herein are in accord with the Bureau of the Budget. Sincerely yours, C. V. WHITNEY, Acting Secretary of Commerce. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW In compliance with paragraph 2a of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as introduced, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): FEDERAL AIRPORT ACT DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR PROJECTS IN STATES APPORTIONMENT OF FUNDS SEC. 6. (a) As soon as possible after any appropriation is made under section 5 (b), [75] 60 per centum of the amount thereof available for grants for projects in the several States shall be apportioned by the Administrator among the several States, one-half in the proportion which the population of each State bears to the total population of all the States, and one-half in the proportion which the area of each State bears to the total area of all the States. All sums so apportioned for a State shall be available only to pay the United States share of the allowable project costs of approved projects located in that State, or sponsored by that State or some public agency thereof but located in an adjoining State. Upon making an apportionment as provided in this subsection, the Administrator shall inform the executive head of each State, and any public agency which has requested such information, as to the sums apportioned for each State. As used in this subsection the term "population" means the population according to the latest decennial census of the United States and the term "area" includes both land and water. CONFERRING JURISDICTION UPON THE COURT OF CLAIMS TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNTS DUE TO AND RENDER JUDGMENT UPON THE CLAIMS OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE ALASKA RAILROAD FOR OVERTIME WORK PERFORMED JULY 21, 1949.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House and ordered to be printed Mr. LANE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following REPORT To accompany H. R. 219] The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 219) to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to determine the amounts due to and render judgment upon the claims of the employees of the Alaska Railroad for overtime work performed, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill, as amended, do pass. The amendment is as follows: Page 2, line 6, strike out all of section 2. STATEMENT OF FACTS The act of March 12, 1914 (48 U. S. C. 301), empowered the President to build the Alaska Railroad and "to fix the compensation of all officers, agents, or employees appointed or designated by him." By Executive Order No. 3861 dated June 8, 1923, the President placed the Alaska Railroad under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior who, on January 11, 1929, issued regulations establishing the duties and powers of the General Manager. Rates of pay of employees of the railroad are fixed in accordance with the following Government wageboard procedure: the General Manager, after conference with the union representatives of the employees, submits proposed adjustments in wage schedules for the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. In arriving at approved rates, consideration is given to rates paid employees performing similar duties on railroads in continental limited States (25 Comp. Gen. 409). Because of higher living costs in Alaska, an effort is made to maintain Alaska Railroad wages at a level at least 25 percent higher than wages for comparable positions in continental limited States. A number of employees of the Alaska Railroad have filed claims in the Court of Claims asserting that they are entitled to the benefits of section 23 of the act of March 28, 1934, which reads as follows: The weekly compensation, minus any general percentage reduction which may be prescribed by Act of Congress, for the several trades and occupations, which is set by wage boards or other wage-fixing authorities, shall be reestablished and maintained at rates not lower than necessary to restore the full weekly earnings of such employees in accordance with the full-time weekly earnings under the respective wage schedules in effect on June 1, 1932: Provided, That the regular hours of labor shall not be more than forty per week; and all overtime shall be compensated for at the rate of not less than time and one-half. The first Economy Act, Public 212, Seventy-second Congress, of June 30, 1932, provided payless furloughs for certain Government employees. The second Economy Act, Public 2, Seventy-third Congress, of March 20, 1933, provided reductions of pay for certain Government employees. Both of these acts were applied to employees of the Alaska Railroad. These acts were subsequently repealed by a series of acts, the first of which was section 23 of the act of March 28, 1934, which abolished the effects of the economy acts with respect to the trades and occupations whose wages are set by wage boards or other wage-fixing authorities, and established a 40-hour week with time and one-half for overtime for the same employees. Section 23 was applied to the employees of the Alaska Railroad for about a month. during the summer of 1934. However, in his decision of July 12, 1934 (14 Comp. Gen. 42), the Comptroller General ruled that section 23 did not apply to employees of the Alaska Railroad, and since July 15, 1934, although they have been required regularly to work in excess of 40 hours, they did not receive overtime pay until July 1, 1945. In very similar factual situations, the Court of Claims and the United States Supreme Court have held that Government employees of the Panama Canal were entitled to the benefits of section 23 (Townsley v. U. S., 101 C. Cls. 237, 323 U. S. 557; Hearne v. U. S., 107 C. Cls. 335, cert. den., 331 U. S. 858.). The employees of the Alaska Railroad are relying upon the doctrines of the Townsley and Hearne cases in asserting their claims to the benefits of section 23. It must be emphasized that, without any legislative action, the Court of Claims now has jurisdiction of these claims and power to award judgments to the claimants for a period covering 6 years prior to the filing of each petition. Furthermore, it apparently has power in the cases of claimants who are married women to award judgments for the full period back to March 28, 1934. With these exceptions, all of the claims are governed by section 156 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. (1940) 262) which bars claims against the United States not filed within 6 years of their accrual. The committee believes that in connection with the claims of the employees of the Alaska Railroad this statute does not perform the usual function of a statute of limitations because (a) the statute cannot prevent inquiry into these claims for the period of 6 years prior to the date of the filing of each petition; and (b) the court is required to decide the merits of these claims, and in order to do so must review the factual situation at the time section 23 was enacted, and consider its applicability to these claimants throughout the period from that date until the suits were filed. The committee feels that, if the court decides that these claimants were entitled to the benefits of section 23 during the whole period back to March 28, 1934, the Government should not avoid payment of just compensation for the full period by seeking refuge behind a statute of limitations. Your committee requested the Interior Department to comment on this bill, and received the following reply: Hon. EMANUEL CELLER, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, House of Representatives. MY DEAR MR. CELLER: This is in reply to your request of February 16 for the comments of this Department with respect to H. R. 219, a bill to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to determine the amounts due to and render judgment upon the claims of the employees of the Alaska Railroad for overtime work performed. There are now pending before the Court of Claims of the United States claims of well over 400 employees and former employees of the Alaska Railroad to recover overtime compensation under section 23 of the act of March 28, 1934 (48 Stat. 522, 5 U. S. C. 673c), which provides that the regular hours of labor shall not be more than 40 per week and that all overtime shall be compensated for at the rate of not less than time and one-half. Pursuant to an opinion of the Comptroller General (14 Comp. Gen. 42) that section 23 of the 1934 act did not apply to the employees of the Alaska Railroad, overtime compensation was not paid to them under the authority of that act. (See 25 Comp. Such compensation was, however, allowed to certain classes of employees when the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 became effective. Gen. 409.) The suits pending in the Court of Claims claim overtime compensation for the period between the effective date of the act of March 28, 1934, and July 1, 1945, it being the position of the claimants that they were at all times since the effective date of the, 1934 act, entitled to compensation at the rate of time and one-half for all overtime in excess of 40 hours per week. Section 2401 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. sec. 2401) prescribes that in every civil action commenced against the United States the complaint is barred unless filed within 6 years after the right of action first accrues. H. R. 219 would suspend operation of section 2401 of the Judicial Code with respect to these claims of employees of the Alaska Railroad so that should the Court of Claims find them to be valid, it might enter judgment for the period since the effective date of the 1934 act. The principal objection to the enactment of this measure is that it might be the forerunner of a series of similar measures in behalf of other claimants against the United States, which might result in the indirect abrogation of the existing statute of limitations. Such a result would not be in the public interest. The bill may also be objected to on the grounds that if its provisions are literally construed it would bar any defenses of the Government to the claims now pending in the Court of Claims, and would require that court merely to find as a fact the amounts due to the claimants without determining as a matter of law whether the 1934 act applied to them. I recommend, therefore, that H. R. 219 be not enacted. The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this report. Sincerely yours. OSCAR L. CHAPMAN, Under Secretary of the Interior. The objection of the Secretary that the bill could be construed to bar any defenses to these claims has been removed by striking section 2 of the bill as introduced. This committee believes that in these cases the statute of limitations should be suspended and recommends that H. R. 219 as amended be given favorable consideration. Hon. EMANUEL CELLER, Chairman, Judiciary Committee, SEEGMILLER & MURDOCK, Washington 6, D. C., May 18, 1949. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN CELLER: There is now pending before your committee the bill, H. R. 219, introduced by Delegate Bartlett of Alaska, to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to determine the amounts due to and render judgment upon the claims of employees of The Alaska Railroad for overtime work performed. An identical bill, S. 319, introduced by Senator Kilgore, is pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Attached hereto is a memorandum outlining the history of these claims, the legislation and administrative acts on which they are based, and the judicial decisions on which the claimants rely. I represent several hundred of these employees who have filed petitions in the Court of Claims for overtime compensation. Copies of the petitions are attached hereto for your files. All of these claims would be affected by H. R. 219 if it were enacted. As counsel for these claimants I urge early and favorable action by your committee. The purpose of this letter is to set forth the reasons why we believe the Bartlett bill is unusually meritorious. All of these claims arise out of the refusal of the management of the Alaska Railroad to apply to its employees the provisions of section 23 of the act of March 28, 1934, which reads as follows: "The weekly compensation, minus any general percentage reduction which may be prescribed by Act of Congress, for the several trades and occupations, which is set by wage boards or other wage-fixing authorities, shall be reestablished and maintained at rates not lower than necessary to restore the full weekly earnings of such employees in accordance with the full-time weekly earnings under the respective wage schedules in effect on June 1, 1932: Provided, That the regular hours of labor shall not be more than forty per week; and all overtime shall be compensated for at the rate of not less than time and one-half." It should be borne in mind that, without any legislative action, the Court of Claims now has jurisdiction of these claims and power to award judgment to the claimants for a period covering 6 years prior to the filing of each petition. Furthermore, it has power in certain cases discussed below to award judgment for the full period back to March 28, 1934. With these exceptions, all of the claims are governed by section 156 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. (1940) 262) which was in effect when the petitions were filed, and which reads as follows: "Every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the court, or transmitted to it by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as provided by law, within six years after the claim first accrues. The claims of married women first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court or transmitted, as aforesaid, within three years after the disability has ceased; but no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred, nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively (Mar. 3 1911, ch. 231, sec. 156, 36 Stat. 1139.)" Thus, unless H. R. 219 or similar legislation is enacted, although the Court of Claims can hear these claims and award judgment for overtime compensation for a period of 6 years, it cannot (with the exceptions discussed in paragraph 3, infra) award judgment for the full amounts due and owing to and wrongfully withheld from the employees. In view of the special circumstances surrounding these claims, we think this statute of limitations would work grave injustice in these cases. The reasons upon which this conclusion is based are briefly summarized below: 1. The principal justification for a statute of limitations does not exist in these cases.-The function of a statute of limitations is to prevent judicial inquiry into any alleged claim which accrued prior to the period fixed by the statute. The rationale of limitations is that a valid unpaid claim will stimulate action by the claimant within a reasonable period, and that delay beyond that period is apt to lead to injustice because of the disappearance of evidence, the death or inaccessibility of witnesses, and the increased difficulty of proving a defense. But the instant limitation cannot perform its traditional function in these cases because: (a) The statute cannot prevent inquiry into these claims. A claim for unemployment compensation accrues whenever and as often as overtime work is per |