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rent, stationery, and contingent expenses" in a specified sum; and then follows the clause appropriating "an amount sufficient for the payment of said sums." Evidently these provisions cannot be limited to one year without doing violence to the ordinary meaning of language. They were enacted by Congress with a knowledge that less explicit language used in the act of March 2, 1867, had been incorporated in the Revised Statutes as à permanent annual appropriation. The appropriating clause in the act of August 5, 1882, is used in connection with permanent provisions for salary and expenses, and its construction may not inappropriately be regarded as affected by the maxim noscitur a sociis. This clause is, therefore, to be deemed as making a permanent annual appropriation.

The question as to the mode of disbursement, is one to which the rulings in Senate-Disbursement Case (2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec. 404) apply.

I. A proper mode of disbursing the appropriation made by the act of August 5, 1882, for the office of reporter of the Supreme Court will be, (1) to pay the salary by warrant on the Treasurer, issued on a balance certified by the First Comptroller, on an account stated from time to time and settled by the First Auditor, and (2) to pay the clerk hire, office rent, stationery, and contingent expenses through a special dis bursing agent. Either mode might properly be adopted as to both classes of payments; but the modes, as stated, would seem to be most convenient and appropriate.

II. There are two modes of paying claims against the United States. 1. A claimant may present his claim to the proper Auditor, who then states an account therein and makes a report thereof to the Commissioner of Customs, or proper Comptroller, as the case may be. The latter, when satisfied of the correctness of the report, certifies a balance due, on which a warrant to the Treasurer of the United States issues, directing the payment of the balance so certified as due. The Treasurer then makes payment in money or by draft. (Rev. Stat., 236, 248, 269, 273, 277, 305, 306, 307, 308, 316; Senate-Disbursement Case, 2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 404; McKnight v. United States, 13 Ct. Cls., 302, 304; s. c., 98 U. S., 179.)

2. A great variety of classes of claims are paid by (1) disbursing officers (Rev. Stat., 235, 305, 351, 524; act March 3, 1881, sec. 2, 21 Stat., 385); (2) disbursing clerks, (Rev. Stat., 176, 201, 215, 235, 351, 393, 416, 440, 496, 522); (3) disbursing agents (Rev. Stat., 255, 3144, 3657, 3658, 4839); and (4) "special agents, charged with the disburse

ment of public moneys." (Rev. Stat., 3614.)

*

Disbursing officers and disbursing clerks are generally appointed as such; disbursing agents are generally appointed as such, or have duties as such by virtue of appointment to some office; while "special agents, charged with the disbursement of public moneys" are not generally appointed by virtue of any express statutory authority, but by heads of executive departments, respectively, who are charged with the duty of expending money under appropriation acts; and have, as

incident to such duty, the power to appoint such agents, upon the well known principle in the law of official agency, that when an officer is charged by statute with a duty, and the means of executing it are not specified, he has implied authority to employ the usual or necessary agents and means for that purpose. (Story, Agency, § 58; Birch's Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 154; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet., 410.) This implied authority is recognized and regulated by statute. (Rev. Stat., 3614, 3648.) The statutory recognition of a power is generally regarded as equivalent to a grant of the power. (Proceeds of Sales Case, ante 36; State v. Miller, 23 Wisc., 634; 15 Op. Att. Gen., 322; Const. U. S., Art. 1, sec. 9; 2 Story, Constitution, § 331; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 216.)

The application of these principles to the act of August 5, 1882, shows that the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint a special agent to be charged with the duty of making the disbursements now in question. That act requires payment "from the Treasury;" the Secretary is the chief executive officer of the Treasury Department-(Rev. Stat., 233, 248, &c.)-hence, as the specific mode of making payment is not prescribed, the Secretary has implied authority to direct that the disbursements be made in either or both of the modes stated. His authority is recognized in the provision made for "the fulfillment of the public engagements." (Rev, Stat., 3614, 3648.)

3. As to the salary of the reporter, it would be more in accordance with usage, and better secure the proper supervision over his right to payment, to pay the same by warrant on the Treasurer on a balance certified by the First Comptroller. The other expenses may be more conveniently paid by the appointment, on the execution of a proper bond, of Mr. Otto, or other person, as special agent charged with the duty of disbursing the money appropriated therefor. (Rev. Stat., 3614.) The accounts of such agents are required to be rendered monthly, and, when so rendered, settled quarterly by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury Department. (Rev. Stat., 3622.)

The reporter of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States will be advised accordingly.*

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, November 3, 1882.

* The Secretary of the Treasury in a letter to the First Auditor, dated June 30, 1857, with his annual report of December 8, 1857, discusses the question how far provisions found in appropriation acts are to be regarded as permanent legislation. He says (page 86):

"The act of March 3, 1845, which was 'An act making appropriation for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending the thirtieth June, eighteen hundred and forty-six, and for other purposes,' provides, in the second section of the act, that no part of the appropriations which may be made for the contingent expenses of either House of Congress shall be applied to any other than the ordinary expenses of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, nor as extra allowance to any clerk, messenger, or attendant of the said two houses, or either of them, nor as payment or compensation to any clerk, messenger or other attendant

[to] be so employed by a resolution of one of said houses, nor in the purchase of books to be distributed to members.' The language of this law is plain, positive, and unequivocal, and, if in force, forbids in express terms the allowance which has been paid in the cases under consideration. If this law is held to be in existence, then the accounting officers of the treasury should refuse to allow credit to disbursing officers, both of the Senate and House, for any payment made by them out of the conlingent fund, either for 'extra allowance to any clerk, messenger, or attendant' of either house, or for payment or compensation to any clerk, messenger, or attendant employed by a resolution of one of said houses.' The only question for the consideration of the department is the one suggested above. Is the second section of the act of March 3, 1845, in force? The only reason given to show that it is not is that it is a provision in an appropriation bill, and expired with the fiscal year for which appropriations were made in that bill. The fact that it is contained in an appropriation bill is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the law is temporary and not permanent in its character. There is nothing in the language of the law which would indicate the intention of Congress to limit its operation to the then succeeding fiscal year, and its just and wise provisions are as applicable since that year as before. There is nothing peculiar to the fiscal year ending the thirtieth June, eighteen hundred and forty-six, which would have called for such enactment, and rendered its future operation improper and unnecessary. I am not left, however, to rely alone upon my own judgment in deciding this point. The question has been thoroughly considered by our predecessors, and opinions similar to the one I have indicated given and acted upon by them. I find the following one, given by Mr. Whittlesey, when acting as First Comptroller, on a similar case.

"This provision is inserted in an appropriation act, but it is a distinct and substantive enactment, and is as permanent as any other law. As doubts have been entertained on this point, the question will be examined somewhat at length.

"In former times it was the custom in Congress, as well as in England, to confine every statute to one subject-matter; to insert nothing in it not germane to its general character and object, and to use provisos as qualifications of and limitations to the general enactments in which they may be inserted, and to those only, and not apply them as limitations to or qualifications of other statutes. But the pressure of legisla tion in Congress has been so great during the past ten or fifteen years, and the difficulty of passing any general statutes by themselves, altering the former laws, has been so insuperable, that the custom has crept in from apparent necessity of engrafting such enactments upon the general appropriation acts, either in the form of provisos or as distinct sections.

"When such enactments are contained in distinct sections in an appropriation act or other statutes there is no room for a question that the words contained in them should receive the same interpretation and construction as if they were used in a statute by itself separate and distinct from any other matter or subject, and when a substantive provision is inserted in an appropriation act or other act of Congress in the form of a proviso, the words and phraseology should all be taken together, and if they indicate or imply an intention of Congress to limit the operation of such proviso to the subject-matter of the statute, and the time during which the enacting clauses of it are to have effect, then the proviso should be so limited. If, on the contrary, the words of such proviso are not specially liited to the enacting sections of the statute, but general, refer to the future without limitation as to time and contain the word hereafter, or its equivalent, and the verbs are in the future tense, the proviso should be regarded as of a general and permanent character.

"The same construction and interpretation should be applied to provisos as to independent sections in a statute.

We have many instances of recent date where such general constructions have been put upon provisos by the Attorneys General.

"The first section of the civil and diplomatic appropriation act of March 3, 1841, contains a proviso limiting the fees of district attorneys, clerks, and marshals in certain cases, which has been construed by Attorneys General Crittenden and Legaré to be a permanent limitation. and not confined to the year in which it was passed nor to the appropriation to which it was annexed.-See Mr. Crittenden's opinion of April 13, 1841, and that of Mr. Legaré of December, 1841, given in answer to certain questions made by the acting Comptroller; see also the proviso on the same subject contained in the 167th paragraph of the appropriation act of May 18, 1842.

"The same act (paragraph No. 202) contains certain limitations of compensation to certain officers in the Post-Office Department, much of which would have no meaning or operation whatever unless such general construction is given to it. The 212th paragraph of the same appropriation act contains a proviso authorizing transfer of funds from one to another head of appropriation in the Post-Office Department. All. or nearly all, the provisions of law made from 1839 to the present time to prohibit extra compensation, to limit fees and compensation, and to prevent a double_compensation, or two salaries, have been contained in appropriation acts.--See the 3d

section of the civil and diplomatic appropriation act approved March 3, 1839, which prohibits extra allowances to disbursing officers, and limits expenditures for newspapers. See the 2d section of the military appropriation act of August 23, 1842, which contains limitations and prohibitions of extra allowances of a more general and extensive character; see, also, section 12 of this same act of August 26, 1842, which contains still further limitations for extra services where one officer performs the duties of another.-See, also, the 4th section of the civil and diplomatic appropriation act of March 3, 1849, (Sess. Laws, p. 68,) which contains a still further limitation as to salaries.

"The appropriation act of September 30, 1850, (Sess. Laws, p. 174,) contains an appropriation for Richard Rush, with a proviso attached to it prohibiting the accounting officers in future from allowing any officer two salaries for performing the duties of two offices at the same time. Every word of that proviso will be inoperative if it is confined to the appropriation to which it is attached.

"These numerous provisos and sections of a general character contained in appropriation acts satisfy me that they should be interpreted and construed in the same manner as if each one was contained in the enacting clause of a distinct act.'

*

"I have given this opinion of Mr. Whittlesey at length because it contains many important references bearing upon the question. It was submitted at the time to Mr. Attorney-General Crittenden, who concurred in the construction placed by Mr. Whittlesey upon the act then under consideration.-(Attorney-General's Opinions, vol. 5, p. 273.)

"Why the same doctrine was not applied to the act of March 3, 1845, I cannot understand. I confess that I am unable to draw a distinction between the cases; and I feel quite confident that if this law had been submitted at the same time to the Attorney-General, he would have given the same opinion in reference to it that he did in the case cited. I concur with him most fully in the construction he gave to the act of 1842, and I have no doubt he would concur with me in applying the same reasoning to the act of 1845.

"My opinion, then, is, that the second section of the act of 1845 was intended to be permanent and not temporary; that it is now in force, and must be applied by the accounting officers of the treasury to all cases coming within its provisions.

"The only additional reason which has been suggested for a different construction is the fact that a different rule has been acted upon both in Congress and in this department. I admit the force of this suggestion, and feel great reluctance in overruling a practice that has continued for so many years.

"If I could find any evidence that the question had been the subject of serious consideration, and an opinion pronounced formally upon it and acquiesced in, I should hesitate long before resorting to a new construction of the law. But such is not the

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IN THE MATTER OF THE RIGHT OF THE SAME PERSON TO RECEIVE THE COMPENSATIONS PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE TWO POSITIONS OF (1) SECRETARY TO THE SCHOOL TRUSTEES, AND (2) CLERK TO A SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.RHEEM'S CASE.

1. A person who holds two distinct compatible offices may lawfully receive the salary of each.

2. A person in the public service, who is designated in an act of Congress as an officer, may be regarded as such, although not in the technical legal sense an officer, when such intent is clearly shown in the act.

3. The positions of (1) secretary to the school trustees of the District of Columbia, and (2) clerk to a superintendent of public schools in said District, are not offices. in the technical legal sense.

H. Ex. 219-20

4. The word "officer" in section 1765 of the Revised Statutes, which prohibits officers and persons in the public service, whose salary or compensation is fixed by law or regulations, from receiving additional compensation, is therein used in its technical, legal, and constitutional sense.

5. The secretary to the school trustees of the District of Columbia, and the clerk to a superintendent of public schools in said District, are persons in the public service within the meaning of section 1765 of the Revised Statutes.

6. Under section 1765 of the Revised Statutes the Commissioners of the District of Columbia are prohibited from paying to one person the compensations prescribed by law for the services of the two positions of secretary to the school trustees of the District of Columbia and clerk to a superintendent of public schools in said District.

7. The District of Columbia appropriation act of March 3, 18×1 (21 Stat., 464), was not intended to give to unofficial employés in the District government the position of officers, entitled to the salaries of two offices, under section 1765 of the Revised Statutes. This results from two considerations: (1) To so hold, would make the appropriation act repeal or modify as to such employés the provisions of section 1765 of the Revised Statutes by implication, and such repeal is not favored, nor are there any words employed to indicate an intention to make such repeal. (2) Said section 1765 has prescribed a general rule for construing appropriation acts in such cases, which forbids the idea of a repeal as to such employés by the act of March 3, 1881.

The act of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat., 458, 464), "making appropriations to provide for the expenses of the government of the District of Colum bia for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, *" contains the following provisions:

PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

For salaries of superintendents, teachers, and janitors, secretary of the board, and clerks, including additional teachers and increase of teachers' pay by continuous service, rents, repairs, furniture, books, stationery, and miscellaneous items, three hundred and ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and eighty dollars, namely:

For officers: For one superintendent at two thousand seven hundred dollars; one superintendent at two thousand two hundred and fifty dollars; one secretary at one hundred and fifty dollars; one clerk to committee on accounts at three hundred dollars; one clerk at eight hundred dollars; one clerk at seven hundred and fifty dollars; in all, six thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars.

The provision, "one secretary at one hundred and fifty dollars,” was for a secretary to the school trustees created by act of June 11, 1878 (20 Stat., 107, sec. 6), and the provision, "one clerk at seven hundred and fifty dollars," was for a clerk to a superintendent of the public schools. Said secretary and clerk were, and could only be, appointed by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia. (Act June 11, 1878, 20 Stat., 104, 107, secs. 3, 6.)

August 1, 1881, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia paid C. B. Rheem $75, for services for one month, July, 1881, as “secretary of the board [of school trustees] and clerk to superintendent" of public schools. This sum included $62.50, for services as clerk, and $12.50,

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