OPINION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller:

The act of April 29, 1878, creates new offenses in relation to policy-lotteries, policy-shops, &c. It re-enacts some of the provisions of section 1174 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, defining crimes, especially that in regard to selling lottery-tickets, and it enlarges the provisions of this section. It does not provide for moieties to informers, as does section 1174; and, so far as this section is superseded by the act of April 29, 1878, informers are not entitled to moieties. Their services are provided for by appropriations for "detection of crime"-District appropriation act of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat., 463). This is an appropriation sufficiently comprehensive to pay informers. The act of April 29, 1878, leaves unchanged and in force that provis ion of said section 1174 which defines the offense of keeping "within the District any office or place of business for the sale of lottery-tickets," &e. As to this offense, or any punishment by fine for the same under this section, informers are entitled to a moiety; for the section provides, as to fines, that one-half "shall go to the informer." This provision is not expressly repealed, nor is there any repeal by implication. The act of April 29, 1878, is not so far a revision of the crimes statutes as to. operate as a repeal of the provision of section 1174 making it an offense to keep within the District an office for the sale of lottery-tickets, nor of the provision of said section giving moieties to informers upon conviction of persons of such offense. In 1 Richardson's Supplement to the Revised Statutes, published 1881, page xiv, this section, 1174, is not mentioned as one "altered, affected, or repealed by legislation," since the revision; but a portion of it may be superseded by the act of April 29, 1878-that is, the provision making it penal "to sell or offer for sale within the District any lottery ticket or any share or interest in any lottery-ticket"-because this seems to be provided for in said act. The only fine, therefore, which can be imposed for the last offense is that prescribed-not by section 1174, but by the act of April 29, 1878. The provision of section 1174 for a moiety as to this offense must necessarily fall by the repeal, because no fine upon conviction of it can any longer be imposed under this section, out of which the moiety can be paid.

The residue of section 1171, above printed in italics, does not seem to be superseded or repealed by implication. There are, among others, three principal modes of repeal-(1) by express repeal, (2) by the enactment of such repugnant provision on the same subject that both statutes cannot stand together, and (3) by a subsequent statute revising the whole subject, and covering the same objects. There is no express repeal of section 1174, and no absolute repugnance as to the clauses mentioned. (Bishop, Written Laws, 157-162; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 92; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall., 657.) The only ground upon which a repeal can be claimed is, that the act of April 29, 1878, is

a "revision of [the] whole subject" embraced in section 1174, and so a repeal by implication of the whole section. The rule in such case has been thus stated: "Where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act." (United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 92.) This repeal occurs when the subjects and objects of both statutes are the same. (United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S., 546.) Bishop, in his new and valuable work "On the Written Laws," says: The just doctrine is, that, without exception, a statute in affirmative terms, with no intimation of an intent to repeal prior laws, does not repeal them, unless the new and the old are irreconcilably in conflict." (Sec. 160.) And he says no such repeal takes place "when the legis lative body makes what on its face is a mere addition to the laws, employing no negative words and saying nothing of repeal." (Sec. 161.) In such cases of different statutes a repeal by implication takes place "only to the extent of the repugnance." (Bishop, Written Laws, 152; Elrod v. Gilliland, Howell & Co., 27 Ga., 467; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall., 657.) Upon these authorities and many others which may be cited, it is clear there is no total repeal of section 1174.

If the act of April 29, 1878, stood alone, and section 1174 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia had not been enacted, keeping an "office or place of business for the sale of lotterytickets, or of any share or interest in lottery tickets" within the District of Columbia, would not constitute an offense against the laws of Congress relating to the District. Hence, not expressly repealing, being repugnant to, or embracing, that provision in said section 1174, which previously enacted, that "it shall not be lawful to keep within the District any office or place of business for the sale of lottery-tickets, or of any share or interest in lottery-tickets" it does not operate as a repeal thereof; so, not operating as a repeal of so much of said section 1174 as created this new offense, it does not repeal that portion of said section which prescribed a fine and penalty for such offense, "one-half of which shall go to the informer and the other half to the District."

The inquiry then arises how shall the informer be paid? It is clear that, when an appropriation has been made by Congress for the purpose, he is to be paid by the Commissioners of the District on an itemized voucher approved by the Auditor of the District, with evidence, (1) that he was the informer, and (2) that a fine has been collected under this section and paid into the Treasury of the United States. The fine is a part of the revenues of the District. Section 1079 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District requires all fines imposed by the police court to be collected and paid over to the District. The act of March 3, 1879, requires that "all revenues of the District *** from taxes or otherwise," shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States. All the recent District appropriation acts contain this provision. The

*

act of June 11, 1878, and other acts cited, require all these revenues to be "disbursed for the expenses of said District, on itemized voucher, approved by the Auditor of the District." It necessarily follows that the marshal of the District cannot, out of a fine collected, pay the informer. The police court has no power to direct the payment, and it does not appear that it is charged with the duty of finding who the informer is. In adopting this mode of payment, the prevailing usage is followed. The Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia provided:

"Sec. 1080. The moneys collected upon the judgments of the police court, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be applied to the payment of the salaries of the judge and other officers of the court,

For a time these salaries were paid by the marshal out of this fund without any appropriation act. (Bundy's Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 184). This was done, either upon the theory that fines collected by the police court, not being money in the Treasury of the United States, might be applied in the manner stated, or upon the theory that this section was itself an appropriation act. The latter proposition cannot be maintained. (Canal Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 141;. Bundy's Case, Id., 184; Conger's Case, 2 Id., 2d ed., 36). The former proposition as to money of the United States is open to question. Fines imposed by the police court belong to the revenues of the District, but, by force of the statutes, are to be paid into the Treasury of the United States, and can only be paid out by authority of an appropriation act. Since the act of March 3, 1879, requiring "all revenues of the District" to be paid into the Treasury of the United States, and in connection with the act of June 11, 1878, requiring all revenues to "he disbursed for the expenses of said District, on itemized voucher, * * approved by the auditor of the District," the marshal has made no disbursement for salaries from fines so collected, and has no authority to do so. These acts have been regarded as modifying the effect of section 1080 above cited. This section is not inserted in Richardson's Supplement to the Revised Statutes as one "altered, affected, or repealed by legislation" since the revision, but it is modified as above stated.

An officer or employé in the public service with compensation fixed by law or regulations is not entitled to pay as an informer. (Revised Stat., 1765.) The marshal will be advised that he cannot make any payment to informers.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, August 24, 1882.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS WHEN THE STATUTE APPROPRIATING MONEY FOR THE PURPOSE CONTAINS A FALSE DE. SCRIPTION OF THE CLAIMS OR THE CLAIMANTS.-FALSE-DESCRIPTION CASE.

1. When a claim or a claimant mentioned in an appropriation act is falsely described therein, or has a false description thereto appended, such description may be rejected; and, if there remain a sufficient description to identify the claim and the claimant, and a purpose in the act to make payment, it may lawfully be made.

2. The maxim, falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat, generally applies as well in the construction of statutes as in other cases.

3. The maxim applied, and payment authorized: I. In the case of an appropriation "to refund to the sureties of C. H. Davis, late postmaster at Vernon Springs, Alabama," there being no such place as "Vernon Springs," but said Davis being sufficiently identified as late postmaster in Alabama. II. In the case of an appropriation to pay (1) John W. Spencer, (2) certified claim, No. 3705, (3) for horse lost in the military service (4) the sum of $150 (5) allowed by the Fourth Auditor and Second Comptroller, when, in fact, (1) Spencer had no claim, and (2) the Fourth Auditor had no jurisdiction of such claims, but in other respects the claim was correctly described, and the certificate numbered 3705 in the Treasury Department showed $150 due Kate R. Bowdish.

The following is taken from the act of Congress of August 5, 1882 (22 Stat., 257, 261, 281, 282, 283):

AN ACT making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, and for prior years, and for those certified as due by the accounting officers of the Treasury in accordance with section four of the act of June fourteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, heretofore paid from permanent appropriations, and for other pur

poses.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the objects hereinafter stated, namely:

To enable the Secretary of the Treasury to refund to the sureties of C. H. Davis, late postmaster at Vernon Springs, Alabama, the amount collected upon a judgment of court in excess of the actual amount due the United States from said postmaster, as appears of record in the office of the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department, seven hundred and thirty-one dollars and seven cents.

SEC. 3. That for the payment of the following supplemental list of claims, which are fully set forth in House Executive Document Number Two hundred and two, Forty-seventh Congress, first session, and are allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury under the fourth section of the act of June fourteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, since January fourteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, transmitted by letter of Secretary of the Treasury of May fifteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, there be appropriated as follows:

CLAIMS ALLOWED BY THE THIRD AUDITOR AND SECOND COMPTROL

LER.

For horses and other property lost in the military service, for same period, fifteen thousand four hundred and eighty-two dollars and sixtynine cents.

The House executive document referred to in the foregoing section, contains a schedule of claims allowed under the caption, with descriptions of claims shown, as follows:

Amounts allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department. ALLOWED BY THE FOURTH AUDITOR AND SECOND COMPTROLLER, UNDER SECTION 4, ACT OF JUNE 14, 1878.

Claims "for horses and other property lost in the military service" are allowed by the Third Auditor and Second Comptroller. Among the claims so allowed was one in favor of Kate R. Bowdish, the balance due as certified by certificate No. 3705 being $150, for a horse "lost in the military service." The certificate No. 3705 appears in the schedule above under the caption of claims "allowed by the Fourth Auditor and Second Comptroller," when it should have been under the caption of claims allowed by the Third Auditor and Second Comptroller, and the name of the claimant is not in the schedule, but is indicated by a "do." under the name of "John W. Spencer."

August 17, 1882, the Secretary of War made a requisition on the Secretary of the Treasury, asking that he will "cause a warrant for $150 to be issued in favor of Kate R. Bowdish due on settlement as per certificate of Second Comptroller No. 3705, to be charged to" appropria