like to insert a table for this purpose, showing the national income of the United States from 1909 to 1941, as given on page 650 of the 1941 agricultural appropriation hearing of the United States Department of Agriculture. (These figures on farm income have been slightly revised by the Department recently.)

It is significant to note that farm income, beginning with 1909, represented 16.4 percent of the national income. Farm income, as a percentage of the total national income, remained on about this level until 1919. To reveal the serious disparity between the farm and nonfarm income the following tables, giving the annual and average farm income for three 5-year periods (1915-19, 1925-29, and 1935-39), together with the average daily farm income for the same periods, are shown:

(The tables referred to and submitted by the witness are here printed in full as follows:)

1 Revision of preliminary estimate given in table on p. 650 of 1941 agricultural appropriation hearings. 2 Preliminary.

Dr. SHEETS. In order to determine whether or not there is any justification for the establishment of price ceilings, price control, or price administration, the significant facts showing the relation of farm income with other groups of society over these periods of years should be taken into account.

For the 5 years, 1915-19, the average farm income was $8,325,200. In other words, each evening as the sun went down the farmers of America had added $22,808,767 of new wealth to the Nation. It is recognized that this 5-year period represented the years covered by World War I, which is very similar to the present period in many respects.

The period following the World War, which is regarded as more nearly a normal one, but a period in which agriculture lacked a great deal of being on a parity with labor and industry, was the period of 1925-29. The average yearly farm income for this period was $6,974,400,000, or the daily produced wealth of $19,135,479.

Compared to the income in recent years, prior to the beginning of the present world conflict farm income for the 5-year period 1935-39 had dropped to the low level of $5,222,800,000, or the daily creation of wealth had dropped from $22,808,767 during the 1915-19 period to $14,309,315. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, these figures answer the question, How are farmers getting along in the States?

It is significant to point out that the total farm income for the 5 years 1915-19 of $41,646,000,000, which was a difference of $15,502,000,000 more than for the 5-year period 1935-39, the income of which was $26,114,000,000.

When it is known that the Farm Credit Administration reports the total farm-mortgage debt in 1935 was $15,299,182,000, you will see that the farm income during the 5 years 1935-39 was reduced by an amount sufficient to have paid off the entire farm-mortgage debt at that time. Those who remember World War I will recall that agricultural products were considered essential defense commodities. It will be remembered by those who had any part in agricultural affairs during the latter years of that conflict that it was but a few days after President Wilson's memorable address and message to the Congress and the

resultant declaration of war that the slogan adopted was "Food will win the war." Throughout the land this slogan, heralding to the world food and fiber as our first line of defense, brought a quick response from American farmers and stockmen.

It is interesting to remember that then, as well as now, a rising business, labor, and the consumer wanted a low price fixed for agricultural commodities. Today as then business and labor want increased prices for their goods and services-witness the strikes for higher wages, and fast-rising costs of things which business and industry have to selland yet the farmers who must pay these increased prices are being told that they should be satisfied with less than parity.

As we build battleships, tanks, airplanes, and all instruments of modern warfare to the extent of billions upon billions of dollars, there are but few who seem to be concerned sufficiently about the place the farmer has in this important program. To understand the difficulty of adapting agriculture to a world at war, it is necessary to realize that farming is still a business of individuals. More than 90 percent of our farm products and commodities are produced by individual farmers and their families. This is because, in our national agricultural plant, there are many thousands of independent units, each with its own management. Programs designed to increase the output of these unit farms must appeal to the many rather than the few. On the other hand, in certain nonagricultural lines of industry, decisions made by a few can and do determine production. An increase or decrease in the production of automobiles, for example, can be brought about by the decision of a few men, but a material increase in wheat, hops, milk, cotton, or corn production can be achieved only when our farmers decide upon the matter and favor cooperation to that end.

Industry can undertake to make contracts with the prospect of comparatively quick sales, carefully guarding against overproduction. Agriculture, on the other hand, must look far into the future and take a chance. First, our farmers must be convinced of the necessity and desirability of stepping up production. It should be remembered that the decision must be made by millions of individuals-not by just a few leaders. Secondly, it should be remembered that farmers can do little to hurry nature or change normal production processes. Farmers require at least a year and usually longer to raise crops or hogs. With beef cattle it takes from 2 to 4 years to bring about an important increase to the market. Increasing dairy production requires almost as long.

The period of time that may elapse before the farmer can realize returns on new decisions naturally makes them cautious about changing their farm program. Individual farmers must be convinced that the need will not pass while they are working with or waiting upon the process of nature. If farmers increase their production greatly, they risk being "caught short." They risk a declining market. They risk having on their hands the necessary new implements required for growing and producing commodities. They risk undertaking a responsibility without assurance of adequate labor at a cost that can be met. All of the hazards mentioned are in addition to the chances farmers must take with the elements of nature. Unwise expansion would be a stone around the neck of agriculture. Farmers therefore are cautious. Their desire is an economic plane for agriculture comparable to that of industry. This is an unselfish desire for the eco

nomic balance of the country and the security of the Nation depends upon its realization.

You have heard an eloquent and very convincing statement on parity today. We have wrestled with the question since early this spring, trying conscientiously and laboriously, all of the farm groups working together. The National Grange, the National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation, the livestock group, the commissioners, secretaries, and directors of agriculture, and they are in substantial agreement that true parity remains a goal-not only a goal, but our goal is, in addition, parity of price to obtain parity of income, and parity of income has declined steadily since 1919.

Senator BROWN. Do you advocate the Holman figures?

Dr. SHEETS. The groups that I have mentioned are in substantial agreement on that method of arriving at fair prices during the emergency. We do not contend that this is the last word on the subject of parity. More study should be given to the question, as there are fundamental differences at this time as to methods of procedure. The groups working together on the problem agree that the wage parity formula or plan is the best method of dealing with the placing of ceilings over farm commodities that would not be fair to agriculture. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a brief résumé on that parity question. It covers only a few paragraphs. (The document referred to and submitted by the witness will be found at the conclusion of his statement.)

Dr. SHEETS. Referring specifically to the legislation that is before the committee and the proposal which Mr. Charles W. Holman presented (Table 1. A comparison of farm prices) as representing the general views of this group, I would like to say that there are two fundamental principles involved. The first is that we believe that the Secretary of Agriculture should have the responsibility for determining when and if ceilings are to be established over agricultural commodities.

While I have spent nearly 16 years in the Department of Agriculture as chief of one of its largest research divisions, I have no brief for the acts of the Department of Agriculture relating to certain phases of agriculture, especially when it comes to the question of parity, because we believe that mistakes have been made and existing methods out of date. We are convinced, however, that the farmers and stockmen of this country must depend upon, look to, and make the United States Department of Agriculture responsible for determining when and if fair parity prices are to be established and just how high the ceiling is to be.

In that connection we are supporting the proposal in the recommendations submitted by Mr. Holman for placing that responsibility in the Department of Agriculture. We feel that we have a precedent for so doing in that the Administrator and others testifying for this legislation have contended that the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board and other related agencies are sufficiently endowed with power and other requisites to determine the relations of labor to the legislation under consideration, and perhaps for these and other reasons labor is very largely if not entirely excluded from the act.

We have no quarrel with labor in any way. We all work with our hands as well as with our heads, and we try to be fair in that respect. But we feel that the Department of Agriculture should have the responsibility for determining where, how, and when or if ceilings are to be placed over farm commodities, and not the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration.

We feel that that is so fundamental that we would like to emphasize that our recommendation be examined most carefully, because we believe that the future welfare of agriculture in this country depends largely upon and around whatever decision is made relating to the

matter.

Furthermore, we are committed strongly to the belief that in case of a great emergency, as at the present time, in the administration of this bill, a board is a safer recommendation than one individual, regardless of who it may be.

It has been my experience in handling emergency matters and in observing the handling of emergency matters by others during my experience in the Government service, a single administrator makes quicker decisions, and if it is a matter that is not too involved and does not cover too many things or people, it will result in perhaps speedier action and many times equally satisfactory service.

Senator BROWN. Perhaps you feel like a good many others, that if it were given to you to administer it should be a one-man job, but for somebody else it should be a five-man job?

Dr. SHEETS. No; I do not. I was going on to say that a task that is as huge as the administration of this act I believe is safer in the hands of a board, where the interests of all groups would be given equal consideration.

Then there is one other safeguard that we would like to see. Let Congress retain some sort of control over whoever administers this act, whether it be one man or five men.

Senator BROWN. There is practically a 2-year limitation now.

Dr. SHEETS. I think 2 years is a little too long. It is suggested that the Congress, to whom the people of this country are looking more earnestly today than ever before, to retain essential control, and possibly changing the plan if necessary, before it is too lote. It may be too late after 2 years. It is our view that 1 year would be a more desirable limit, unless you retain control of this important matter.

Stockmen and farmers of this country are slow to express their opinion, but they are beginning to speak their mind and they are speaking it loudly. They hope that you will take sufficient time in redrafting this bill to make it safe for American agriculture, because they believe that in its present form it is not safe.

Senator HUGHES. We can always stop it if we want to. Even though we fix it at 2 or 21⁄2 years, or whatever time it runs, we can stop it. Dr. SHEETS. In that connection it may be stated we have had experience in the delegation of authority to negotiate trade treaties, and from the standpoint of the livestock industry of this country we feel that that delegation of authority has been unfortunate. We know that it can be recalled, but it has not been.

Senator BROWN. I misspoke myself a moment ago, and Senator Taft calls my attention to it. This bill will expire on July 1, 1943, which is a little more than a year and a half.