Mr. WINGATE. Yes. Senator BANKHEAD. The prices have really been higher this season, lately, than they were the day he made this order; were they not? Mr. WINGATE. Yes. Senator BANKHEAD. He did not make the order because of any continuing run-away price signals? Mr. WINGATE. No. Senator BANKHEAD. He just took a notion to make an order, and it was done when the prices of all these things were considerably lower? Mr. WINGATE. Yes, sir. Senator BANKHEAD. An ex post facto program? Mr. WINGATE. Yes. To make the record clear I would like very much to place in the record a list of the prices of cottonseed, soybeans, and peanut oil, being daily prices in cents per pound, from November 1941 to date. Senator BROWN. That statement will be received and placed in the record at the end of your remarks. Mr. WINGATE. That is all, sir. Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Wingate. (The statement referred to and submitted by Mr. Wingate is here printed in full as follows:) TABLE 14 Cottonseed, soybeans, and peanut oil: Daily prices (cents per pound), November STATEMENT OF PERRY L. GREEN, REPRESENTING THE OHIO FARM BUREAU Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman and gentleman of the committee, I speak generally to the question and not specifically as to details. The farmers of Ohio are insistent, I would say, that rather rigid controls on prices, wages, and I might also say, profits, be administered under duly constituted acts of Congress at this time. The farmers are very familiar with what happened following the other war, with the very wild inflation that took place without adequate controls, and we have not yet gotten the bill paid in terms of tenancy, liquidation of indebtedness, and the like that came as an immediate result of that condition. The question of labor has been raised. I think it should be understood that no farm group has any intention of being a party to making the wages of labor become disturbed in their relationship to the income of farmers; but, frankly, we cannot conceive of any method of over-all controls that does not take into consideration that factor. The question also is raised as to why farmers should ask for this 110-percent ceiling. That has been explained, I think, adequately, by the people who have already spoken. It is not at all with the idea that they will by that action receive 110 percent on everything, but it will at least help to maintain a balance. Another thing that has not been mentioned in connection with the position of agriculture is that the combination of property interests so closely associated with earnings or family subsistence brings a different relationship in connection with the consideration of prices for agricultural products, and that is true either with labor or industry. In conclusion I should like to suggest or to call your attention to the necessity of taking into consideration adequate taxation of excess profits and thereby, it seems to us, eliminating some of the conflicts which may arise on the part of agriculture and labor with industrial relationships. I thank you. Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Green. STATEMENT OF HON. ELMER THOMAS, A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I do not desire to make what might be termed an argument. If I may, I should like to place some facts and figures and data in the record that may be helpful in the future consideration of this all-important matter. Senator BROWN. Do you have your figures ready? Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. Yes. I shall proceed if I am in order. Senator BROWN. They should be placed in the record at the end of your remarks. Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. I realize that I am appearing before one of the major and most important committees of the Senate, a committee made up of good lawyers and good businessmen Senator TOBEY (interposing). And good fellows. Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. Always. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I appear before the committee in sympathy with this proposed legislation, with the proviso that the bill can be made a constitutional bill and, second, a fair and just bill to all groups. I contend that the present Administrator, so called, is operating entirely without authority. I think he admits that. But the Constitution provides, in article I, section 1, that— All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of the Senate and House of Representatives. So the entire law-making power of the Government is in the Congress. Up to date there has been no power delegated to anyone, not even to the President, on the question of prices; and it is my contention that in the absence of proper and legal delegation of powers the President cannot at this time exercise a power that has not been delegated to the extent of making prices. If the President has no power to make prices himself, he certainly has no power to delegate something that he does not have to someone else. So I contend that the present activity that we have is wholly void and illegal. The pending bill is a measure, as I understand it, which proposes to delegate legislative power to a price-fixing agent or to a price-fixing board. It is my contention that the Congress has the power to delegate its powers, under certain restrictions and certain conditions. If the Congress seeks to delegate its powers, it must delegate them to some specific agent or agents. Then the Congress must lay down certain conditions under which the agent could exercise the powers conferred and delegated. Second, the Congress must lay down the limits within which the agent can act. So that there are two things that the Congress must do to make this bill or any similar bill a constitutional or a binding legislative act. I will ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to place in the record at this point, to sustain the point I have just stated, a number of paragraphs from the decision in the case of Panama Refining Company and others v. Ryan and others, and Amazon Petroleum Corporation and others v. Ryan and others. It is found in United States Reports, volume 293, at page 388. I will ask that the reporter be kind enough, with the permission of the Chair, to copy at this point from the syllabus, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. The decision itself I will not refer to. If anyone is interested he can read the syllabus, and from that he can go to the body of the decision. Senator BROWN (presiding). The matter may appear in the record as requested. (The paragraphs from the syllabus of the case of Panama Refining Company et al. v. Ryan et al., and Amazon Petroleum Corporation et al. v. Ryan et al., are as follows: 4. Assuming (not deciding) that Congress itself might have the power sought to be delegated to the President by section 9 (c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act-viz, the power to interdict the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum products produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amounts permitted by State authority-the attempted delegation is plainly void, because the power sought to be delegated is legislative power, yet nowhere in the statute has Congress declared or indicated any policy or standard to guide or limit the President when acting under such delegation. (Pp. 414, et seq.) The declarations of section 1 of title I of this Act are simply an introduction in broad outline, leaving the legislative policy as to particular subjects to be declared and defined, if at all, by subsequent sections. The Court can find nothing in section 1 or elsewhere in the act which limits or controls the authority sought to be conferred by section 9 (c). The effort by ingenious and diligent construction to supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the President the functions of a legislature rather than those of an executive or administrative officer executing a declared legislative policy. 5. The question whether the delegation is permitted by the Constitution is not answered by the argument that it should be assumed that the President has acted, or will act, for what he believes to be the public good. The point is not one of motives but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute. (P. 420.) 6. If Congress can vest such legislative power in the President, it may vest it in any board or cfficer of its choice; and the power vested may concern not merely the transportation of oil or of oil produced in excess of what the States may allow; it may extend to transportation in interstate commerce of any commodity, with or without reference to State requirements; indeed, there would appear to be no ground for denying a similar prerogative of delegation with respect to other subjects of legislation. (P. 420.) 7. The principle forbidding Congress to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested by article I, section 1, and article I, section 8, paragraph 18, of the Constitution, has been recognized by the Court in every case in which the question has been raised. (P. 421.) 8. Congress may lay down its policies and establish its standards and leave to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules, within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the policy, as declared by Congress, shall apply; but the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. (P. 421.) 9. The question is not as to the intrinsic importance of the particular statute involved, but of the corstitutional processes of legislation which are an essential part of our system of Government. (P. 430.) 10. Both section 9 (c) and the Executive order made in pursuance of it are in notable contrast with historic practice (as shown by many statutes and proclamations) by which declarations of policy are made by the Congress, and delegations are within the framework of that policy and have relation to facts and conditions to be found and stated by the President in the appropriate exercise of the delegated authority. (P. 431.) 11. If from the extremely broad description contained in section 1 of the act, and the widely different matters to which the section refers, it were possible to derive a statement of prerequisites to the President's action under section 9 (c), it would still be necessary for the President to comply with those conditions and to show such compliance as the ground of his prohibition. (P. 431.) 12. If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a legislative order of an executive officer, board, or commission, due process of law requires that it shall appear that the order is within the authority of the officer, board, or commission; and, if that authority depends on determinations of fact, those determinations must be shown. (P. 432.) 13. When the President is invested with legislative authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such a delegation. (P. 433.) Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. It is my contention that the bill before this committee is not drawn properly. It can be drawn properly by following the decisions of the courts which are clear and specific, that power to fix prices can be delegated, provided conditions exist giving the agent jurisdiction under the act; and second, provided two limits are placed; I would say a ceiling above and a floor below. I submit that to the members of the committee for such consideration as the committee may see proper to give it. I appear here specifically with respect to section 3 of this bill. That section refers to agriculture in the main. It is my contention that section 3, if left in the bill as it is now printed, will be ineffective in that it is not sufficiently definite and distinct to be of value. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I desire to call the attention of the committee to the present law on parity prices, as that seems to be the all-important point that is under discussion, especially by the farm group. I will place in the record, if I may, a definition of parity prices. The definition is found in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. This section is on page 9 thereof. I ask that that section defining "parity" be included at this point in connection with my remarks. Senator BROWN. Is it too long to read, Senator? Senator BROWN. You might read it. Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. It is my contention that the Congress has never defined "parity," in the first place, and, secondly, if they have defined it, they have never legally delegated the power to any agency to arrive at parity. And I think it is obvious, if my contention is correct, that the power must be delegated to a specific agency, and then when the agency acts the jurisdiction to act must have limitations. Senator BROWN. What are you going to read from now? Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. From the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Senator BROWN. That is statute law? Senator THOMAS of Oklahoma. Yes. I will read from title III— Loans, Parity Payments, Consumer Safeguards, and Marketing Quotas. Subtitle A-Definitions, Loans, Parity Payments, and Consumer Safeguards. Then the definitions [reading]: SEC. 301. (a) General definitions. For the purposes of this title and the declaration of policy (1) "Parity," as applied to prices for any agricultural commodity, shall be that price for the commodity which will give to the commodity a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy equivalent to the purchasing power of such commodity in the base period; and, in the case of all commodities for which the base period is the period August 1909 to July 1914, which will also reflect current interest payments per acre on farm indebtedness secured by real estate, tax payments per acre on farm real estate, and freight rates, as contrasted with such interest payments, tax payments, and freight rates during the base period. The base period in the case of all agricultural commodities except tobacco shall be the period August 1909 to July 1914, and, in the case of tobacco, shall be the period August 1919 to July 1929. I shall not take the time of the committee to read the balance of that section. It is my contention, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that that is not a complete and full definition of parity prices. It is my contention, secondly, that there is no power delegated in this section that enables any agent to proceed to arrive at parity prices and to place parity prices in force and effect. So I contend that that sec-. tion is not self-operating and would not be sustained in the courts if someone undertook to operate under it and became involved and the case were taken to a court of competent jurisdiction. |