What progress is being made and what are you accomplishing in contiguous training of Reserves and National Guard units with regular Army divisional structures? General MOHR. Sir, I will go first here if General Weber doesn't mind and tell you I think the progress is getting under way that the Congress has long looked for. This is in what I referred to earlier as the gaining program. This is new to the Army. It is a program in which the units and it is not an easy thing because of the number-you know, in the Guard and Reserve we are talking 6,000 units and that is a lot of units. But we are seeing and we have actually exercised some units that work directly with the units that they will work with in wartime. Mr. FLYNT. Will you be more specific and refer to brigades which form the third brigade of some Army divisions. General MоHR. I would take the 310 TACON at Fort Belvoir. We sent them to Europe to train with the European Command. That is a specific example of the unit training with the command it will support in the wartime. We are concentrating on the D to D plus 30 units that will deploy very early to implement that program and then on to the D plus 60 and eventually include all units in the force. Mr. FLYNT. To me this is the most effective type of Reserve training. It lends itself somewhat to the Air Force, that is, integration of Reserve units into larger units of the regular force. Admiral Charbonnet, I am not sure that it would lend itself as much to the Navy as it would other services. Would you agree? Admiral CHARBONNET. It does for part of the service. For the Seabees it does real well and for our air units and ships we measure them by identical standards. For the ship augmentation units it makes it more difficult. We have to go to the ship to perform the training of the unit as a whole. Mr. FLYNT. Is pressure being applied on regular as well as Reserve components and Reserve units to implement this contiguous training aspect? General MOHR. Sir, I don't think there is any question about it. I agree with you that this is one of the most significant advances in training that we have yet seen in the Army. Maybe General Weber has a different view of it. General WEBER. If I may, Mr. Flynt, we are prone as we talk with the committees you know, what have you done for us lately-I think it is most essential that we advise you that the Army has done one heck of a lot for the readiness of the Guard and Reserve. It reorganized itself in CONUS in 1973 wherein for the first time regular Army, active Army general officers have responsibilities for the readiness of Guard and Reserve units. That has been expanded by the affiliation and round-out program wherein we have four brigades that make up the third brigade of four active Army divisions. These are getting day-to-day help from the active Army. As General Mohr has indicated, we are now giving the emphasis to the early deploying units. They are getting the money and they are getting the equipment. So a great deal has been done. I would suggest that probably any time earlier than the present time would have been too early for the gaining command that General Mohr has talked to. I think we are now ready for that and the Army is looking into it deeply. Mr. FLYNT. In addition to upgrading the quality of training, this type of training program would certainly form, as Mr. Robinson referred to a while ago, this C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4 doesn't mean a lot unless you have something to measure it by. Certainly, when you have Reserve component units training side by side with the regular forces, to me that seems one of the most effective ways of all to adequately and correctly measure the state of readiness. General MOHR. We fully agree, sir. I think General Weber put it very accurately that we are getting the kind of support that we have long needed and the active Army is doing a tremendous job. Mr. MAHON. The DOD Reserve Training and Administration study report states that "all of the existing full-time support systems can, when properly funded, managed, and manned, produce the desired combat readiness and deployment capability commensurate with the equipment and resources allocated to the Selected Reserve units." No one can quarrel with that statement. Any system which is properly managed, funded, manned, and equipped should be reasonably successful in reaching its goals. In FY 78, the Congress fully funded the authorized strength levels of the Reserve and Guard forces. Yet the Army Guard and Reserves strength plan for FY 78 has been revised downward by DOD by over 47,000 billets. Moreover, this Committee has received copies of numerous Defense Department audits which provide a devastating indictment of the general lack of readiness of the reserve forces of all three military departments. In view of these revelations, this Committee is extremely concerned over the status of our reserve forces. Every year we attempt to provide the Reserves the funding which can be efficiently utilized, and yet we are told that Reserve equipment is being diverted to Europe for use by the Active forces and that their readiness and manning is not at an acceptable level. Would you please comment in detail as to when DOD foresees a well-managed, efficient, properly equipped Reserve and Guard Force? [The information follows:] The Air Reserve Forces and the Air Reserve Components of the other Services are well managed and efficient; however, their equipment, while generally usable, is not as modern and capable as we would like it to be. Current and out-year programs for modernization will maintain usable equipment in the Guard and Reserve, but due to technology changes, we will always most likely be in the position of updating equipment destined for the Guard and Reserve. Our system, with few exceptions, provides new equipment to the Active forces with their older equipment going to our Reserve forces. In the Army Guard and Reserve, we have a number of initiatives under way which, if successful, will lead to substantial improvement in all areas (management, efficiency, equipment) within approximately the next three years. The USNR is now undergoing an intensive review in these areas which we expect to be completed in time for the FY 1980 budget cycle. The USMC has revised the management of their Reserves within the past year and we believe they have now reached the status of a well-managed efficient, properly equipped Reserve force, although as mentioned previously, the equipment is not as modern as we would like it to be. We believe also that we have more capability in our Reserve forces than is generally realized, but still recognize there is much work to do in improving those areas discussed above. 28-496 - 78 - 21 Mr. MAHON. The Reserve study group reviewed the Reserve programs being used in Britain, Canada and Germany, but concluded that little of value could be drawn from their Reserve program. Would you briefly summarize their Reserve programs and explain why they are of no instructive value to this country? Mr. CHASE. To be as brief as I can, they have the old method of calling up classes of Reserves as individuals. That was good in World War I and previously, but for handling large numbers, it is much better to have them in units. As a matter of fact, we have put a lot of effort in trying to entice them to think along the lines of organizing more in units as we are. The Germans are actually changing. So that we feel there is a lot to be learned from the interchange of ideas, but we feel that our organization is better for the kind of warfare that we would have to fight in the future. Mr. MAHON. All right. Thank you very much. The DoD Reserve Training and Administration report mentions that the study group entered into a contract with Linton and Company, a management consulting firm, to provide an independent evaluation of the mobilization readiness of the Selected Reserves. Yet, the only references to any benefit received from this contract was that "the independent findings of the Linton study basically concur with the findings of this study group." When the study group report qualifies the Linton concurrence with the word "bascially," it would seem to hint at areas of disagreement. Would you provide a copy for the record of the executive summary of the Linton report, and briefly summarize now for the Committee what Linton's findings were and to what extent there may have been areas of disagreement with the findings of your study groun? [The information follows:] There was no disagreement with the Linton Renort. The wording in the report on the degree of agreement between the Linton and Company report and the Study Group should have read, "the independent findings of the Linton Study substantially (in lieu of basically) concur with the findings of the study group." No executive summary was developed for the Linton Report, however, copies of the pertinent pages are attached hereto. Linton was charged with the responsibility to develop facts and objective findings of system efficiency for the Study Group. Their significant finding on page 45 is quoted as follows: "The difference between active duty reservists and excepted service technicians is not very great. The dual-status technician provides continuity, a high degree of local identification and is by definition, a mobilization asset. He may lack some of the military professionalism and personal flexibility of the regular or even the active duty reservists, but this is largely a matter of degree. Apart from the attributes of the individual dual-status technician, the system itself has worked well, especially as developed by the National Guard. To eliminate it completely would undoubtedly create a period of turbulence and reduced readiness that might not be offset by longer-term gains. The system has a high degree of flexibility built in and can be changed to affect necessary improvements. Once it is eliminated, some of those options are gone." TABLE B Required Full-Time Force for Each Selected Reserve A-2 TABLE E Comparison of Years In Service for Technicians/ A-13 TABLE F Median Age by Military Grade for Technicians/ A-18 TABLE G Army National Guard, Technician Grade By Military TABLE H Army Reserve, Technician Grade By Military Grade..... A-25 TABLE I Air National Guard, Technician Grade By Military A-28 TABLE J Air Force Reserve, Technician Grade by Military A-34 TABLE K Years In Service for Technicians/Selected Reserve - A-37 TABLE L Years In Service for Technicians/Selected Reserve A-38 What progress is being made and what are you accomplishing in contiguous training of Reserves and National Guard units with regular Army divisional structures? General MOHR. Sir, I will go first here if General Weber doesn't mind and tell you I think the progress is getting under way that the Congress has long looked for. This is in what I referred to earlier as the gaining program. This is new to the Army. It is a program in which the units and it is not an easy thing because of the number-you know, in the Guard and Reserve we are talking 6,000 units and that is a lot of units. But we are seeing and we have actually exercised some units that work directly with the units that they will work with in wartime. Mr. FLYNT. Will you be more specific and refer to brigades which form the third brigade of some Army divisions. General MоHR. I would take the 310 TACON at Fort Belvoir. We sent them to Europe to train with the European Command. That is a specific example of the unit training with the command it will support in the wartime. We are concentrating on the D to D plus 30 units that will deploy very early to implement that program and then on to the D plus 60 and eventually include all units in the force. Mr. FLYNT. To me this is the most effective type of Reserve training. It lends itself somewhat to the Air Force, that is, integration of Reserve units into larger units of the regular force. Admiral Charbonnet, I am not sure that it would lend itself as much to the Navy as it would other services. Would you agree? Admiral CHARBONNET. It does for part of the service. For the Seabees it does real well and for our air units and ships we measure them by identical standards. For the ship augmentation units it makes it more difficult. We have to go to the ship to perform the training of the unit as a whole. Mr. FLYNT. Is pressure being applied on regular as well as Reserve components and Reserve units to implement this contiguous training aspect? General MOHR. Sir, I don't think there is any question about it. I agree with you that this is one of the most significant advances in training that we have yet seen in the Army. Maybe General Weber has a different view of it. General WEBER. If I may, Mr. Flynt, we are prone as we talk with the committees-you know, what have you done for us lately-I think it is most essential that we advise you that the Army has done one heck of a lot for the readiness of the Guard and Reserve. It reorganized itself in CONUS in 1973 wherein for the first time regular Army, active Army general officers have responsibilities for the readiness of Guard and Reserve units. That has been expanded by the affiliation and round-out program wherein we have four brigades that make up the third brigade of four active Army divisions. These are getting day-to-day help from the active Army. As General Mohr has indicated, we are now giving the emphasis to the early deploying units. They are getting the money and they are getting the equipment. So a great deal has been done. I would suggest that probably any time earlier than the present time. would have been too early for the gaining command that General |