The CHAIRMAN. Looking at the annual funding spent and projected for the Shuttle, we can see the low start and build up, going from $12.5 million in fiscal year 1970, to $80 million, $100 million, $200 million, $475 million, $850 million, $1.1 billion, $1.2 billion, to $1.1 billion in fiscal year 1978. That adds up to about $5.1 billion but the tail-end decline of the program isn't yet there in fiscal year 1978, still being up near peak funding.

Please explain this unusual funding pattern; or if it's not the whole pattern, how much will follow and where will it come from in fiscal year 1979 on.

Answer. The Shuttle Program has three program phases; the on-going design, development, test and evaluation (DDT&E), and later the production and the operations phases. In the latter part of the 1970's, there is an overlapping of these phases and a requirement for concurrent annual funding.

The NASA commitment to develop the Space Shuttle for $5.150 billion in 1971 dollars applies only to the DDT&E phase of the program which extends into FY 1980. The $5.150 billion DDT&E estimate in 1971 dollars is still valid, however, a 5% escalation factor based on the inflation which occurred between 1971 and 1972 has been applied to this estimate resulting in a new DDT&E total of $5.394 billion in 1972 dollars.

Total Shuttle funding through FY 1978 is now estimated at $5.083 billion of which $4.666 billion is for DDT&E and $.417 billion is for a production start on the initial orbiter fleet and to allow for long-lead operational spare parts provisioning. The remaining $.728 billion of the DDT&E will be required in FY 1979 and FY 1980. The annual funding estimates for the Shuttle DDT&E are as follows:

'This total is equivalent to the agency commitment of $5.150 billion in 1971 dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please provide for the record a complete list of shuttle-related expenditures requested in the fiscal year 1974 budget in addition to the line-item request for $475 million. (For example, under the Space Applications Program, there is $4.5 million for "Shuttle experiment definition"; under Structures Research and Technology “a major portion has been devoted to shuttle structural design"; under Entry Research and Technology, "extensive" work is in support of space Shuttle design. Can you apportion part of the R. & P.M. funds to the Shuttle?

How does this fiscal year 1974 total Shuttle-related expenditures compare to the line item request?

Answer. The Space Shuttle budget line item for fiscal year 1974 provides $475 million which covers the basic requirements for Shuttle Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities. The Construction of Facilities estimate provides $67.2 million for facilities required for the Shuttle program.

In addition, several other areas of the budget request provide for activities which support or have applicability to the Space Shuttle program:

A. Space Research and Technology.-As part of this program, which supports a broad technology effort applicable to all space programs, approximately $9.5 million in fiscal year 1974 has been identified to activities applicable to the Shuttle. These activities in the Structures and the Entry research and technology areas will be concentrated respectively on verification of integrated thermal protection systems and critical dynamic factors, and at generating aerothermodynamic technology support.

B. Space Life Sciences.-The Space Life Sciences efforts, concentrated primarily in the areas of medical, behavioral, and biological research, which are identifiable to the Shuttle, are estimated at about $4 million in fiscal year 1974.

C. Development, Test, and Mission Operations (DTMO).-DTMO includes a variety of common technical and disciplinary capabilities necessary to support all activities conducted at the Manned Space Flight (MSF) Centers. In consideration of the total program activities planned at the MSF Centers in fiscal year 1974, a reasonable proration of the total DTMO support capability would result in the assignment of approximately $37 million attributable to the Shuttle activities. In addition to the above, of course, the Research and Program Management (R&PM) appropriation provides for the maintenance of installations, a variety of common institutional support services, and the salaries and related benefits of all NASA personnel. Since the R&PM funding estimates are based on institutional and functional requirements, there is no valid basis for assigning program related funding estimates, however, the planned assignment of NASA personnel by program has been developed. The number of direct NASA personnel assigned to the Shuttle at the end of fiscal year 1974 is estimated at 3,402.

In regard to Shuttle experiment definition, the agency's experiment or payload definition activities are for the purpose of identifying and defining the manner in which future missions can best utilize the Shuttle's capability. If the Shuttle were not the dominant vehicle in future space operations as planned, these payload definition activities would nonetheless continue but be oriented to other applicable launch vehicle capabilities. For this reason, the payload definition activities are not regarded as part of the effort necessary to achieve a Shuttle operational capability, but as advanced activities aimed at exploiting the Shuttle's capability. The total funding requested for this Shuttle payload definition effort by the offices of Manned Space Flight, Applications, Space Sciences, and Aeronautics and Space Technology is $22 million in fiscal year 1974.

The funding requirements beyond fiscal year 1974 for such areas as Space Research and Technology, Space Life Sciences, DTMO, and R&PM have not been developed on a specific program relevance basis. Such estimates are not considered meaningful since the allocated R&PM and DTMO funding are variables directly related to future agency program mix. In general, it is reasonable to expect the research and technology funding to decrease and the R&PM and DTMO funding to increase as the Shutle development activities progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Going back to the hardware existing that could be used for a second Skylab mission—it is my understanding that there will be only two Saturn IB vehicles remaining—would a second Skylab with the possibility of only two visits be worthwhile?

Answer. Although a second set of Skylab missions with only two visits would be valuable, NASA has not recommended it. NASA's views on a "Skylab B" are expressed in a letter dated March 19, 1973, to Senator Weicker, which letter is included in the record of the hearing on March 6 (p. 311).

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been a very helpful and profitable hearing and I do appreciate the responses we have received. I look forward to continuing. We will be back in session at 9:30 Friday morning. We will stand in recess until then.

[Whereupon at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 9:30a.m., Friday, March 9, 1973.]

NASA AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974

FRIDAY, MARCH 9, 1973

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 235, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank E. Moss (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Moss, Cannon, Goldwater, and Weicker.

Also present: Robert F. Allnutt, staff director; Mary Jane Due, counsel/chief clerk; James J. Gehrig, Glen P. Wilson, Craig Voorhees, Charles Lombard, Lester Fettig, professional staff members; Ralph E. Vandervort, assistant chief clerk; and Mary Rita Robbins, clerical assistant.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

The Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee of the U.S. Senate is honored to have as its first witness today Prof. Maurice Marc Levy, President of the European Space Research Organization, called ESRO. Professor Levy is a French citizen, was educated in France, and served the French Government. Today, however, he is testifying not as a Frenchman but in his capacity as the President of an international organization, ESRO. I hope that the members of the committee will receive his testimony in that spirit.

Following Professor Levy's testimony, we will resume the questioning of Mr. Dale Myers, Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight of NASA, and following Mr. Myers, the committee will receive testimony from Gen. Robert H. Curtin, Director of Facilities of NASA.

We welcome you, Professor Levy. I will place in the record this sketch of your education and experiences, which is most impressive. We are honored to have you before our committee today. You may proceed.

[Biography of Prof. Maurice Levy follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF PROF. MAURICE MARC LEVY

Born: At Tlemcen, Algeria, on 7 September 1922.

Education: Baccalaureate, 1941. Licence-en-sciences (B.SC.), Algiers University, 1944. Post-graduate Higher Diploma in Physics, Algiers University, 1945. Doctor of Science (Physics), Paris University, 1949.

University Career: 1945–53 Re-earch Assistant, then Research Associate, then Research Fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Scientific Research Institute). 1953-54, Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Sci

ence, Bordeaux. 1954-59, Senior Lecturer, then Professor, at the Faculty of Science of Paris University. Since 1959, Professor of Theoretical and Highenergy Physics at the Faculty of Science of Paris University (Since 1970, ParisVI University).

Other Activities: 1952-60, Director of the Theoretical Physics Department at Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris. 1960-65, Director of the Laboratory of Theoretical and High-energy Physics at the Faculty of Science at Orsay (Paris University). Since 1965, Director of the Laboratory of Theoretical and High-energy Physics at the Faculty of Science at the Quai Saint Bernard (Paris University). 1956-70, Member of the Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Council for Scientific Research). 1968-70, Scientific Advisor at the French Embassy in Washington and Head of the French Scientific Mission in the USA. Since 1971, Head of the Department of Research Organizations Program at the Ministry of Industrial and Scientific Development.

University Posts Abroad: 1949-50, Research Fellow at Manchester University (England). 1950-52, 1955-56, 1962-63, Member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J. Since 1954, Visiting Professor in the USA: University of Rochester (1954), Stanford University (1955, 1962, 1969), University of Wisconsin (1963), California Institute of Technology (1961-1962), Columbia University, New York (1965-1966).

Distinctions: Robin Prize of the Societe Francaise de Physique, 1957. Officer of the Ordre National du Merite, 1966.

STATEMENT OF PROF. MAURICE MARC LEVY, CHAIRMAN, EUROPEAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION COUNCIL

Professor LEVY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased and honored, of course, to appear in front of your committee and I would like to thank you for giving the European countries the opportunity to have their views known in the United States.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appear before you as Chairman of the Council of ESRO, the European Space Research Organization, which regroups 10 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), in order to describe briefly for you the present plans of our organization for participating in the development and use of what is called in the United States the "Sortie Lab," and which we prefer to think of as the "Space Laboratory" or Spacelab. This, as you know, is part of a more complex program, the Space Shuttle and Orbital Systems Program, which Europe also plans to use in cooperation with the United States.

Before speaking about the present situation and the way we see the future, I would like first to recall the historical background.

ESRO'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN POST-APOLLO PROGRAM

"It was in the autum of 1969 that the Europeans were given a briefing on what was then called the post-Apollo program and invited to participate in it. At that time the NASA budget amounted to nearly $5 billion per year. The first landing on the Moon had just taken place, the technological progress achieved was undisputed, and the postApollo program comprised not only the Shuttle system but also a reusable Tug as well as a Space Station and a Nuclear-Powered Rocket (NERVA).

During 1970, while the American authorities were studying this program, the Europeans reflected on the implications of participating in it. It was during this same year that they decided to embark on

Application Satellites (in the fields of telecommunications, air traffic control and surveillance, and meteorology). It was at the ministerial meeting of the European Space Conference held at Brussels in July 1970 that it was decided to finance studies both on application programs and in the post-Apollo area.

The discussions on participation in the Space Shuttle program were lengthy, on account of the following factors:

The size and scope of the program in relation to the sum of European space budgets;

The difficulty of deciding on participation when the content of the program as a whole had not yet been fixed;

The absence, until January 1972, of an American decision to embark on a definite program;

The lack of clear and precise information on the conditions under which the cooperation would take place.

ESRO'S ULTIMATE GOAL IS A LAUNCHING CAPABILITY

Nothwithstanding these uncertainties Europe was greatly interested, on account mainly of the important prospects offered by manned flights and the hope that participation in the program would lead to the resolution of the problem of launchers, which had always given rise to many difficulties in Europe.

When the program was finally approved and defined by the American authorities in January 1972, the Europeans largely centered their discussions of participation in the Space Tug. It was in this context that a delegation of the European Space Conference, went to the United States at the beginning of June 1972 in the hope that a decision on participation could be taken at a ministerial meeting of the Conference which was then scheduled for July 1972. The particular attraction of the tug as far as Europe was concerned was that it would to some extent help to resolve the problem of the construction of European launchers.

I might perhaps here open a parenthesis on this question of launchers, which has been at the center of European discussions on cooperation with the United States. Most European countries believe that, in the long run, it is essential for Europe to have its own launching capability, if it wants to play an active and continuing role in space research and applications. However, there exist differences among them on the procedures to reach this goal. Some countries would like, in spite of past technical setbacks, to embark immediately on the development of a conventional launcher adapted to the operational Application Satellites of the 1980's. Others, pointing out the fact that the whole space concepts are going to be deeply modified by the advent of the Space Shuttle, would prefer to rely on a close cooperation with the United States, hoping that near the end of the decade Europe will have reached a sufficient technological capability to acquire its own launching system. Since it was difficult, because of limited financial resources, to pursue both courses simultaneously, the development of a Space Tug appeared as a good compromise, as it would have meant continuing an activity in the propulsion area, thus conserving the possibility of a subsequent development of launchers in Europe.