LUNAR AND PLANETARY EXPLORATION

The following table compares the Lunar and Planetary Exploration Program plan on which the FY 1973 authorization was based with the current planned program:

A net increase of $10,769,000 results from a reassignment of the program and budget responsibilities for planetary flight support. This project provides for acquisition and operation of the computers, display devices and other equipment necessary to conduct planetary program operations, including mission test, simulation, and training; the control of spacecraft and mission operations during flight; and the processing, display, analysis and distribution of data received from the spacecraft. These activities were formerly funded by a combination of Tracking and Data Acquisition funds and planetary project funds. To more properly align funding responsibilities with program responsibilities, this project was established within the Planetary Program office and a fund transfer from the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition was accomplished. In addition to these funds, $4,231,000 was reprogramed into Planetary Flight Support from other project activity of the Planetary Program. Most of these additional funds became available when the operation of the Mariner 9 spacecraft in Martian orbit proved to be shorter than planned because exhaustion of the control gas occurred slightly ahead of schedule and because operations proved to be more economical than planned.

LAUNCH VEHICLE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

The following table compares the Launch Vehicle Procurement Program authorization with the current FY 1973 plan:

The net increase in the Launch Vehicle Procurement area is $29,400,000. Within this total the Centaur project has been increased by $14,200,000, and the Delta project by $34,100,000.

Part of the increase in these projects is the result of additional reliability and quality assurance measures taken after launch failures of both vehicles. Some

provision had been included in our FY 1973 request for this effort; however, the total impact of the required effort on FY 1973 funding had been significantly underestimated.

Another factor increasing the FY 1973 funding needed for Delta and Centaur was the cost increases experienced in certain contracts, including the contracts for the Delta Inertial Guidance System (DIGS) development, the H-1 Engine Adaption improvements for Delta, the Centaur standard shroud development, and the development of a new computer for the Improved Centaur.

Finally, changes in the phasing of requirements for reimbursable missions served to increase the FY 1973 funding required for Delta. NASA costs for launch vehicle hardware and supporting services are influenced, at any given time, by the mix of NASA and reimbursable missions. The amount of reimbursable activity must be estimated at the time the budget is prepared. In FY 1973, reimbursements have not been realized to the extent anticipated due to launch schedule changes and other factors, although the total number of contracted units is supported by firm missions. Since it would be uneconomical to disrupt the production of vehicles in process, the net result is that the requirements for NASA funding must be phased differently and the amount required in FY 1973 is greater than originally estimated.

The increased funding for Delta and Centaur was offset in part by reductions in other launch vehicle projects. Planned product improvements for the Scout vehicle were deferred resulting in a $5,300,000 reduction in FY 1973 funding for that project, and rephasing of Titan III C procurement together with cancellation of the ATS-G vehicle permitted a reduction of $12,700,000 in funding for Titan III C's. An additional reduction of $900,000 was made in Supporting Research and Technology.

The CHAIRMAN. In the statement you made on January 29 on the budget, you said: "To maintain a strong program will require budgets at a higher level in future years, but the cost reduction efforts now underway will yield more program content for the dollars invested and permit us to hold this level to one that the Nation can afford."

How much higher will the budgets have to be in future years? Dr. FLETCHER. Well, as I indicated earlier, we do not anticipate the budgets going any higher than the level budget we projected last year in fiscal year 1971 dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that $3.4 billion?

INFLATION WILL AFFECT FUTURE BUDGETS

Dr. FLETCHER. $3.4 billion, not allowing for inflation, but we do not know precisely what those numbers will be, and we cannot project them accurately without the support of the Office of Management and Budget. But we do have an indication from them of the fiscal year 1975 budget, which is

Dr. Low. $3.235 billion.1

The CHAIRMAN. $3.235?

Dr. Low. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying is, if we should experience a 10-percent inflation, the budget would have to be 10-percent higher than $3.4 billion.

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would be $300 million more.

Dr. FLETCHER. Approximately. We put that as a ceiling. We are not saying we are going to that budget, but we would project no higher than that.

1Outlays-telephonic communication between Mr. William Lilly and committee staff, Mar. 5, 1973. The President's fiscal year 1974 budget. page 40. estimates fiscal year 1975 budget authority at $3.2 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose the budget could not be raised in future years or the Congress is unwilling to raise it? What projects, in your opinion, would have to be cut back?

Dr. FLETCHER. Well, we would have to take a look at the amount of the cuts, the size of the cuts, and decide on that basis. I do not think we can prioritize without seeing how large the cuts are that are suggested. All of the programs, of course, would be subject to cut. We would try to preserve whatever elements of the program we could. We think any cut in the present proposal would be a major disaster from NASA's viewpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Space Shuttle be a likely victim, do you think, if the budget were cut back?

Dr. FLETCHER. I would not want to comment on that. You would have to indicate the size of the cut you propose, and then we would have to study it and decide which programs made the most sense to cut. I do not think the Space Shuttle can be trimmed back much more and still carry out a viable program.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are telling us that any appreciable cut is likely to terminate or to stretch out the Space Shuttle so that it could not fly as scheduled?

Dr. FLETCHER. I think maybe I should have answered that more specifically. If a stretchout is contemplated for the Shuttle, that might make it no longer a viable program. We have stretched it out as much as we think we can and still maintain a viable program. It would certainly increase the cost, and I would think it would give serious doubts as to whether the program could survive.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the economics of a stretchout? We talk about stretching out a program with an assumption that in the long run we spend the same money, but we spend it over a longer period of time. Do we spend the same money, or does it cost more or less to stretch out!

Dr. FLETCHER. It depends on the size of the stretchout, how much, and when it is done. In other words, there is an optimum way to do a program and we have presented what we think is the optimum way to do the current Shuttle program. If the stretchout occurs now, which we did the 9 months' stretchout-it will not change that very much; but as you proceed to stretch it out too much, too far, you come down off the optimum part of that curve, and you will then greatly increase the cost. So you can stretch it some, and still not increase the cost. If you do too much, however, you will greatly increase the cost.

The CHAIRMAN. But you always run into the inflationary factor which we have been experiencing for years.

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes. In my answer I was leaving out inflation. Of course, it always increases the cost in those years' dollars because you delay the things in the years where the dollar is worth less.

DEVALUATION WILL AFFECT OVERSEAS STATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Since you were working on this budget's figures, we have come to the devaluation of the dollar. How much impact will that have on these figures?

Dr. FLETCHER. Well, to the best of my knowledge, it will not have any impact on the programs which we have presented to you. There are some overseas stations, however, but I do not remember what the total dollar volume of our overseas stations is in our budget.

Dr. Low. We are estimating in a very preliminary fashion that in fiscal year 1974, the devaluation will have an impact of $3 million to $5 million, but we have not yet firmed up on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You are calculating that really on expenditures

overseas.

Dr. Low. This is based entirely, as Dr. Fletcher said, on expenditures overseas to support our tracking stations.

Dr. FLETCHER. This is in the tracking and data acquisition area, and we can get that information more precisely for you for the record. The CHAIRMAN. We would like to know that later on. I am not an economist either, but it is my understanding that even though the dollar here internally still is a dollar and is supposed to match everything, that the net effect has been to have some devaluation internally as well as externally by the change in the rate of exchange.

Dr. FLETCHER. It would primarily affect our overseas work; and since we have quite a few different countries involved, it gets a little complicated to estimate the impact of each one.

[The information requested follows:]

The recent 10% devaluation of the dollar will result in about a $4 million increase for the operation and maintenance of our overseas tracking stations. This amount may, of course, increase or decrease slightly depending upon the currency exchange rates in effect during Fiscal Year 1974.

ABOLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF NASC AND OST

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Fletcher, what effect will the abolishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Office of Science and Technology, have on executive branch organization for and coordination of aeronautics and space activities?

Dr. FLETCHER. As far as the Aeronautics and Space Council is concerned, it served a very useful purpose in Government in coordinating the space and aeronautics activities throughout the Government, and we particularly will miss the impact of the Vice President, who chaired that Council.

On the other hand, it is my understanding that this will be picked up monthly by the Council on Economic Affairs, headed by George Shultz, and I think that will probably function in a similar manner. And in talking to the Vice President, he is still interested in our program, and he plans to continue in an informal way his close relationship with the space and aeronautics programs in Government.

Now, as far as the Office of Science and Technology is concerned, we were less closely related to that organization than we were to the NASC. It is my understanding that that function will be transferred to the National Science Foundation, and the principal place that we related to that organization was through the Federal Council on Science and Technology, the FCST. Dr. Stever, Director of the National Science Foundation, has indicated that he plans to carry on a function similar to that Federal Council. The exact title is not yet clear.

The CHAIRMAN. So you expect that coordination will come now through the National Science Foundation?

Dr. FLETCHER. The Office of Science and Technology work will presumably come from the National Science Foundation in the future. The CHAIRMAN. Going back to the discussion about the budget, could you provide the committee with a table that shows your request to the OMB for the fiscal 1974 budget and the allowances made by NASA by program item?

Dr. FLETCHER. We can do so. We have that information, and we are prepared to provide you with it (see p. 45).

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate it. You have furnished the committee with a 5-year runout on cost projections which, without objection, I will include in the record at this point.

[The information referred to follows:]

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION-FUNDING IMPLICATIONS OF FISCAL YEAR 1974

The CHAIRMAN. I would like my colleagues to have some time for questioning. The questioning is informal. If any question raises another one, it is perfectly agreeable to ask to yield and ask the question. I will call first on the ranking minority member, Senator Goldwater. Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Fletcher, it is a pleasure to welcome you and your colleagues to the committee. I commend you for a fine statement on the purposes to be served by the NASA authorization for fiscal year 1974, and I want to continue to congratulate you on the stability that the staff have built into this decreasing budget. I think our job is to decrease the stability with which the budget is decreasing.

Dr. FLETCHER. Very good.

you

and

Senator GOLDWATER. I know you remember the problems of America's space program following the launch of Sputnik in 1957. There were many disappointments and failures. It looked as though we might have to play catchup ball forever.

1972 A BANNER YEAR FOR SPACE PROGRAM

Now, in 1972 we have a year in which all of NASA's launches and missions were successful. NASA deserves credit for making 1972 a