leaft diminish from the abfolute glory and happiness of God; yet, as to us, the difhonouring, that is, the difobeying his laws, is a difhonouring of himself; that is, it is, as much as in us lies, a defpifing his fupreme authority, and bringing his government into contempt. Now the fame reafon that there is, why honour should be paid to the laws of God at all; the fame reafon there is, that that honour should be vindicated, after it has been diminished and infringed by fin. For no law-giver, who has authority to require obedience to his laws, can or ought to fee his laws defpifed and dishonoured, without taking fome measures to vindicate the honour of them, for the fupport and dignity of his own authority and government. And the only way, by which the honour of a law, or of its author, can be vindicated after it has been infringed by wilful fin, is either by the repentance and reformation of the tranfgreffor, or by his punishment and deftruction. So that God is ne ceffarily obliged, in vindication of the honour of his laws and government, to punish those who prefumptuously and impenitently difobey his commandments. Wherefore, if there be no diftinction made by fuitable rewards and punishments, between those who obey the laws of God, and thofe who obey them not, then God fuffers the authority of his laws to be finally trampled upon and defpifed, without ever making any vindication of it. Which being impoffible; it will follow that these things are not really the laws of God, and that he has no fuch regard to them as we imagine. And the confequence of this must needs be the denial of his moral attributes; contrary, as before, to what has been already proved. And confequently the certainty of rewards and punishments in general is neceffarily established.

IV. Though, in order to establish this fuitable difference between the fruits or efects of virtue and vice, fo reasonable in itself, and so abfolutely neceffary for the vindication of the honour of God; the nature of things, and the conftitution and order of God's creation, was originally fuch, that the obfervance of the eternal u'es of juftice, equity, and goodness, does indeed of itself tend by direct and natural confequence to make all creatures happy; and the contrary practice, to make them miferable: yet fince, through fome great and general corruption and depravation (whencefoever that may have arifen), the condition of men in this present state is such, that the natural order of things in this world is in event manifeftly perverted, and virtue and goodness are vifibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due effects in establishing men's happiness proportionable to their behaviour and practice; therefore it is abfolutely impoffible, that the whole view and intention, the original and the final defign of God's creating such rational beings as men are, and placing them on this globe of earth as the chief and principal, or indeed (to speak more properly) the only inhabitants, for whofe fake alone this part at leaft of the creation is manifeftly fitted up and accommodated; it is abfolutely impoffible (I

fay)

fay) that the whole of God's defign in all this fhould be nothing more than to keep up eternally a fucceffion of fuch fhort-lived generations of men as we at prefent are; and thofe in fuch a corrupt, confufed, and diforderly ftate of things as we fee the world is now in, without any due obfervation of the eternal rules of good and evil, without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and moft neceffary difference of things, and without any final vindication of the honour and laws of God in the proportionable reward of the beft, or punishment of the worst of men. And confequently it is certain and neceffary (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before demonftrated), that, inftead of the continuing an eternal fucceffion of new generations in the prefent form and ftate of things, there muft at fome time or other be fuch a revolution and renovation of things, fuch a future state of existence of the fame perfons, as that, by an exact diftribution of rewards and punishments therein, all the prefent diforders and inequalities may be fet right; and that the whole fcheme of providence, which to us who judge of it by only one fmall portion of it, feems now fo inexplicable and confufed, may appear at its confummation to be a defign worthy of infinite wifdom, juftice, and goodness,

1. HAT, ACCORDING TO THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION OF THINGS, VIRTUE AND VICE ARE ATTENDED WITH NATURAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

In order to establish a just and suitable difference between the refpective fruits or effects of virtue and vice; the nature of things, and the conftitution and order of God's creation, was originally fuch, that the obfervance of the eternal rules of piety, justice, equity, goodnefs, and temperance, does of itfelf plainly tend by direct and natural confequence to make all creatures happy, and the contrary practice to make them miferable. This is evident in general; becaufe the practice of univerfal virtue is (in imitation of the divine goodness) the practice of that which is beft in the whole; and that which tends to the benefit of the whole muft of neceffary confequence originally and in its own nature tend alfo to the benefit of every individual part of the creation. More particularly a frequent and habitual contemplating the infinitely excellent perfections of the all-mighty creator and all-wife governor of the world, and our moft bountiful benefactor, fo as to excite in our minds a fuitable adoration, love, and imitation of thofe perfections, a regular employing all our powers and faculties in fuch defigns and to fuch purposes only as they were originally fitted and intended for by nature, and a due fubjecting all our appetites and paffions to the government of fober and modeft reafon, are evidently the directeft means to obtain fuch fettled peace and folid satisfaction of mind as is the firft foundation and the principal and moft neceffary ingredient of all true happinefs. The temperate and moderate enjoyment of all the good things of this prefent world, and of the pleafures of life, according to the meafures of right reafon and fimple nature, is plainly and confeffedly the certaineft and most direct me

thod

thod to preferve the health and ftrength of the body. And the practice of univerfal juftice, equity, and benevolence, is manifeftly as has been before obferved) as direct and adequate a means to promote the general welfare and happiness of men in fociety, as any phyfical motion or geometrical operation is to produce its natural effect. So that if all men were truly virtuous, and practifed thefe rules in fuch manner, that the miferies and calamities arifing usually from the numberlefs follies and vices of men, were prevented; undoubtedly this great truth would evidence itself vifibly in fact, and appear experimentally in the happy ftate and condition of the world. On the contrary; neglect of God, and infenfibleness of our relation and duty towards him; abuse and unnatural mifapplication of the powers and faculties of our minds; inordinate appetites, and unbridled and furious paffions; neceffarily fill the mind with confufion, trouble, and vexation. And intemperance naturally brings weaknefs, pains, and fickneffes into the body. And mutual injuftice and iniquity; fraud, violence, and oppreffion; wars and defolations; murders, rapine, and all kinds of cruelty; are fufficiently plain caufes of the miferies and calamities of men in fociety. So that the original conftitution, order, and tendency of things, is evidently enough fitted and defigned to establish naturally a juft and fuitable difference in general between virtue and vice, by their refpective fruits or effects.

2. BUT THAT NOW, IN THIS PRESENT WORLD, THE NATURAL ORDER OF THINGS IS SO PERVERTED, THAT VICE OFTEN FLOURISHES IN GREAT PROSPERITY, AND VIRTUE FALLS UNDER THE GREATEST CALAMITIES OF LIFE.

But though originally the constitution and order of God's creation was indeed fuch, that virtue and vice are by the regular tendency of things followed with natural rewards and punishments; yet in event, through fome great and general corruption and depravation (whencefoever that may have arifen, of which more hereafter), the condition of men in the prefent ftate is plainly fuch, that this natural order of things in the world is manifeftly perverted; virtue and goodness are vifibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due effect, in establishing men's happiness proportionable to their behaviour and practice; and wickednefs and vice very frequently escape the punishment which the general nature and difpofition of things tends to annex unto it. Wicked men, by ftupidity, inconfideratenefs, and fenfual pleasure, often make thift to filence the reproaches of confcience, and feel very litlle of that confufion and remorfe of mind, which ought naturally to be confequent upon their vitious practices. By accidental ftrength and robuftnefs of conftitution, they frequently efcape the natural ill confequences of intemperance and debauchery; and enjoy the fame proportion of health and vigour, as thofe who live up to the rules of ftrict and unblameable fobriety. And injuftice and iniquity, fraud, violence, and cruelty, though they are always attended indeed with fufficiently calamitous confequences in the general; yet the most of thofe ill confequences

confequences fall not always upon fuch perfons in particular as have the greatest share in the guilt of the crimes, but very commonly on those that have the leaft. On the contrary; virtue and piety, temperance and fobriety, faithfulness, honefty, and charity; though they have indeed both in themfelves the true fprings of happiness, and also the greatest probabilities of outward caufes to concur in promoting their temporal profperity; though they cannot indeed be prevented from affording a man the highest peace aud Latisfaction of fpirit, and many other advantages both of body and mind in respect of his own particular perfon; yet in refpect of those advantages which the mutual practice of focial virtues ought to produce in common, it is in experience found true, that the vices of a great part of mankind do so far prevail against nature and reason, as frequently to opprefs the virtue of the beft; and not only hinder them from enjoying thofe public benefits, which would naturally and regularly be the confequences of their virtue, but oft-times bring upon them the greatest temporal calamities, even for the fake of that very virtue. For it is but too well known, that good men are very often afflicted and impoverished, and made a prey to the covetoufnefs and ambition of the wicked; and fometimes moft cruelly and maliciously perfecuted, even upon account of their goodness itself. In all which affairs, the providence of God feems not very evidently to interpofe for the protection of the righteous. And not only fo; but even in judgements alfo, which feem more immediately to be inflicted by the hand of heaven, it frequentiy fuffers the righteous to be involved in the fame calamities with the wicked, as they are mixed together in bufinefs and the affairs of the world.

3. THAT THEREFORE THERE MUST NEEDS BE A FUTURE

STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

Which things being fo (viz. that there is plainly in event no fufficient diftinction made between virtue and vice; no proportionable and certain reward annexed to the one, nor punishment to the other, in this prefent world); and yet it being no lefs undeniably certain in the general, as has been before fhown, that if there be a God (and that God be himself a being of infinite juftice and goodnefs; and it be his will, that all rational creatures fhould imitate his moral perfections; and he cannot but fee and take notice how every creature behaves itfelf; and cannot but be accordingly pleased with such as obey his will and imitate his nature, and be difpleafed with fuch as act contrary thereto); it being certain, I fay, that, if thefe things be fo, God muft needs, in vindication of the honour of his laws and government, fignify at fome time or other

Εἰ δὲ μὴ λανθάνετο τὸς θεὸς, ὁ μὲν δίκαιο θεσφιλής ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ ἀδικῶν θεσμικής. Το 2 Θεοφιλεῖ, ὅσα γε ὑπὸ θεῶν γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεται, ὡς οἷόγο άριςα- Οὕτως ἄρα ἀποληπείον περὶ τῶ δικαίω ἀνδρὸς, ἐάν τ' ἐν πενία γίγνεται, τών τ' ἐν νόσοις, ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκώντων κακῶν, ὡς τέτῳ ταῦται εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευθήσει ζωντι ἡ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δικαιο γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνασὰν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοῦσθαι θεῷ. Plato de Ree publ. lib. X.

this his approbation or difpleafure, by making finally a fuitable difference between thofe who obey him and thofe who obey him not: it follows unavoidably, either that all these notions which we frame concerning God, are falfe; and that there is no providence, and God fees not, or at least has no regard to what is done by his creatures, and confequently the ground of all his own moral attributes is taken away, and even his being itself; or else that there must neceffarily be a future ftate of rewards and punishments after this life, wherein all the prefent difficulties of providence fhall be cleared up, by an exact and impartial administration of justice. But now, that thefe notions are true; that there is a God and a providence, and that God is himself a being indued with all moral perfections, and expects and commands that all his rational creatures should govern all their actions by the fame rules, has been particularly and diftin&tly proved already. It is therefore directly demonftrated, that there must be a future ftate of rewards and punishments. "Let not "thine heart envy finners, but be thou in the fear of the Lord all "the day long; for furely there is a reward, and thine expectation "fhall not be cut off," Prov. xxiii. 17, 18.

4. OF THE STOICAL OPINION CONCERNING THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF VIRTUE TO ITS OWN HAPPINESS.

This argument is indeed a common one; but it is nevertheless ftrongly conclufive and unanfwerable. So that, whoever denies a future ftate of rewards and punishments, muft of neceffity, by a chain of unavoidable confequences, be forced to recur to downright Atheism. The only middle opinion that can be invented, is that affertion of the Stoicks, that virtue is felf-fufficient to its own happinefs, and a full reward to itself in all cafes, even under the greatest fufferings that can befall a man for its fake. Men who were not certain of a future ftate (though most of them did indeed believe it highly probable), and yet would not give up the cause of virtue; had no other way left to defend it, than by afferting that it was in all cafes and under all circumftances abfolutely felf-fufficient to its own happiness; whereas on the contrary, because it is manifeftly not felf-fufficient, and yet undoubtedly the caufe of virtue is not to be given up; therefore they ought from thence to have concluded the certainty of a future ftate. That virtue is truly worthy to be chofen, even merely for its own fake, without any refpect to any recompence or reward, muft indeed neceffarily be acknowledged. But it does not from hence follow, that he who dies for the fake of virtue, is really any more happy than he that dies for any fond opinion of any unreasonable humour or obftinacy whatsoever; if he has no other happiness than the bare fatisfaction arifing from the fenfe of his refolutenefs in perfifting to preserve his virtue, and in adhering immoveably to what he judges to be right; and there be no future ftate wherein he may reap any benefit of that his refolute perfeverance. On the contrary, it will only follow, that God has made virtue neceffarily amiable, and fuch as men's judgement and concience can never but choofe; and yet that he has not annexed to it