136. not at all depend on the variable opinions, fancies, or imaginations THE MOST PROFLIGATE MEN, NOT UTTERLY INSENSIBLE OF Some men indeed, who, by means of a very evil and vitious education, or through a long habit of wickednefs and debauchery, have extremely corrupted the principles of their nature, and have long accustomed themfelves to bear down their own reafon, by the force of prejudice, luft, and paffion; that they may not be forced to confefs themselves felf-condemned, will confidently and abfolutely contend that they do not really fee any natural and neceffary difference between what we call right and wrong, juft and unjuft; that the reafon and judgement of their own mind does not tell them' they are under any fuch indifpenfable obligations as we would endeavour to perfuade them; and that they are not fenfible they ought to be governed by any other rule, than their own will and pleafure. But even thefe men, the moft profligate of all mankind, however induftriously they endeavour to conceal and deny their felf-condemnation, yet cannot avoid making a 'difcovery of it fometimes when they are not aware of it. For example: there is no mari fo vile and defperate, who commits at any time a murder and robbery, with the most unrelenting mind, but would choofe, if fuch a hing could be propofed to him, to obtain all the fame profit or advantage, whatfoever it be that he aims at, without committing the crime, rather than with it; even though he was fure to go unpunished for committing the crime *. Nay I believe, there is no man, even in Mr. Hobbes's ftate of nature, and of Mr. Hobbes's own principles, but if he was equally affured of fecuring his main end, his felf-prefervation, by either way, would choose to preferve himfelf rather without deftroying all his fellow-creatures; than with it; even fuppofing all impunity, and all other future conveniences of life, equal in either cafe. Mr. Hobbes's own fcheme, of men's agrecing by compact to preferve one another, can hardly be fuppofed without this. And this plainly evinces, that the mind of man unavoidably acknowledges a natural and necefiary difference between good and evil, antecedent to all arbitrary and pofitive conftitution whatsoever. MEN'S NATURAL SENSE OF ETERNAL MORAL OBLIGATIONS PRO- But the truth of this, 'that the mind of man naturally and neceffarily affents to the eternal law of righteoufnefs, may ftill better and "Quis eft enim, aut quis unquam fuit, aut avaritia tam ardenti, aut tam effrænatis bus cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem, quam adipifci fcelere quovis velit, non multis parti and more clearly and more univerfally appear, from the judgement that men pafs upon each other's actions, than from what we can difcern concerning their confciousness of their own. For men may diffemble and conceal from the world the judgement of their own confcience; nay, by a strange partiality, they may even impose upon and deceive themfelves; (for who is there, that does not fometimes allow himself, nay, and even juftify himself in that, wherein he condemns another ?) But men's judgements concerning the actions of others, efpecially where they have no relation to themselves, or repugnance to their intereft, are commonly impartial; and from this we may judge, what fenfe men naturally have of the unaltera+ ble difference of right and wrong. Now the obfervation which every one cannot but make in this matter, is this; that virtue and true goodness, righteoufnefs and equity, are things: fo truly noble and excellent, fo lovely and venerable in themfelves, and: do fo neceffarily approve themfelves to the reafen and confciences of men, that even thofe very perfons, who, by the prevailing power of fome. interest or luft, are themselves drawn afide out of the paths of virtue, can yet hardly ever forbear to give it its true character and commendation in others. And this obfervation holds true, not only in the generality of vitious men, but very frequently even in the worst fort of them, viz. thofe who perfecute others for being better than themfelves.. Thus the officers who were fent by the Pharifees to apprehend our Saviour, could not forbear declaring, that he spake as never man fpake :" John vii, 46. and the Ro man governour, when he gave fentence that he should be crucified, could not at the fame inftant forbear openly declaring, that he found no fault in him." John xviii. 38. Even in this cafe, men cannot chufe but think well of thofe perfons, whom the dominion of their lufts will not fuffer them to imitate, or whom their prefent intereft and the neceffity of their worldly affairs compels them to difcourage. They cannot but defire, that they themselves were the men they are not; and with with Balaam, that though they imitate not the life, yet at leaft they might die the death of the righteous, and that their laft end might be like theirs. And hence it is that Plato judiciously obferves, that even the worst of men feldom or never make fo wrong judgement concerning perfons, as they do concerning things; there being, in virtue an unaccountable and as it were divine force, which, whatever confufion men endeavour to introduce in things by their vitious difcourfes and debauched practices, yet almoft always compels them to diftinguifh right concerning perfons, and makes them admire and praife juft and equitable and honeft men +. On the contrary; vice and injuftice, profaneness bus malit ad fefe, etiam omni impunitate propofita, fine facinore, quam illo modo per"venire Cic. de Finib. lib. III. "Placet fuapte natura, adeoque gratiofa virtus eft, ut infitum etiam fit malis probare meliores." Seneca de Benéf. 1. IV. † Οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι τυγχάνεσιν εν πολλοί, τοσοῦτον καὶ τῷ κρίνειν τὰς ἄλλας εἰ πονηροί και άχρησοι· θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔτοχόν ἐςὶ καὶ τῖσι κακοῖς, ὅτε παμπόλλοι καὶ τῶν σφόδια κακῶν, εὖ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ δόξαις διαιρῶνται τὰς ἀμείνεις, τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς γείρως. Plato de Leg. lib. XII. and and debauchery, are things fo abfolutely odious in their own nature, that, however they infinuate themselves into the practice, yet they can never gain over to themselves the judgement of mankind. They who do evil, yet fee and approve what is good; and condemn in others what they blindly allow in themfelves; nay and very frequently condemn even themselves also, not without great diforder and uneafinefs of mind, in thofe very things wherein they allow themfelves. At least, there is hardly any wicked man, but when his own cafe is reprefented to him under the perfon of another, will freely enough pafs fentence against the wickednefs he himself is guilty of; and with fufficient feverity exclaim against all iniquity. This shows abundantly, that all variation from the eternal rule of right is abfolutely and in the nature of the thing itself to be abhorred and detefted; and that the unprejudiced mind of man as naturally disapproves injuftice in moral matters, as in natural things it cannot but diffent from falfehood, or diflike incongruities. Even in reading the hiftories of past and far diftant ages, when it is manifeft we can have no concern for the events of things, nor prejudices concerning the characters of perfons; who is there, that does not praise and admire, nay highly efteem and in his imagination love (as it were), the equity, justice, truth, and fidelity of fome perfons; and with the greatest indignation and hatred deteft the barbarity, injuftice, and treachery of others? Nay further; when the prejudices of corrupt minds lie all on the fide of injuftice; as when we have obtained fome very great profit or advantage through another man's treachery or breach of faith; yet who is there, that upon that very occafion does not (even to a proverb) dislike the perfon and the action, how much foever he may rejoice at the event? But when we come ourselves to fuffer by iniquity, then where are all the arguments and fophiftries, by which unjust men, while they are oppreffing others, would perfuade themselves that they are not fenfible of any natural difference between good and evil? When it comes to be these men's own cafe, to be oppreffed by violence, or over-reached by fraud; where then are all their pleas against the eternal diftinction of right and wrong? How, on the contrary, do they then cry out for equity, and exclaim against injuftice how do they then challenge and object against providence, and think neither God nor man fevere enough, in punishing the violaters of right and truth! Whereas, if there was no natural and eternal difference between juft and unjuft; no man could have any reafon to complain of injury, any other than what laws and compacts made fo; which in innumerable cafes will be always to be evaded. * AN ANSWER TO THE OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE TOTAL IGNORANCE OF SOME BARBAROUS NATIONS IN MATTERS OF MORALITY. There is but one thing, that I am fenfible of, which can here with any colour be objected against what has been hitherto faid Qes Pullum Nomitorem, Fregelianum proditorem, quanquam reipublicæ noftræ profuit, non odit ?" Cic. de Finib. lib. Y. concern concerning the neceffity of the mind's giving its affent to the eter→ nal law of righteoufnels; and that is, the total ignorance, which fome whole nations are reported to lie under, of the nature and force of thefe moral obligations. The matter of fact is not very true but, if it was, it is certain there are more nations and people totally ignorant of the plaineft mathematical truths; as, of the proportion, for example, of a fquare to a triangle of the fame bafe and height and yet these truths are fuch, to which the mind cannot but give its affent neceffarily and unavoidably, as foon as they are diftinctly propofed to it. All that this objection proves therefore, fuppofing the matter of it to be true, is only this; not, that the mind of man can ever diffent from the rule of right; much less, that there is no neceflary difference in nature between moral good and evil; any more than it proves, that there is no certain and neceffary proportions of numbers, lines, or figures: but this it proves only, that men have great need to be taught and inftructed in fome very plain and eafy, as well as certain truths; and, if they be important truths, that then men have need alfo to have them frequently inculcated, and ftrongly inforced upon them. Which is very true, and is (as fhall hereafter be particularly made to appear) one good argument for the reasonableness of expecting a revelation. 4. OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL OBLIGATIONS IN PARTICULAR. Thus it appears in general, that the mind of man cannot avoid giving its affent to the eternal law of righteoufnefs; that is, cannot but acknowledge the reasonablenefs and fitnefs of men's governing all their actions by the rule of right or equity and alfo that this affent is a formal obligation upon every man actually and constantly to conform himself to that rule. I might now from hence deduce, in particular, all the feveral duties of morality or natural religion. But because this would take up too large a portion of my intended discourse, and may eafily be fupplied abundantly out of feveral late excellent writers; I thall only mention the three great and principal branches, from which all the other and smaller inftances of duty do naturally flow, or may without difficulty be derived. OF PIETY, OR MEN'S DUTY TOWARDS GOD. First then, in refpect of God, the rule of righteoufnefs is, that we keep up constantly in our minds the highest poffible honour, efteem, and veneration for him; which must exprefs itfelf in proper and refpective influences upon all our paffions, and in the fuitable direction of all our actions: that we worship and adore him, and him alone, as the only fupreme author, preferver and governour of all things that we employ our whole beings, and all our powers and faculties, in his fervice, and for his glory; that is, in encouraging the practice of univerfal righteoufnefs, and promoting the defigns of his divine goodness amongst men, in fuch way and manner as fhall at any time appear to be his will we fhould do it: and, finally, that, to enable us to do this continually, we pray unto him. conftantly for whatever we ftand in need of, and return him contisual and hearty thanks for whatever good things we at any time receive. receive. There is no congruity or proportion, in the uniform difpofition and correfpondent order of any bodies or magnitudes, no fitnefs or agreement in the application of fimilar and equal geometrical figures one to another, or in the comparing them one with another, fo vifible and confpicuous as is the beauty and harmony of the exercife of God's feveral attributes, meeting with fuitable returns of duty and honour from all his rational creatures throughout the universe. The confideration of his eternity and infinity, his knowledge, and his wifdom, neceffarily commands our highest admiration. The fenfe of his omniprefence forces a perpetual awful regard towards him. His fupreme authority, as being the creator, preferver, and abfolute governour of all things, obliges us to pay him all poffible honour and veneration, adoration, and worfhip; and his unity requires, that it be paid to him alone. His power and juftice demand our fear. His mercy and placableness encourage our hope. His goodnefs neceffarily excites our love. His veracity and unchangeablenefs fecure our truft in him. The fenfe of our having received our being and all our powers from him, makes it infinitely reasonable that we fhould employ our whole beings and all our faculties in his fervice. The consciousness of our continual dependence upon him, both for our preservation and the fupply of every thing we want, obliges us to conftant prayer. And every good thing we enjoy, the air we breathe, and the food we eat, the rain from heaven, and the fruitful feafons, all the bleffings and comforts of the prefent time, and the hopes and expectations we have of what is to come, do all demand our heartiest gratitude and thanksgiving to him. The fuitablenefs and proportion, the correfpondency and connexion of each of these things refpectively, is as plain and confpicuous, as the thining of the fun at noon-day; and it is the greatest abfurdity and perverfenefs in the world, for creatures endued with reafon to attempt to break through and tranfgrefs this neceffary order and dependency of things. AN inanimate and all irrational beings, by the neceffity of their nature, conftantly obey the laws of their creation; and tend regularly to the ends for which they were appointed. How monftrous then is it, that reasonable creatures, merely becaufe they are not neceffitated, fhould abufe that glorious priviledge of liberty, by which they are exalted in dignity above the reft of God's creation, to make themfelves the alone unreasonable and diforderly part of the univerfe! That a tree planted in a fruitful foil, and watered continually with the dew of heaven, and cherished conftantly with the kindly warmth and benign influence of the fun-beams, thould yet never bring forth either leaves or fruit, is in no degree to irregular and * Quem vero aftrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicifitodines, quem menfium "temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum cife cogant; bunc "hominem omninò numerare quî decct?" Cic. de Leg b. lib. II. Εἰ γὰρ νοῦν εἴχομεν, ἀλλά τι έδει ἡμᾶς ποιείν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδία, ἡ ὑμνεῖν τὸ δίον, και Αυθημεν, κα ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χέρια; ὁ ἐκ τὸν ἢ σκύπλουτος και ο ενας καὶ ἐσθίολας ἦσειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν Jaba Méyrog & Seng, by warsye & you caûra di' da mia pār iepazijuûaş Miyes & Jils, öze Xalons diównor, &c. 'Arrian, lib. I. cap. 16. contrary |