intent of Congress before interpreting this novel requirement. The limited legislative history of the amended section 305(b) yields two indications of congressional judgment on the standards we should apply in carrying out our duty under this section, both of which appear in the Conference Report on the 1973 Act (House of Representative Report No. 93-587, October 12, 1973). On page 14 of the Conference Report, it is stated that this Commission is to issue the required certificate if a proposed auto-ferry service "will not unduly impair the ability of Amtrak to reduce its losses or increase its revenues." [Emphasis supplied.] The word "unduly" does not appear in the statute. However, we believe the use of this term in the report accompanying the final draft of the bill is an indication that Congress did not intend us to deny a certificate to a proposed auto-ferry service on the grounds of any trivial or transitory potential damage to Amtrak.

The second indication of congressional intention with respect to our findings under section 305(b) is the sentence which directly follows the quotation in the preceding paragraph; "The burden of proving that such impairment would not occur would not be on the applicant for the certificate." It is clear from this sentence that we would be ignoring the congressional intention as expressed in the Conference Report if we placed a burden on Auto-Train of proving that Amtrak's financial condition would not be impaired by the proposed Louisville-Sanford route. If a "burden of proof" exists, it may be said to lie on Amtrak, or perhaps the Commission. However, we need not decide this question here. Amtrak has declined to present any evidence of impairment and has, in fact, withdrawn its protest after "having weighed all the relevant legal and factual issues" and obtained Auto-Train's agreement to waive any contractual rights it may have to object to Amtrak's proposed autoferry service.

While the withdrawal of its protest may not, ipso facto, settle the issue of impairment, Amtrak's action is certainly highly persuasive that such impairment is not anticipated by those in the best position to evaluate the economic consequences of the proposed Auto-Train service, i.e., Amtrak's management. It may be assumed, at a minimum, that the management of Amtrak does not believe the Auto-Train service will "unduly impair the ability of Amtrak to reduce its losses or increase its revenues," as stated in the Conference Report on the 1973 Act. In fact, it is quite apparent that Amtrak obtained a quid pro quo in the Auto-Train waiver of contractual rights which might otherwise have encumbered

Amtrak's proposed initiation of auto-ferry service between Indianapolis and Poinciana. Accordingly, a denial of the subject applications on the grounds that the Auto-Train service will impair Amtrak's financial capabilities would achieve the awkward result of the Commission insisting on injury and the supposedly injured party claiming none.

It is not necessary, however, to rely solely on the failure of Amtrak to object to the applications since other factors exist which indicate that the probable absence of impairment to Amtrak's ability to increase its revenues and reduce its losses. Certain of these factors relate to Amtrak's passenger service and others to Amtrak's proposed auto-ferry service.

With respect to rail passenger service, Amtrak's train, the "Floridian," runs daily between Chicago, Ill., and either St. Petersburg or Miami in Florida. This train stops at both Louisville, Ky., and Sanford, Fla., the termini of the proposed Auto-Train service. In evaluating the effect of the Auto-Train service on the Floridian, we believe that the results of a survey conducted by AutoTrain of its passengers on its Alexandria-Sanford route are relevant. By way of extrapolation, these figures can give some guide or comparison as to the extent of a competitive market between Amtrak and Auto-Train. In response to the survey, 67 percent of the passengers said that, had Auto-Train's service been available, they would have driven; 20 percent would have gone by air, and 12 percent would not have made the trip. Less than 1 percent indicated they would have otherwise used an intercity passenger train. While the foregoing indicates there may be a negligible loss of traffic to the Floridian, there is evidence which suggests that the Auto-Train service may actually benefit Amtrak by arousing consumer interest in rail passenger traffic generally. Following the inauguration of the present Auto-Train Alexandria-Sanford service in December 1971, Amtrack has experienced large gains in traffic aboard its regular passenger trains. For the period from May to December 1972, Amtrak ridership on its Florida trains increased by 11 percent over May to December 1971. (Amtrak commenced service on May 1, 1971.) In 1973, Amtrak's ridership on its Florida trains rose 29 percent over 1972.

Turning to the question whether the applicant's projected service will damage the prospects of Amtrak's proposed IndianapolisFlorida auto-ferry service, it would be mere speculation on our part to conclude that such damage would occur. From the limited

information furnished us, it would appear that so many operational and financial questions involving the Amtrak auto-ferry service are still to be resolved that no meaningful evaluation of the competitive potential of the two services can now be made. It would be inequitable to deny Auto-Train its opportunity on such a record. One feature of the Amtrak service which is now settled is its northern terminus, Indianapolis, Ind. With this point of origin, it will presumably have a competitive advantage over Auto-Train in serving customers from Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. It may well appear that there is more than sufficient traffic for two MidwestFlorida auto-ferry services to be profitable. If the current gasoline shortage continues, this is a possible result. Furthermore, the existence of two auto-ferry services could stimulate interest in, and foster acceptance of, this mode of travel among travelers between the Midwestern States and Florida. This phenomenon appears to have occurred in connection with conventional rail passenger service as pointed out above.

In light of the foregoing, we find that the Louisville-Sanford autoferry service proposed to be operated by Auto-Train will not impair the ability of Amtrak to reduce its losses or to increase its revenues. On the basis of the evidence described in the earlier section of this report entitled "Need For Service," and considering the fact that there is no opposition to Auto-Train's proposal, we also find that the Louisville-Sanford service proposed to be operated by Auto-Train "is required to meet the demands of the public," as such terms are used in the 1973 Act. In making these findings we have considered the "Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose" set forth at the beginning of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (to which the 1973 Act was an amendment), and we believe our action herein is fully in accord with, and in furtherance of, this declaration of congressional policy. Section 1 of the 1970 Act reads, in part, as follows:

SEC. 101 CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION PURPOSE. The Congress finds that modern, efficient, intercity railroad passenger service is a necessary part of a balanced transportation system; that the public convenience and necessity require the continuance and improvement of such service to provide fast and comfortable transportation between crowded urban areas and in other areas of the country; that rail passenger service can help to end the congestion on our highways and the overcrowding of airways and airports; that the traveler in America should to the maximum extent feasible have freedom to choose the mode of travel most convenient to his needs.

Based upon the material set forth above under "Need for Service," we conclude that there is a definite public need for an auto-train service between Louisville, Ky., and Sanford, Fla., and that AutoTrain should be issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity pursuant to the provisions of section 1(18) of the act. The Operating Agreement between SCL, L&N, and Auto-Train will be consistent with the public interest as required by section 5(2) of the act. The allocation of costs under the agreement is designed to permit Auto-Train an adequate return on its investment and will adequately compensate the operators for the operating expenses incurred. This allocation has apparently proved to be satisfactory to the parties in the case of the Alexandria-Sanford route. SCL and L&N have adequate resources to meet their obligations under the agreement without interfering with their ability to conduct their other carrier operations. Fixed charges will be incurred solely by Auto-Train as a result of the interest payments under the credit agreement described above, the terms of which we find to be just and reasonable.

The Railway Executives' Association has filed a statement objecting to the grant of the subject applications, unless the Commission imposes the same conditions for the protection of the SCL and L&N employees as are set forth in Oklahoma Ry. Co. Trustees Abandonment, 257 I.C.C. 177. These conditions were imposed by us when we approved the Alexandria-Sanford route and the applicants have indicated their willingness to accept these conditions in operating the Louisville-Sanford route. Accordingly, we shall require that SCL and L&N railroad employees be given the protection of the Oklahoma conditions. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is also opposed to the grant of these applications unless SCL and L&N execute agreements comparable to the implementing agreement of November 24, 1971, between SCL and the Brotherhood, which sets forth specific protective conditions relating to the existing Auto-Train route. Applicants are willing to negotiate such an agreement in reference to the proposed route, and we will make it a condition of our approval of this transaction that the SCL and L&N and representatives of their railroad employees meet for the purpose of reaching an agreement containing specific labor protective conditions similar to those set forth in the agreement of November 24, 1971, and, if no agreement is reached within 90 days from the effective date of the order herein, the matter shall be referred to the Commission for imposition of appropriate conditions. In our report on the Alexandria-Sanford

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route, 342 I.C.C. 533, 542, we imposed no conditions for the protection of Auto-Train employees on the grounds that Auto-Train could not acquire carrier status until the transactions authorized in that report were consummated and, therefore, it had no railroad employees entitled to be protected. At this point in time, however, there appears to be no justification for denying Auto-Train employees the protection required by section 5(2)(f) of the act, and we impose the Oklahoma conditions for the benefit of such AutoTrain employees.

An envorinmental threshold assessment survey has been prepared by this Commission and made available for public inspection upon request. The survey found that approval of the application here in would have beneficial impact on the environment but that such impact would not be significant. By order of the Commission, Commissioner Tuggle, dated February 14, 1974, it was determined that, based on the aforesaid threshold assessment survey, no environmental impact statement need be issued in this proceeding as it does not represent a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. Appropriate public notice of this determination was given and the Commission has received no comments on such determination.

FINDINGS

(1) In Finance Docket No. 27508, we find that under section 1(18) of the Interstate Commerce Act the present and future public convenience and necessity require operation by Auto-Train Corporation, of a combined rail passenger automobile transport service between Louisville, Ky., on the one hand, and, on the other, Sanford, Fla.

(2) In Finance Docket No. 27525 we find that, subject to the conditions for the protection of SCL and L&N employees, the operating agreement between SCL, L&N, and Auto-Train providing for the rail operation by SCL and L&N of the properties of AutoTrain and the acquisition by Auto-Train of trackage rights over certain lines of SCL and L&N, as described here inabove, is a transaction within the scope of section 5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act; that the terms and conditions are just and reasonable; and that the transaction will be consistent with the public interest.

An appropriate order will be entered.

347 I.C.C.