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See Contracts XX.
See Overtime Pay I, II, III, IV, V, VI.
See Contracts XIV XV. XVI.
See Damages I, II.
See Contracts XVI.
OPA CEILING PRICES.
See Just Compensation II, III, IV, V, VII.
I. The situation of the plaintiff in the instant case is identi-
cal with that of the plaintiff, who was given a judg-
ment, in Townsley v. United States, 101 C. Cls. 237,
which was affirmed, 323 U. S. 557, and under ordinary
circumstances the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
under the precedent of the Townsley decision, but in
order to permit the Government to present evidence
and argument which were not presented fully, if at all,
in the Townsley case, and because of the importance
of the question, the court has given a complete re-
consideration to the issues involved, in the right of addi-
tional evidence and the new or modified arguments
presented by the Government; and upon such reconsid-
eration the decision in the Toronsley case is reaffirmed.
II. Plaintiff, an employee of the Panama Canal, who worked
on floating equipment and who was paid on the basis
of an annual salary, is entitled to recover overtime
compensation at the rate of time and one-half for
hours of work in excess of 40 hours per week, under the
provisions of Section 23 of the Act of March 28, 1934
(48 Stat. 522; 5 U. S. C. 673c). Id.
III. Where there was a wage board, appointed by the Governor
of the Canal Zone to advise him as to what should be
the wages of workmen whose wages were not set by
or pursuant to statutory classifications; and where this
board, pursuant to the Governor's order creating it,
only made recommendations to the Governor, who him-
self fixed the wages; and where in this respect the
board's function was identical with that of the various
wage boards set up in governmental establishments in
the United States where persons were employed in
the mechanical trades and were not covered by the
Classification Act; it is held that the wage board ap-
pointed by the Governor was à wage board within
the meaning of Section 23 of the Act of March 28,
1934, and its recommendations with respect to plain-
tiff and other"floating equipment" employees were
within the contemplation of the Act. Id.
IV. The ruling of the Comptroller General, which was fol-
lowed by the Governor of the Canal Zone, to the effect
that Section 23 was not applicable to floating equip
ment employees, on the ground that their compensa-
tion was not fixed by a wage board, was based on a
misapprehension of the facts and is not controlling. Id.
V. The contention of the Government that Section 23 is
not applicable to employees, otherwise within its scope,
whose compensation is fixed on a monthly basis was
vigorously presented to the Court of Claims in the
T'oronsley case (101 C. Cls. 253–263) and to the Su-
preme Court (323 U. S. 503-573) and did not per-
suade either court; and has no administrative con-
struction nor practice to support it. Id.
VI. Where the rulings of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army, the Comptroller General of the United States
and the United States Attorney for the Canal Zone, as
to the interpretation of Section 23 of the Act of March
28, 1934, were confusing and unclear; and where the
Government itself in the instant case and in the Torons-
ley litigation has found it difficult to analyze the prob-
lems and produce the evidence sufficient to determine
whether or not plaintiff had rights under the statute;
it would be quite unfair to hold that a workman such
as the plaintiff did not see his statutory rights with
sufficient clarity to insist upon them promptly and
VII. Under the terms of the Act of 1942, the Act of 1943, and
regulations issued thereunder, providing for overtime
pay at time and one-half in certain circumstances and
additional compensation in lieu of overtime in certain
cases; it is held that plaintiffs are not entitled to re-
cover overtime compensation in excess of the amounts
which have been allowed and paid them for the periods
involved. 56 Stat. 1068; 57 Stat. 75. Conn et al, 422.
VIII. Plaintiffs were employed as civilian firefighters at an
Army Air Base and their salaries were fixed on an
annual basis. During the periods covered by the claims
for additional overtime pay, plaintiffs worked under
the two-platoon system, which consisted of regular
scheduled tours of duty of 24 hours on duty, followed
by 24 hours off duty, but in each 24 hours on duty
8 hours was designated for rest and sleep except when
interrupted by fire drills and by fire alarms. These
interruptions were irregular and were compensated for
by additional time for rest and sleep. The evidence
shows, upon analysis, that plaintiffs were actually
working approximately 3812 hours during each week
while on their tours of 24 hours on duty and 24 hours
off duty. It is held that under the applicable statutes
and regulations the plaintiffs were properly classified
as employees whose "hours of duty" were intermittent
or irregular and were paid overtime accordingly. Id.
IX. Congress prescribed the standards for the classification
of employees for overtime pay purposes but left the
decision as to what specific groups should come within
the respective classifications to be determined by
“necessary and proper" regulations to be prescribed
by the President, the Civil Service Commission and the
heads of departments; and regulations so prescribed
have the force and effect of law unless clearly beyond
the authority conferred or unless they produce a result
clearly different from that intended by Congress. Id.
OYSTERS AND OYSTER BEDS.
Under the provisions of the Act of August 30, 1935, the Court finds
that plaintiff's oysters were in part destroyed and in part dam-
aged by dredging operations and mine-testing operations car-
ried on by the Government in the Patuxent River, and dam-
ages are awarded in the nature of a jury verdict. Seipp, 210..
I. Plaintiffs, executors respectively, of Bunn and Richard-
son, attorneys, produced evidence to show that the in-
ventor, Garand, in 1919, made a contract with Bunn
and Richardson, agreeing to give them a certain per-
centage of sums realized for assignment, sale or li-
cense of any patents relating to an automatic rifle,
which he might obtain during the life of the contract.
In 1936 and subsequently, Garand, then an employe
of the Government, without the knowledge of Bunn
and Richardson, made assignments to the Government
of all his rights in patents obtained by him, and to
be obtained, under certain applications for patents on
inventions relating to automatic rifles. Plaintiffs claim
this constituted a taking by the Government of the
interest of Bunn and Richardson in the patents. It
is held that the proof fails to show that defendant had
proper notice of Garand's contract of 1919 with Bunn
and Richardson at the time it accepted assignments of
of the patents. Being ignorant of plaintiffs' rights, a
promise to pay them compensation as for a taking
cannot be implied by the defendant's acceptance of
the assignments from Garand. Tempel v. United
States, 248 U. S. 121. Burke and Herbert Bank and
Trust Co., Adm., 108.
II. Not only were the assignments from Garand, in 1836,
taken in actual ignorance of plaintiffs' rights, if any,
but there was nothing to charge the defendant with
knowledge of the contract of 1919 between Garand
and Bunn and Richardson. Id.
III. Knowledge acquired by one agent of a principal will not
be imputed to the principal in a subsequent transac-
tion negotiated by another agent unless it was the
duty of the first agent to transmit the knowledge to
his principal. Id.
IV. In the instant case, notice to a subordinate officer of the
War Department in 1919 is not sufficient to bind the
Department in a transaction in 1936, unless there was
a duty on the officer receiving the notice to make a
record of the fact in such a way as to bring it to the
attention of the officers in later years who might be
called to deal with the matter; and there is no proof
that there was any such duty. Id.
V. When, after the assignment in 1936 to the War Depart.
ment by Garand, the Department received notice of
the 1919 contract, and the Department thereafter regis-
tered the assignment with the Patent Office; the regis-
tration of the assignment could not give rise to an
implied promise to pay to the plaintiffs compensation
for the taking of their interests in the patents, be
cause at the time the assignment was recorded the
defendant held the patents under a claim of right
arising from the assignment by Garand. The regis-
tration of the assignment was not an acquistion of any
rights in the patents but was merely notice of rights
already acquired. Id.
VI. The court having held that for want of notice, the defend-
ant is not liable for the taking of plaintiffs' interest, it
any, in the Garand patents; the court does not decide
whether or not the contract of 1919 with Garand gave
plaintiffs an interest in the patents, for the taking of
which the defendant would have been obligated to pay
to plaintiffs just compensation. Id.
PAY AND ALLOWANCES.
I. Plaintiff, an unmarried officer of the United States Coast
Guard, without dependents, who was performing the
duties of an aviator engaged in antisubmarine warfare
in the Gulf of Mexico, and whose planes were land-
PAY AND ALLOWANCES-Continued
based, and who had certain shore duties which were
incidental to his duties in combat; although he had
received an increase in pay on the ground that he
was performing sea duty as such duty was defined by
the head of his department, under section 2 of the
Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, was entitled to rental
allowance under section 6 of the Pay Readjustment Act
and the Executive Order 9255 prescribing regulations
pursuant to said section 6; and is entitled to recover.
II. The determination of the head of the department, under
which the plaintiff received increased pay for sea
duty, was final, under section 2 of the Pay Readjust-
ment Act. Id.
III. Under Executive Order 9255, issued pursuant to section
6 of the Pay Readjustment Act, providing that “the
term 'sea duty' shall mean service at sea by an officer
on a vessel under orders,” etc., the plaintiff, who was
not performing service at sea on board a vessel, was
not on sea duty as regards rental allowance. Id.
IV. “Sea Duty" is not a self-defining term and neither the
President nor the head of the department was defining
the term in a universal sense. Their definitions were
in authorized aid of separate statutory provisions, one
directed to the housing of an officer and the other to
the hazardous nature of his duties. Id.
V. An officer in the Coast Guard who occupied a house
furnished to him by the Government, the rental of
which was deducted from his pay, is entitled to re-
tired pay based on his salary without deductions, under
the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1926 (44 Stat.
161), reenacted and made permanent by the Act of
March 5, 1918 (45 Stat. 162, 193). Ockenfels, 150.
See Taking I, II, III, IV.
See Contracts XLIV.
See Rental of Property by Government VI.
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT.
See Contracts XV, XVI.
REFORMATION OF RELEASE.
See Contracts XIV, XV, XVI.
See Contracts XIV, XV, XVI.
RENT, DEDUCTION FOR.
See Pay and Allowances V.